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Synthese Library/Synthese library

Not Individuals, Nor Even Objects: On the Ontological Nature of Quantum Systems

Olímpia Lombardi

Published Jan 1, 2023• 6 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-31840-5_4

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Abstract The issue about the nature of quantum systems usually hinges on the category of individual: the question is whether this category can be applied to understand the peculiarities of quantum behavior. However, some metaphysical subtleties are commonly overlooked in this discussion. What is the difference between the notions of object and of individual? What metaphysical principles are quantum systems supposed to fulfill? What ontological kinds of properties are involved in the quantum domain? These questions should be taken into account when the issue at stake is the ontological nature of quantum systems and, more generally, the structure of the quantum realm. In order to address these and other metaphysical questions, different ontological distinctions that are scarcely taken into account in the debate are brought to the fore in this chapter. In light of these distinctions, the ontological challenges that quantum mechanics poses to the ontological picture presupposed by traditional metaphysics will be discussed in the following chapter.

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<Articles>Modeling a Procedure for Providing the Ontology of Quantum Objects: Focussing on the Identity and Individuality of Single Particles in Individual Quantum Systems

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Since the 2000s, studies on the ontology of quantum objects have developed relatively actively. However, few studies have thoroughly addressed not only theoretical and metaphysical perspectives but also experimental viewpoints within specific cases. This paper aims to clarify the ontology of quantum objects, focusing on the issues of identity and individuality. Specifically, it constructs a new model that represents a procedure for providing the ontology of quantum objects, with particular attention to single-particle experiments in individual quantum systems. The proposed model is developed by complementarily organizing, abstracting, and integrating the discussions of Bueno (2018), Imai (2024), and Chen (2016, 2018, 2023), which examine the ontology of microscopic objects from theoretical and/or experimental perspectives. Although this model cannot independently resolve the issues of identity and individuality for quantum objects in specific cases, it is a valuable tool for exploring the ontology of quantum objects from a broader framework.

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The non-relativistic quantum mechanics offers us conditions to consider at least two possible metaphysical packages, but incompatible between themselves: metaphysics of individuals, and metaphysics of non-individuals. In addition, the standard formalism is compatible with both the ontologies, without the theory being decided for either of them. From this particular kind of situation, the thesis of the underdetermination of metaphysics by physics can be established. Actually, it can be found, among scientists and philosophers, defenders of one, or another ontology, as well as those who do not address the issue, given that theory on its own does not decide. This means that if we make a choice for one of these packages, it will be happing in a metaphysical field, increasing a lot the philosophical discussions about individuality of quantic objects in quantum physics. From a naturalized methodological view, we present the issues from those defend the individuality of quantic objects, and from those, include us, defend non-individuality, focusing two approaches: (i) the ontological one, in which the fail of IIP as individuation principle is discussed; and, (ii) the logical one, in which non-reflexive logics, as well as a quasi-set theory became more suitable for representing the non-individuals. In this paper we stand for the choice of non-individuals ontology becomes more plausible, and should be taken in account seriously, opening up possibilities for ontological pluralism.

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Abstract The issue about the nature of quantum systems usually hinges on the category of individual: the question is whether this category can be applied to understand the peculiarities of quantum behavior. However, some metaphysical subtleties are commonly overlooked in this discussion. What is the difference between the notions of object and of individual? What metaphysical principles are quantum systems supposed to fulfill? What ontological kinds of properties are involved in the quantum domain? These questions should be taken into account when the issue at stake is the ontological nature of quantum systems and, more generally, the structure of the quantum realm. In order to address these and other metaphysical questions, different ontological distinctions that are scarcely taken into account in the debate are brought to the fore in this chapter. In light of these distinctions, the ontological challenges that quantum mechanics poses to the ontological picture presupposed by traditional metaphysics will be discussed in the following chapter.
Since the 2000s, studies on the ontology of quantum objects have developed relatively actively. However, few studies have thoroughly addressed not only theoretical and metaphysical perspectives but also experimental viewpoints within specific cases. This paper aims to clarify the ontology of quantum objects, focusing on the issues of identity and individuality. Specifically, it constructs a new model that represents a procedure for providing the ontology of quantum objects, with particular attention to single-particle experiments in individual quantum systems. The proposed model is developed by complementarily organizing, abstracting, and integrating the discussions of Bueno (2018), Imai (2024), and Chen (2016, 2018, 2023), which examine the ontology of microscopic objects from theoretical and/or experimental perspectives. Although this model cannot independently resolve the issues of identity and individuality for quantum objects in specific cases, it is a valuable tool for exploring the ontology of quantum objects from a broader framework.
The non-relativistic quantum mechanics offers us conditions to consider at least two possible metaphysical packages, but incompatible between themselves: metaphysics of individuals, and metaphysics of non-individuals. In addition, the standard formalism is compatible with both the ontologies, without the theory being decided for either of them. From this particular kind of situation, the thesis of the underdetermination of metaphysics by physics can be established. Actually, it can be found, among scientists and philosophers, defenders of one, or another ontology, as well as those who do not address the issue, given that theory on its own does not decide. This means that if we make a choice for one of these packages, it will be happing in a metaphysical field, increasing a lot the philosophical discussions about individuality of quantic objects in quantum physics. From a naturalized methodological view, we present the issues from those defend the individuality of quantic objects, and from those, include us, defend non-individuality, focusing two approaches: (i) the ontological one, in which the fail of IIP as individuation principle is discussed; and, (ii) the logical one, in which non-reflexive logics, as well as a quasi-set theory became more suitable for representing the non-individuals. In this paper we stand for the choice of non-individuals ontology becomes more plausible, and should be taken in account seriously, opening up possibilities for ontological pluralism.