In this paper, a novel hierarchical game framework for physical layer security (PLS) with dynamic trilateral coalitions is studied. In the considered system, legitimate users (LUs) aim to transmit secret data to associated base stations (BSs) via uplink communications under the threat of eavesdroppers (EVs), while there also exists jammers (JAs) which may choose to form coalitions with either LUs for increasing their secrecy transmission rates or EVs for increasing their eavesdropping rates in exchange for potential rewards. Different from the existing work, we explore such complicated while dynamic coalition relationships under the uncertainties of wireless systems (e.g., time-varying channel conditions), and formulate a hierarchical game integrated with a dynamic trilateral coalition formation game to model the strategic interactions among all three parties, i.e., LUs, JAs and EVs, in PLS. Particularly, we first analyze stability conditions of the trilateral coalitions. On top of this, we further propose a deep reinforcement learning (DRL) based approach for reaching the equilibrium with long-term performance guarantees for the hierarchical game. Simulations evaluate the proposed solution and show its superiority over counterparts.
In this paper, a novel hierarchical game framework for physical layer security (PLS) with dynamic trilateral coalitions is studied. In the considered system, legitimate users (LUs) aim to transmit secret data to associated base stations (BSs) via uplink communications under the threat of eavesdroppers (EVs), while there also exists jammers (JAs) which may choose to form coalitions with either LUs for increasing their secrecy transmission rates or EVs for increasing their eavesdropping rates in exchange for potential rewards. Different from the existing work, we explore such complicated while dynamic coalition relationships under the uncertainties of wireless systems (e.g., time-varying channel conditions), and formulate a hierarchical game integrated with a dynamic trilateral coalition formation game to model the strategic interactions among all three parties, i.e., LUs, JAs and EVs, in PLS. Particularly, we first analyze stability conditions of the trilateral coalitions. On top of this, we further propose a deep reinforcement learning (DRL) based approach for reaching the equilibrium with long-term performance guarantees for the hierarchical game. Simulations evaluate the proposed solution and show its superiority over counterparts.
In this paper, a novel hierarchical game framework for physical layer security (PLS) aware wireless communications with dynamic trilateral coalitions is studied. In the considered system, legitimate users (LUs) aim to transmit secret data to associated base stations (BSs) via uplink communications under the threat of eavesdroppers (EVs), while there also exists jammers (JAs) which may choose to form coalitions with either LUs for increasing their secrecy transmission rates or EVs for increasing their eavesdropping rates in exchange for potential rewards. Different from the existing work, we explore such complicated while dynamic coalition relationships under uncertainties of wireless systems (e.g., time-varying channel conditions), and formulate a hierarchical game integrated with a dynamic trilateral coalition formation game to model strategic interactions among LUs, JAs and EVs. Particularly, we first analyze stability conditions of the trilateral coalitions and propose a hedonic coalition selection and formation algorithm for reaching the stable coalition partition in each time slot. On top of this, we propose a deep reinforcement learning (DRL) based solution, which can achieve the equilibrium with long-term performance guarantees for the hierarchical game running over multiple time slots with dynamic evolutions. Simulations evaluate the proposed solution and show its superiority over counterparts.
This paper investigates a dynamic game framework for physical layer security (PLS)-aware wireless network with third-party collaborative users (TCUs). In the considered system, legitimate users (LUs) aim to transmit secret signals under the threat of eavesdroppers (EVs). There exists TCUs rationally selecting to form coalitions with LUs or EVs, strategically enhancing the secrecy transmission rates for LUs or increasing eavesdropping rates for EVs to obtain rewards. Due to the unpredictability of wireless systems (e.g., time-varying channel conditions, user mobility), coalitions among the three parties may be unfixed and dynamically changing. A hierarchical game integrating a matching subgame with a coalition formation subgame is formulated to model the interactions among LUs, EVs, and TCUs. In order to derive the optimal long-term strategies while solving the equilibrium of the hierarchical game, we first introduce a constrained Gale-Shapley algorithm which determines the optimal power, mode, and channel selections of TCUs with the known coalition partition, and then propose a coalition selection algorithm for reaching the stability of coalition partitions. Moreover, we develop a deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based solution to concatenate the aforementioned algorithms, producing the long-term optimal strategies for LUs, EVs and TCUs over multiple time slots. Simulations evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, and demonstrate its superiority over counterparts.
In this paper, we introduce third-party intelligent reflecting surfaces (TIRSs) into the physical layer security aware wireless communication system, where a central legitimate transmitter is designed to transmit secret signals to a group of legitimate receivers in the presence of the threat from an active eavesdropper (EV). Due to the channel reshaping ability of TIRSs, they are able to not only help legitimate pairs (LPs) enhance the secure transmission rate but also assist EV in improving the eavesdropping performance. Furthermore, with the potential selfishness, TIRSs may dynamically choose to ally with LPs or EV in exchange for potential benefits (e.g., payoffs). This leads to complex dynamic ally-adversary relationships among LPs, EV, and TIRSs under unpredictable wireless channel conditions. To address this issue, we formulate a repeated coalition formation game (RCFG) with dynamic decision-making to model the long-term strategic interactions among LPs, EV, and TIRSs. In particular, we theoretically analyze the existence of Nash equilibrium in the formulated RCFG, and then propose a switch operations-based coalition selection along with a deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based approach for obtaining such an equilibrium. Simulations examine the feasibility of the proposed approach and show its superiority over counterparts.
With the rapid evolution toward 6G networks, ensuring robust physical layer security (PLS) in highly dynamic and heterogeneous wireless environments has become a key challenge. Traditional security methods often struggle to adapt to time-varying channels, especially in the absence of perfect channel state information. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of node selection and power allocation in heterogeneous networks creates a complex hybrid action space operating across multiple timescales, significantly complicating the design of efficient and adaptive security strategies. To address this, this paper proposes a novel constrained hierarchical reinforcement learning (CHRL) framework for secure cooperative communications in next-generation wireless systems. The framework is designed to optimize secrecy performance within a hybrid action space comprising both discrete node selection and continuous power allocation, operating at different timescales. By hierarchically decoupling the joint optimization problem, the upper layer performs risk-aware node selection to maximize long-term secrecy capacity (SC) while guaranteeing a stable and secure link. At the lower layer, we develop a constrained MiniMax Multi-objective Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (M3DDPG) algorithm that optimizes power allocation considering worst-case conditions. Lagrange multipliers are integrated to enforce a strictly positive SC constraint throughout transmission, effectively preventing security outages. Simulation results under time-varying Rayleigh fading channels demonstrate that the proposed CHRL framework outperforms existing HRL methods, achieving up to 17% improvement in SC while strictly maintaining security constraints. These results validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach for enhancing PLS in next-generation cooperative wireless networks.
Recently, physical layer security has been recognized as a new design paradigm to provide security in wireless networks. In contrast to the existing conventional cryptographic methods, physical layer security exploits the dynamics of fading channels to enhance security of wireless communications. This paper studies optimization frameworks for a multicasting network in which a transmitter broadcasts the same information to a group of legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In particular, power minimization and secrecy rate maximization problems are investigated for a multicasting secrecy network. First, the power minimization problem is solved for different numbers of legitimate users and eavesdroppers. Next, the secrecy rate maximization problem is investigated with the help of private jammers to improve the achievable secrecy rates through a game theoretic approach. These jammers charge the transmitter for their jamming services based on the amount of interference caused to the eavesdroppers. For a fixed interference price scenario, a closed-form solution for the optimal interference requirement to maximize the revenue of the transmitter is derived. This rate maximization problem for a nonfixed interference price scenario is formulated as a Stackelberg game in which the jammers and transmitter are the leaders and follower, respectively. For the proposed game, a Stackelberg equilibrium is derived to maximize the revenues of both the transmitter and the private jammers. To support the derived theoretical results, simulation results are provided with different numbers of legitimate users and eavesdroppers. In addition, these results show that physical layer security based jamming schemes could be incorporated in emerging and future wireless networks to enhance the quality of secure communications.
Security is an issue of paramount importance, yet is it a significant challenge for wireless communications, which becomes more intricate when facing a full duplex (FD) active eavesdropper capable of performing eavesdropping and jamming simultaneously. In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security issue in the presence of an FD active eavesdropper, who launches jamming attacks to further improve the eavesdropping. The jamming, however, also results in self-interference at the eavesdropper itself. This security problem is formulated within a hierarchical game framework where the eavesdropper acts as the leader and the legitimate user is the follower. In particular, we first investigate the follower's secrecy rate maximization problem and derive the optimal legitimate transmission strategy. Then, the leader's wiretap rate maximization is expressed as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Leveraging the concavity of the follower's problem, we transform the MPEC problem into a single-level optimization and obtain the jamming power allocation strategy by applying the primal-dual interior-point method. Moreover, we analyze the situations where only partial channel state information is available at the legitimate user and the corresponding impacts on the game. Finally, we present extensive simulation results to validate our theoretical analysis.