Abstract A widespread view among physicists is that Bell’s theorem rests on an implicit assumption of “classicality,” in addition to locality. According to this understanding, the violation of Bell’s inequalities poses no challenge to locality, but simply reinforces the fact that quantum mechanics is not classical. The paper provides a critical analysis of this view. First we characterize the notion of classicality in probabilistic terms. We argue that classicality thus construed has nothing to do with the validity of classical physics, nor of classical probability theory, contrary to what many believe. At the same time, we show that the probabilistic notion of classicality is not an additional premise of Bell’s theorem, but a mathematical corollary of locality in conjunction with the standard auxiliary assumptions of Bell. Accordingly, any theory that claims to get around the derivation of Bell’s inequalities by giving up classicality, in fact has to give up one of those standard assumptions. As an illustration of this, we look at two recent interpretations of quantum mechanics, Reinhard Werner’s operational quantum mechanics and Robert Griffiths’ consistent histories approach, that are claimed to be local and non-classical, and identify which of the standard assumptions of Bell’s theorem each of them is forced to give up. We claim that while in operational quantum mechanics the Common Cause Principle is violated, the consistent histories approach is conspiratorial. Finally, we relate these two options to the idea of realism, a notion that is also often identified as an implicit assumption of Bell’s theorem.
Abstract A widespread view among physicists is that Bell’s theorem rests on an implicit assumption of “classicality,” in addition to locality. According to this understanding, the violation of Bell’s inequalities poses no challenge to locality, but simply reinforces the fact that quantum mechanics is not classical. The paper provides a critical analysis of this view. First we characterize the notion of classicality in probabilistic terms. We argue that classicality thus construed has nothing to do with the validity of classical physics, nor of classical probability theory, contrary to what many believe. At the same time, we show that the probabilistic notion of classicality is not an additional premise of Bell’s theorem, but a mathematical corollary of locality in conjunction with the standard auxiliary assumptions of Bell. Accordingly, any theory that claims to get around the derivation of Bell’s inequalities by giving up classicality, in fact has to give up one of those standard assumptions. As an illustration of this, we look at two recent interpretations of quantum mechanics, Reinhard Werner’s operational quantum mechanics and Robert Griffiths’ consistent histories approach, that are claimed to be local and non-classical, and identify which of the standard assumptions of Bell’s theorem each of them is forced to give up. We claim that while in operational quantum mechanics the Common Cause Principle is violated, the consistent histories approach is conspiratorial. Finally, we relate these two options to the idea of realism, a notion that is also often identified as an implicit assumption of Bell’s theorem.
The view exists that the Bell inequality is a mere inconsistent application of classical concepts to a well-established quantum world. In the article, ``Nonlocality claims are inconsistent with Hilbert-space quantum mechanics'' [Phys. Rev. A, 101, 022117, (2020)], Robert B. Griffiths advocates for quantum theory's locality. Although R. B. Griffiths presents valuable insights in favor of quantum mechanics' local character, he argues the Bell inequality is an inconsistent application of classical physics to quantum mechanics. We explain why a correct assessment of the Bell inequality does not in fact conflict with Griffiths's views of quantum locality and, on the contrary, it already contemplates them. Hence, Bell inequality inconsistency is not necessary for Griffiths's quantum locality to hold.
It is shown that when properly analyzed using principles consistent with the
use of a Hilbert space to describe microscopic properties, quantum mechanics is
a local theory: one system cannot influence another system with which it does
not interact. Claims to the contrary based on quantum violations of Bell
inequalities are shown to be incorrect. A specific example traces a violation
of the CHSH Bell inequality in the case of a spin-3/2 particle to the
noncommutation of certain quantum operators in a situation where (non)locality
is not an issue. A consistent histories analysis of what quantum measurements
measure, in terms of quantum properties, is used to identify the basic problem
with derivations of Bell inequalities: the use of classical concepts (hidden
variables) rather than a probabilistic structure appropriate to the quantum
domain. A difficulty with the original Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument
for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics is the use of a counterfactual
argument which is not valid if one assumes that Hilbert-space quantum mechanics
is complete; locality is not an issue. The quantum correlations that violate
Bell inequalities can be understood using local quantum common causes.
Wavefunction collapse and Schr\odinger steering are calculational procedures,
not physical processes. A general Principle of Einstein Locality rules out
nonlocal influences between noninteracting quantum systems. Some suggestions
are made for changes in terminology that could clarify discussions of quantum
foundations and be less confusing to students.
Among the various "no-go theorems" in the foundations of quantum mechanics, Bell inequalities are among the few, which do not implicitly rely on the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. Instead, Bell inequalities are commonly understood to rest on Kolmogorov's theory of probability and a "locality" assumption. Physical evidence supporting their violation is hence taken as evidence against at least one of these two assumptions.
This work provides a comprehensive analysis of the physical debate on Bell inequalities from the point of view of Kolmogorov's theory of probability, focusing on the Bell-Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt inequality (BCHSH inequality). The central contribution is the motivation and mathematical study of the notion of contextuality in Bell experiments: in so-called contextual Bell models the detectors themselves behave randomly and the distribution of the random detector parameters depends on the chosen detector settings. It is shown how even "classical" Bell experiments motivate such a description. The need to account for contextuality was pointed out before by de la Peña, Cetto, Brody, Lochak, Bohm, Hiley and others. A broad class of contextual models is proven to satisfy the BCHSH inequality, thereby generalizing a previous result by Gill and Lambare. Nonetheless, even under strong locality requirements, contextual Bell models may violate the BCHSH inequality: based on work by Popescu and Rohrlich, we consider a "proof of concept" example exhibiting the maximum possible violation.
Contrary to the much debated "loopholes" in empirical tests of Bell inequalities, contextuality thus reveals a conceptual misunderstanding in the physical conclusions commonly drawn from Bell inequality violations.
It is shown that when properly analyzed using principles consistent with the use of a Hilbert space to describe microscopic properties, quantum mechanics is a local theory: one system cannot influence another system with which it does not interact. Claims to the contrary based on quantum violations of Bell inequalities are argued to be incorrect. A specific example traces a violation of the CHSH Bell inequality in the case of a spin-3/2 particle to the noncommutation of certain quantum operators in a situation where (non)locality is not an issue. A consistent histories analysis of what quantum measurements measure, in terms of quantum properties, is used to identify the basic problem with derivations of Bell inequalities: the use of classical concepts (hidden variables) rather than a probabilistic structure appropriate to the quantum domain. A difficulty with the original Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics is the use of a counterfactual argument which is not valid if one assumes that Hilbert-space quantum mechanics is complete; locality is not an issue. The quantum correlations that violate Bell inequalities can be understood using local quantum common causes. Wave-function collapse and Schr\"odinger steering are calculational procedures, not physical processes. A general Principle of Einstein Locality rules out nonlocal influences between noninteracting quantum systems. Some suggestions are made for changes in terminology that could clarify discussions of quantum foundations and be less confusing to students.
Bell's theorem is popularly stated as the inconsistency of quantum theory with local realism. Realism is here formalized by the ontological models framework, where elements of reality are points of a measurable space and probabilities obey the Kolmogorov axioms. In the Bell scenario, locally causal ontological models posit a common cause supporting a global valuation, a joint assignment of outcomes to all measurements at once, across incompatible contexts. Within this notion of realism, Bell's theorem makes any realist explanation of the quantum predictions conspiratorial: any mechanism, whether superluminal, superdeterministic, or retrocausal, must be finely tuned so as never to manifest operationally. We redefine realism through a new ontological framework that generalizes the standard one. The elements of reality, which we call records, are no longer points but relational parts of a point-free generalization of a topological space (sublocales of a locale). A record shared by two incompatible contexts establishes the sameness of a measurement across them, without such pairwise identities composing into a global valuation, and the common cause is then a web of such records. Within this framework, Bell's no-go theorem becomes a go theorem: local causality, restated for records, is no longer at odds with the quantum statistics. This is possible because modularity, the inclusion-exclusion law of classical probability, fails across incompatible contexts, so that the probability theory generalizes Kolmogorov's. We exhibit explicit models reproducing several quantum strategies, including the optimal CHSH violation. More broadly, locally causal models of this kind attain every Bell-CHSH value up to the algebraic maximum. A realist explanation of the quantum predictions need not be conspiratorial; every causal influence posited by these models is reflected in the operational predictions.
This short article concentrates on the conceptual aspects of the violation of Bell inequalities, and acts as a map to the 265 cited references. The article outlines (a) relevant characteristics of quantum mechanics, such as statistical balance and entanglement, (b) the thinking that led to the derivation of the original Bell inequality, and (c) the range of claimed implications, including realism, locality and others which attract less attention. The main conclusion is that violation of Bell inequalities appears to have some implications for the nature of physical reality, but that none of these are definite. The violations constrain possible prequantum (underlying) theories, but do not rule out the possibility that such theories might reconcile at least one understanding of locality and realism to quantum mechanical predictions. Violation might reflect, at least partly, failure to acknowledge the contextuality of quantum mechanics, or that data from different probability spaces have been inappropriately combined. Many claims that there are definite implications reflect one or more of (i) imprecise non-mathematical language, (ii) assumptions inappropriate in quantum mechanics, (iii) inadequate treatment of measurement statistics and (iv) underlying philosophical assumptions.