The paper deals with a proposal and implementation of the quantum key distribution in the 5G campus network. The authors share here their practical experience with the implementation of quantum cryptography in 5G which has been achieved within projects the NATO QUANTUM5 and the Czech Ministry of Interior NeSPoQ, both project contributing to the security of 5G mobile networks. Finally, the results of the experimental research demonstrate how the network performance is affected by the use of QKD.
The paper deals with a proposal and implementation of the quantum key distribution in the 5G campus network. The authors share here their practical experience with the implementation of quantum cryptography in 5G which has been achieved within projects the NATO QUANTUM5 and the Czech Ministry of Interior NeSPoQ, both project contributing to the security of 5G mobile networks. Finally, the results of the experimental research demonstrate how the network performance is affected by the use of QKD.
Every attempt to access to the Internet through a Web browser, email sent, VPN connection, VoIP call, instant message or other use of telecommunications systems involves cryptographic techniques. The most commonly applied technique is asymmetric cryptography, which is generally executed in the background without the user even being aware. It establishes a cryptographic code based on the computational complexity of mathematical problems. However, this type of cryptography, which is widely used in today’s telecommunications systems, is under threat as electronics and computing rapidly develop. The development of fifth-generation cellular networks (5G) is gaining momentum, and given its wide field of application, security requires special attention. This is especially true faced with the development of quantum computers. One solution to this security challenge is to use more advanced techniques to establish cryptographic keys that are not susceptible to attack. An essential part of quantum cryptography, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) uses the principles of quantum physics to establish and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys between two geographically distant users. QKD establishes information-theoretically secure cryptographic keys that are resistant to eavesdropping when they are created. In this paper, we survey the security challenges and approaches in 5G networks concerning network protocols, interfaces and management organizations. We begin by examining the fundamentals of QKD and discuss the creation of QKD networks and their applications. We then outline QKD network architecture and its components and standards, following with a summary of QKD and post-quantum key distribution techniques and approaches for its integration into existing security frameworks such as VPNs (IPsec and MACsec). We also discuss the requirements, architecture and methods for implementing the FPGA-based encryptors needed to execute cryptographic algorithms with security keys. We discuss the performance and technologies of post-quantum cryptography, and finally, examine reported 5G demonstrations which have used quantum technologies, highlighting future research directions.
In recent years, 5G networks and services become progressively popular among telecommunication providers. Simultaneously, the growth in the usage and deployment of smartphone platforms and mobile applications have been seen as phenomenal. Therefore, this paper discusses the current state of the art of 5G technology in the merger of unconditional security requirements referred to as Quantum Cryptography. The various domain of Quantum Cryptography is illustrated including the protocols available, their functionality and previous implementation in real networks. This paper further identifies research gaps covering critical aspects of how Quantum Cryptography can be realized and effectively utilized in 5G networks. These include improving the current technique in Quantum Cryptography through efficient key distribution and message sharing between users in 5G networks.
Abstract Conventional cryptographic methods are losing their long-term reliability in the face of growing information security threats ranging from increasing computational power to the emergence of quantum computers. In this regard, quantum cryptography technologies, in particular, quantum key distribution (QKD), are emerging as promising tools for ensuring physically grounded data security. This work presents a comprehensive analysis of the potential for autonomous implementation of QKD in 4G/5G mobile networks, focusing on practical deployment and possible limitations. Additionally, the integration of post-quantum cryptography and QKD is explored as a complementary approach to securing user data, along with the prospects for building a secure infrastructure based on VPN technologies and QKD systems. Special attention is given to comparison of international and domestic developments in this field and evaluation of the applicability of these technologies in existing mobile networks.
With the rapid growth of 5G networks that introduce better speed, connectivity, and scalability than previous generation networks, new security threats have also started to arise, especially from quantum computing. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Zero Trust (ZT) have emerged as viable solutions to overcome these security issues. Previous literature has discussed the independent implementation of these two frameworks in 5G networks. However, several new studies have been proposed and examined the integration of QKD and ZTA together in the same network in order to enhance the security against quantum threats, which leaves room for a new comprehensive review that will encompass the current research and development of QKD and ZTA in 5G networks. Therefore, this paper aims to address this gap by reviewing state-of-the-art progress, implementation approaches, and drawbacks of QKD and ZTA in 5G. This review also recommends future research direction by discussing the potential implementation of QKD and ZTA integration together in 5G networks.
The paper aims to highlight how symmetric cryptographic key generation via Quantum Key Distribution-based technology can be used to secure protected communications within a private network. Within a testbed of the 5G network installed in the campus of the Technical University of Ostrava, the quantum key distribution (QKD) technology and encryptors are implemented to demonstrate secure 5G network concepts such as network function virtualization (NFV) and network management software-defined networking (SDN). Specifically, two APIs are programmed with all the necessary steps for two Secure Application Entities to secure a new symmetric key that is in turn generated by two Key Manager Entities via a protocol called "Coherent One-Way".
The advent of quantum computing will pose great challenges to the current communication systems, requiring essential changes in the establishment of security associations in traditional architectures. In this context, the multi-technological and heterogeneous nature of 5G networks makes it a challenging scenario for the introduction of quantum communications. Specifically, 5G networks support the unification of non-3GPP access technologies (i.e. Wi-Fi), which are secured through the IPsec protocol suite and the Non-3GPP Interworking Function (N3IWF) entity. These mechanisms leverage traditional public key cryptography and Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanisms, which should be updated to quantum-safe standards. Therefore, in this paper we present the design and development of a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) based non-3GPP access mechanism for 5G networks, integrating QKD keys with IPsec tunnel establishment. Besides, we also demonstrate the feasibility of the system by experimental validation in a testbed with commercial QKD equipment and an open-source 5G core implementation. Results show that the time required to complete the authentication and IPsec security association establishment is 4.62% faster than traditional cryptography PSK-based systems and 5.17% faster than the certificate-based system, while ensuring Information-Theoretic Security (ITS) of the QKD systems.