Abstract Complementarity is the idea that mutually exclusive pictures are needed for a complete description of quantummechanical reality. The paradigm example is the complementarity between particle and wave (or ‘spacetime’ and ‘causal’) pictures, which Bohr took to be reflected in the uncertainty relation LixLip 2: h. Bohr saw this relation as defining the latitude of applicability of the concepts of position and momentum to a single system, not just as putting a limit on our ability to predict the values of both position and momentum within an ensemble of identically prepared systems. Furthermore, right at the start of his celebrated reply to the EinsteinPodolsky Rosen (EPR) argument against the completeness of quantum the
Abstract Complementarity is the idea that mutually exclusive pictures are needed for a complete description of quantummechanical reality. The paradigm example is the complementarity between particle and wave (or ‘spacetime’ and ‘causal’) pictures, which Bohr took to be reflected in the uncertainty relation LixLip 2: h. Bohr saw this relation as defining the latitude of applicability of the concepts of position and momentum to a single system, not just as putting a limit on our ability to predict the values of both position and momentum within an ensemble of identically prepared systems. Furthermore, right at the start of his celebrated reply to the EinsteinPodolsky Rosen (EPR) argument against the completeness of quantum the
This article explores Bohr's argument, advanced under the heading of 'complementarity,' concerning quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, and its physical and philosophical implications.In Bohr, the term complementarity designates both a particular concept and an overall interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, in part grounded in this concept.While the argument of this article is primarily philosophical, it will also address, historically, the development and transformations of Bohr's thinking, under the impact of the development of quantum theory and Bohr's confrontation with Einstein, especially their exchange concerning the EPR experiment, proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in 1935.Bohr's interpretation was progressively characterized by a more radical epistemology, in its ultimate form, which was developed in the 1930s and with which I shall be especially concerned here, defined by his new concepts of phenomenon and atomicity.According to this epistemology, quantum objects are seen as indescribable and possibly even as inconceivable, and as manifesting their existence only in the effects of their interactions with measuring instruments upon those instruments, effects that define phenomena in Bohr's sense.The absence of causality is an automatic consequence of this epistemology.I shall also consider how probability and statistics work under these epistemological conditions.
To resolve the challenges (paradoxes) attending the genesis of quantum theory, Niels Bohr in 1927 proposed a generalization of the conceptual framework of classical physics, termed complementarity, which posited pairs of classical concepts that could be manifested only in mutually exclusive experimental arrangements with both needed to embrace the full range of physical experience. In this context particle–wave complementarity has encountered two major obstacles; (1) No formulation of it has commanded a general consensus; and (2) empirical evidence abounds that contradicts the claim of mutual exclusivity of particle and wave properties of quantum objects in a single experiment. These problems are rooted in the unrestricted scope of this claim. It is shown that a restricted version of particle–wave complementarity, here called “which value–interference” complementarity, is consistent with observations, is naturally contained in the mathematical formalism of quantum theory and, in fact, holds in any representation of quantum theory defined by the eigenvectors of a complete set of commuting observables, such as the configuration space position (kinematic) variables or the complementary linear momentum (dynamic) variables. Thus, the which value–interference form of particle–wave complementarity exists within kinematic–dynamic complementarity, a “layered” complementarity, so to speak. It is hoped that a consistent and valid exposition of particle–wave complementarity will be helpful to those who find the framework of complementarity useful and appropriate for some purpose.
Complementarity, e.g., the wave–particle duality of nature, lies at the heart of quantum mechanics. It distinguishes the world of quantum phenomena from the reality of classical physics. In the 1920s, quantum theory as we know it today was still new, and examples used to illustrate complementarity emphasized the position (particle-like) and momentum (wave-like) attributes of a quantum mechanical object, be it a photon or a massive particle. This is the historical reason why complementarity is often superficially identified with the so-called wave-particle duality of matter . Complementarity, however, is a more general concept. We say that two observables are complementary if precise knowledge of one of them implies that all possible outcomes of measuring the other one are equally probable. We may illustrate this by two extreme examples. The first example consists of the position and momentum (along one direction) of a particle: if, say, the position is predetermined then the result of a momentum measurement cannot be predicted, all momentum values are equally probable (in a large range). The second extreme involves two orthogonal spin components of a spin- 1/2 particle: if, say, the vertical spin component has a definite value ( up or down ) then upon measuring a horizontal component both values ( left or right , for instance) are found, each with a probability of 50%. Thus, in the microcosmos complete knowledge in the sense of classical physics is not available. The classic example of the merger of wave and particle behavior is provided by Young's double-slit experiment.
After summarising a previously given analysis of Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR), this chapter endorses the claim made by Everett himself that Everettian quantum mechanics `in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr'. On the one hand, it shows how Everett's theory provides a reconstruction of Bohr's viewpoint of complementarity as applied to the EPR case and a justi�cation of his criticism of EPR's `criterion of reality'. On the other hand, it includes a notion of physical reality that is independent of any observational context, and suggests a remaining shortcoming of Bohr's reply.
Updating the wave-particle duality Maria C. Bosca e-mail: bosca@ugr.es Departamento de Fisica Atomica, Molecular y Nuclear Universidad de Granada E-18071. Granada Spain The wave-particle-duality, the fundamental component of the new quantum formalism in Bohr’s opinion, must be reformulated by incorporating the results of some experiments accomplished in the last decades of twentieth century. The Bohr´s complementarity principle stated the mutual exclusiveness and joint full completeness of the two (classical) descriptions of quantum systems; after Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen’paper, the wave-particle duality, or wave-particle complementarity, could be expressed by stating that it is impossible to build up an experimental arrangement in which we observe at the same time both corpuscular and wave aspects. In a two-slit experiment, they would correspond, respectively, to the which-way knowledge and the observation of interference pattern. Bohr showed this mutual exclusivity in numerous examples , and linked it to the unavoidable disturbance inherent in any measurement event. In quantum mechanical formalism, the complementarity principle has a clear mathematical expression: two observables are complementary if precise knowledge of one of them implies that all possible outcomes of the other are equally probable; their extension to classical concepts (as wave and particle) is not concerned. In 1991 Scully et al published a variant of the two-slit experiment that incorporates two micromasers cavities and a laser beam to provide which-path information without net momentum transferred during the interaction ; the impossibility of know which slit an atom went through and still observe the interference fringes is preserved by the establishing of quantum correlations between the measuring apparatus and the system being observed. They claimed that complementarity, of which wave-particle duality would be to them a manifestation, is more fundamental than the uncertainty principle . In 1996 B-G. Englert, following an approach originally due to Wooters and Zurek , derived , without making use of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation, an inequality that quantifies the mutual compatibility relation between fringe visibility and which-way information. The inequality, that they denominated as “interferometric duality”, has the expression D^2 + V^2 ≤ 1, where D stands for the distinguishability of the ways and V for the fringe visibility; both of them are mathematical expressions that can be measured to check experimentally the inequality . Today, it is clear that intermediate particle-wave behaviours exist and, in addition to that, there are single experiments in which both classical wave-like and particle-like behaviours are showed total and simultaneously on an individual system. For instance, in the Bose’s double-prism experiment , tunnelling and perfect anticoincidence were observed in single photon states. Consequently, the meaning of the wave-particle duality must incorporate the simultaneous use of the two classical descriptions in the interpretation of experiments, loosing their original mutual exclusivity , which is incorporated as an extreme case in the new interferometric duality, a continuous quantum concept . The wave-particle duality, therefore, must be formulated as an interpretative addition to quantum mechanics, to which is possible to renounce if any pretension of visualize quantum phenomena in terms of classical concepts and intuitions is abandoned.
The article offers a rereading of Bohr’s reply to the argument of A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen (EPR) concerning the incompleteness, or else nonlocality, of quantum mechanics. Bohr shows EPR’s argument to be deficient on their own terms, by virtue of an ambiguity found in their application of the criterion of reality they propose to the phenomena in question. He also offers an alternative interpretation of the EPR experiment itself, the thought experiment proposed by EPR, as part of his overall interpretation of quantum mechanics as complementarity.