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The Quanturn Picture of the World

Lawrence Sklar

Published Dec 17, 1992• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Quantum theory has presented scientists and philosophers of science with a series of perplexing questions. It seems to many that any attempt to comprehend a world described by quantum theory will require revision in our understanding of the nature of things far more radical than the revision in our understanding of the nature of space and time demanded by the theories of relativity. It has been claimed that to comprehend quantum theory we must revise our very understanding of such matters as the objective nature of reality and its independence from our perception of it, the nature of a complex system and its relation to its components, and the nature of causal and other kinds of determination in the world.

DOI
10.1093/oso/9780198751380.003.0004

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The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review•Jan 1, 1956•1 citation
Abstract Quantum theory has presented scientists and philosophers of science with a series of perplexing questions. It seems to many that any attempt to comprehend a world described by quantum theory will require revision in our understanding of the nature of things far more radical than the revision in our understanding of the nature of space and time demanded by the theories of relativity. It has been claimed that to comprehend quantum theory we must revise our very understanding of such matters as the objective nature of reality and its independence from our perception of it, the nature of a complex system and its relation to its components, and the nature of causal and other kinds of determination in the world.
It has become ever more clear over the past 70 years that reality is best described by a theory that no one fully understands and which cannot be applied to most everyday phenomena. Quantum theory has been subjected to many stringent tests and all of its predictions, however strange, have always been borne out. Originally developed to account for why atoms do not collapse and why they radiate and absorb energy in discrete amounts (quanta), it has now gone far beyond these rather simple beginnings. It is essentially a mathematical theory, so trying to describe it in words is analogous to transforming a picture into a poem. Inaccuracies, distortions and over-simplifications inevitably creep in. Nevertheless, one can convey the essence of the picture, and that is what is attempted here. Some grasp of what the material world is really like, and of the unfamiliar ways in which it can behave, is probably necessary to reaching an understanding of awareness and is certainly needed to comprehend the experimental evidence set out in Chapter 5.
What does not satisfy me in that theory [quantum mechanics], from the standpoint of principle, is its attitude towards that which appears to me to be the programmatic aim of all physics: the complete description of any (individual) real situation (as it supposedly exists irrespective of any act of observation or substantiation). Albert Einstein, Reply to Criticisms [This] implies the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear . In fact, the individuality of the typical quantum effects finds its proper expression in the circumstance that any attempt of subdividing the phenomena will demand a change in the experimental arrangement introducing new possibilities of interaction between objects and measuring instruments which in principle cannot be controlled. Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects. Indeed the finite interaction between object and measuring agencies conditioned by the very existence of the quantum of action entails – because of the impossibility of controlling the reaction of the object on the measuring instruments, if these are to serve their purpose – the necessity of a final renunciation of the classical idea of causality and a radical revision of our attitude towards the problem of physical reality. […]
Despite scholarly consensus on the empirical facts, ever since its inception in the 1920s there has been deep disagreement about how to interpret quantum theory. “To interpret a physical theory is to say what the world would be like, if the theory were true.” All scientific theories require interpretation, since strictly speaking what they describe are our experiences of the world rather than the world itself. Thus, whether we are trying to explain or merely describe the world, we are always engaged in inference. To make inferences we need a context for interpretation. For any given claim this context is provided locally by related theories, more broadly by disciplinary paradigms, and ultimately by worldview claims about the nature of reality. The challenge in interpreting scientific theories is to integrate them into this hierarchy of knowledge. Usually this is not too difficult. New theories often require adjustments to nearby theories, but in doing so we can rely on paradigms to make them cohere. More rarely paradigmatic assumptions are themselves challenged, but in that case scientists can fall back on their worldview to make sense of the needed changes. By implication, the most difficult interpretive problems arise when our worldview is called into question, which leaves us without any frame of reference on which to fall back. Quantum theory poses a worldview problem. Prior to the quantum revolution the classical worldview could not be tested scientifically and so it was essentially metaphysical. Even though it corresponded to our experience of material objects, we lacked proof that it adequately represented the deep structure of reality. By giving us access to that deep structure for the first time, quantum mechanics made it possible to do such a test, or “experimental metaphysics.” Unfortunately, the results seemed to contradict classical assumptions, at least on the sub-atomic level.
Abstract Quantum theory provides a superb description of physical reality on a small scale, yet it contains many mysteries. Without doubt, it is hard to come to terms with the workings of this theory, and it is particularly difficult to make sense of the kind of ‘physical reality’—or lack of it—that it seems to imply for our world. Taken at its face value, the theory seems to lead to a philosophical standpoint that many (including myself) find deeply unsatisfying. At best, and taking its descriptions at their most literal, it provides us with a very strange view of the world indeed. At worst, and taking literally the proclamations of some of its most famous protagonists, it provides us with no view of the world at all.
In this chapter, I offer some personal reflections about the nature of reality, shaped by my work as a quantum physicist, my experimentation with psychedelic drugs during the 1960s, and my more recent studies of modern cognitive science. Traditionally, questions about the essential nature of reality are asked by philosophers. In the twentieth century, these questions were asked for the first time by scientists as well. During the first three decades of the century, the exploration of the atomic and subatomic world brought physicists in contact with a strange and unexpected reality that shattered the foundations of their worldview and forced them to think in entirely new ways. Quantum physics showed scientists “a new reality,” and from that time on, the nature of reality became a popular subject of discussion not only in philosophy but also in science. In recent decades, cognitive scientists took another radical step in the scientific conception of the nature of reality. They asserted that the features of our ordinary, everyday reality are not features of an independently existing world, but are created in the very process of perception. In a way this generalizes the influence of the act of perception on the perceived object, which was famously analyzed in quantum physics by Werner Heisenberg, to everyday perception. In other words, even our everyday reality is just one of many alternate realities.
THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE THROUGH MOTION AND MATTER THE most fundamental questions which are raised in modern science are concerned with matter and energy. which are said to be different aspects of the same reality. This reality is described in terms of particles and waves, and there is good experimental evidence for both. Particles can be recognized by their tracks in a photographic emulsion or in a cloud chamber, and they can be recorded with a Geiger counter. Diffraction and interference phenomena serve for the study of the continuous field or wave character of matter, which is manifested not only by light but also by electrons, neutrons and protons. Thus particles appear as waves and waves as particles: the two seem inseparable. Yet the difficulty of combining these two aspects of things in a unified picture is so great that it has been called the main stumbling block which prevents the formation of a stable and certain concept of matter. It has been suggested that the particles may be more or less temporary entities within the wave field whose form and behavior are determined by the laws of the waves themselves, which in certain cases permit waves to appear as if they were permanent substantial beings. Or perhaps the wa.ve field is merely a device for computing the probability of finding a particle of given properties at a given position. At any rate most theoreticians will probably admit that the individual particle is not a well-defined and permanent entity whose identity or sameness can be detected experimentally. In a word, the modern analysis of matter leaves us uncertain whether the world is a system o£ waves or particles or both. The only thing which seems certain is that there are no welldefined and permanent entities. This picture of physical reality may at first seem very dis219 WILLIAM H. KANE concerting and quite opposed to ordinary ways of thinking. For reassurance we may take hasty refuge in the common view that nothing is certain in science, nothing finaL New data will surely be uncovered, and new principles will be formulated. After all, science gives us only a tentative and partial view which is always subject to revision and revaluation. But the hypotheses of science are not opposed to previous valid findings. On the contrary, agreement with the data of experience is what validates a scientific principle. When new data exceed the limits of former principles, new hypotheses must be formulated which include as special cases the facts and correlations already established. The primary datum of our sensory experience is the fact of change in the world around us and in us. When we realize that we ourselves were born and will die; that we came into being and will cease to be in this world at least; that not only organisms of all kinds but also the chemical compounds are generated and corrupted, why is it surprising to be told by modern scientists that even the chemical atoms and the elementary particles of which they are composed are not permanent entities but transitory things? Perhaps it is because we had become accustomed to think of the atoms as indestructible building blocks out of which all bodies are made. Perhaps there is also a deeper reason for wonder. If everything is changing, how can there be anything even relatively permanent in the world? ·what are air and water, rocks and trees, animals and men? How can there even be change? Can there be a wave without something waving? How can anything come to be and cease to be in this world? To these questions there is no certain answer in modern science. Yet these are the very questions which the primary data of experience raise in our minds. If we desire a fundamental understanding of natural things we must account for change. We must explain in terms of its own proper principles what a changeable thing is and how it comes into being and ceases to be. It is not customary in modern science to look for basic prin- THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE 221 ciples. Often we are told by philosophers of science and scientific methodology...