Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

Integrated Communication and Receiver Sensing with Security Constraints on Message and State

Mehrasa Ahmadipour, Michèle Wigger, Shlomo Shitz Shamai

Published Jun 25, 2023• 17 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We study the state-dependent wiretap channel with non-causal channel state informations at the encoder in an integrated sensing and communications (ISAC) scenario. In this scenario, the transmitter communicates a message and a state sequence to a legitimate receiver while keeping the message and state-information secret from an external eavesdropper. This paper presents a new achievability result for this doubly-secret scenario, which recovers as special cases the best-known achievability results for the setups without security constraints or with only a security constraint on the message. The impact of the secrecy constraint (no secrecy-constraint, secrecy constraint only on the message, or on the message and the state) is analyzed at hand of a Gaussian-state and Gaussian-channel example.

DOI
10.1109/isit54713.2023.10206763

Related papers

Integrated Communication and Receiver Sensing with Security Constraints on Message and State

Mehrasa Ahmadipour, Michèle Wigger, Shlomo Shitz Shamai

We study the state-dependent wiretap channel with non-causal channel state informations at the encoder in an integrated sensing and communications (ISAC) scenario. In this scenario, the transmitter communicates a message and a state sequence to a legitimate receiver while keeping the message and state-information secret from an external eavesdropper. This paper presents a new achievability result for this doubly-secret scenario, which recovers as special cases the best-known achievability results for the setups without security constraints or with only a security constraint on the message. The impact of the secrecy constraint (no secrecy-constraint, secrecy constraint only on the message, or on the message and the state) is analyzed at hand of a Gaussian-state and Gaussian-channel example.

arXiv:2303.06637•Mar 12, 2023•0 citations

Sensing-Assisted Secure Communications over Correlated Rayleigh Fading Channels

Martin Mittelbach, Rafael F. Schaefer, Matthieu R. Bloch +2 more

We consider a secure integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) scenario, where a signal is transmitted through a state-dependent wiretap channel with one legitimate receiver with which the transmitter communicates and one honest-but-curious target that the transmitter wants to sense. The secure ISAC channel is modeled as two state-dependent fast-fading channels with correlated Rayleigh fading coefficients and independent additive Gaussian noise components. Delayed channel outputs are fed back to the transmitter to improve the communication performance and to estimate the channel state sequence. We establish and illustrate an achievable secrecy-distortion region for degraded secure ISAC channels under correlated Rayleigh fading, for which we show that the signal-to-interference-plus-noise is not a sufficient statistic. We also evaluate the inner bound for a large set of parameters to derive practical design insights. The presented results include parameter ranges for which the secrecy capacity of a classical wiretap channel setup is surpassed and for which the channel capacity is approached. Thus, we illustrate for correlated Rayleigh fading cases that our secure ISAC methods can (i) eliminate the need for the legitimate receiver to have a statistical advantage over the eavesdropper and (ii) provide communication security with minimal rate penalty.

Entropy•Feb 21, 2025•10 citations

Transmitter Actions for Secure Integrated Sensing and Communication

Truman Welling, Onur Günlü, Aylin Yener

This work models a secure integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) system as a wiretap channel with action-dependent channel states and channel output feedback, e.g., obtained through reflections. The transmitted message is split into a common and a secure message, both of which must be reliably recovered at the legitimate receiver, while the secure message needs to be kept secret from the eavesdropper. The transmitter actions, such as beamforming vector design, affect the corresponding state at each channel use. The action sequence is modeled to depend on both the transmitted message and channel output feedback. For perfect channel output feedback, the secrecy-distortion regions are provided for physically-degraded and reversely-physically-degraded secure ISAC channels with transmitter actions. The corresponding rate regions when the entire message should be kept secret are also provided. The results are illustrated through characterizing the secrecy-distortion region of a binary example.

arXiv:2408.13635•IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jul 7, 2024•10 citations

Secure Integrated Sensing and Communication Under Correlated Rayleigh Fading

Martin Mittelbach, Rafael F. Schaefer, Matthieu R. Bloch +2 more

We consider a secure integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) scenario, in which a signal is transmitted through a state-dependent wiretap channel with one legitimate receiver with which the transmitter communicates and one honest-but-curious target that the transmitter wants to sense. The secure ISAC channel is modeled as two state-dependent fast-fading channels with correlated Rayleigh fading coefficients and independent additive Gaussian noise components. Delayed channel outputs are fed back to the transmitter to improve the communication performance and to estimate the channel state sequence. We establish and illustrate an achievable secrecy-distortion region for degraded secure ISAC channels under correlated Rayleigh fading. We also evaluate the inner bound for a large set of parameters to derive practical design insights for secure ISAC methods. The presented results include in particular parameter ranges for which the secrecy capacity of a classical wiretap channel setup is surpassed and for which the channel capacity is approached.

arXiv:2408.17050•Aug 30, 2024•1 citation

Nonasymptotic Performance Limits of Low-Latency Secure Integrated Sensing and Communication Systems

Onur Günlü, Matthieu R. Bloch, Rafael F. Schaefer +1 more

This paper considers an information theoretic model for secure integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) with the goal of establishing fundamental limits in low-latency scenarios. In this secure ISAC model, a message is transmitted through a state-dependent wiretap channel with decoder-side state availability. The model is studied under a strong secrecy constraint when only a part of the transmitted message should be kept secret. First, the secrecy-distortion rate region is established for a degraded channel by treating the model as a special case of a feed-backed secure ISAC model. Finite-length inner bounds are then proved by applying nonasymptotic random binning techniques. Bounds on the rates have a similar form to common finite-length bounds, and the distortion bound follows from a bound for letter-typical sequences.

IEEE International Conference on Acoustics Speech and Signal Processing•Mar 18, 2024•8 citations

Private broadcasting with probing constraint

Y. Ozan Basciftci, C. Emre Koksal

We consider a three-receiver wiretap channel in which the transmitter aims to send a common message to legitimate receivers 1 and 2 while keeping it secret from the receiver 3 (eavesdropper). The transmitter takes cost constrained actions to probe the transmitter-to-receiver 1 and transmitter-to-receiver 2 channels. Under the probing cost constraint, we provide a lower bound to the secrecy capacity of this setting. The achievability strategy employs a block Markov coding strategy in which the channel state sequence of the previous block is mapped to a key which secures the part of the confidential message to be transmitted in the current block. The challenge in using the state sequence as a source of the key is the fact that the legitimate receivers are not aware of each other's channel state. To that end, we employ a novel strategy in which the transmitter takes XOR of individual keys generated from the state sequences of transmitter-to receiver 1 and transmitter-to-receiver 2 channels and send the XOR-ed key along with the confidential message. We furthermore analyze the trade-off between the achievable secrecy rate and the probing cost constraint. We conclude that there is a linear dependency between the key rate and probing cost constraint.

IEEE International Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications (SPAWC)•Jun 1, 2014•1 citation
We study the state-dependent wiretap channel with non-causal channel state informations at the encoder in an integrated sensing and communications (ISAC) scenario. In this scenario, the transmitter communicates a message and a state sequence to a legitimate receiver while keeping the message and state-information secret from an external eavesdropper. This paper presents a new achievability result for this doubly-secret scenario, which recovers as special cases the best-known achievability results for the setups without security constraints or with only a security constraint on the message. The impact of the secrecy constraint (no secrecy-constraint, secrecy constraint only on the message, or on the message and the state) is analyzed at hand of a Gaussian-state and Gaussian-channel example.
We study the state-dependent wiretap channel with non-causal channel state informations at the encoder in an integrated sensing and communications (ISAC) scenario. In this scenario, the transmitter communicates a message and a state sequence to a legitimate receiver while keeping the message and state-information secret from an external eavesdropper. This paper presents a new achievability result for this doubly-secret scenario, which recovers as special cases the best-known achievability results for the setups without security constraints or with only a security constraint on the message. The impact of the secrecy constraint (no secrecy-constraint, secrecy constraint only on the message, or on the message and the state) is analyzed at hand of a Gaussian-state and Gaussian-channel example.
We consider a secure integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) scenario, where a signal is transmitted through a state-dependent wiretap channel with one legitimate receiver with which the transmitter communicates and one honest-but-curious target that the transmitter wants to sense. The secure ISAC channel is modeled as two state-dependent fast-fading channels with correlated Rayleigh fading coefficients and independent additive Gaussian noise components. Delayed channel outputs are fed back to the transmitter to improve the communication performance and to estimate the channel state sequence. We establish and illustrate an achievable secrecy-distortion region for degraded secure ISAC channels under correlated Rayleigh fading, for which we show that the signal-to-interference-plus-noise is not a sufficient statistic. We also evaluate the inner bound for a large set of parameters to derive practical design insights. The presented results include parameter ranges for which the secrecy capacity of a classical wiretap channel setup is surpassed and for which the channel capacity is approached. Thus, we illustrate for correlated Rayleigh fading cases that our secure ISAC methods can (i) eliminate the need for the legitimate receiver to have a statistical advantage over the eavesdropper and (ii) provide communication security with minimal rate penalty.
This work models a secure integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) system as a wiretap channel with action-dependent channel states and channel output feedback, e.g., obtained through reflections. The transmitted message is split into a common and a secure message, both of which must be reliably recovered at the legitimate receiver, while the secure message needs to be kept secret from the eavesdropper. The transmitter actions, such as beamforming vector design, affect the corresponding state at each channel use. The action sequence is modeled to depend on both the transmitted message and channel output feedback. For perfect channel output feedback, the secrecy-distortion regions are provided for physically-degraded and reversely-physically-degraded secure ISAC channels with transmitter actions. The corresponding rate regions when the entire message should be kept secret are also provided. The results are illustrated through characterizing the secrecy-distortion region of a binary example.
We consider a secure integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) scenario, in which a signal is transmitted through a state-dependent wiretap channel with one legitimate receiver with which the transmitter communicates and one honest-but-curious target that the transmitter wants to sense. The secure ISAC channel is modeled as two state-dependent fast-fading channels with correlated Rayleigh fading coefficients and independent additive Gaussian noise components. Delayed channel outputs are fed back to the transmitter to improve the communication performance and to estimate the channel state sequence. We establish and illustrate an achievable secrecy-distortion region for degraded secure ISAC channels under correlated Rayleigh fading. We also evaluate the inner bound for a large set of parameters to derive practical design insights for secure ISAC methods. The presented results include in particular parameter ranges for which the secrecy capacity of a classical wiretap channel setup is surpassed and for which the channel capacity is approached.
This paper considers an information theoretic model for secure integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) with the goal of establishing fundamental limits in low-latency scenarios. In this secure ISAC model, a message is transmitted through a state-dependent wiretap channel with decoder-side state availability. The model is studied under a strong secrecy constraint when only a part of the transmitted message should be kept secret. First, the secrecy-distortion rate region is established for a degraded channel by treating the model as a special case of a feed-backed secure ISAC model. Finite-length inner bounds are then proved by applying nonasymptotic random binning techniques. Bounds on the rates have a similar form to common finite-length bounds, and the distortion bound follows from a bound for letter-typical sequences.
We consider a three-receiver wiretap channel in which the transmitter aims to send a common message to legitimate receivers 1 and 2 while keeping it secret from the receiver 3 (eavesdropper). The transmitter takes cost constrained actions to probe the transmitter-to-receiver 1 and transmitter-to-receiver 2 channels. Under the probing cost constraint, we provide a lower bound to the secrecy capacity of this setting. The achievability strategy employs a block Markov coding strategy in which the channel state sequence of the previous block is mapped to a key which secures the part of the confidential message to be transmitted in the current block. The challenge in using the state sequence as a source of the key is the fact that the legitimate receivers are not aware of each other's channel state. To that end, we employ a novel strategy in which the transmitter takes XOR of individual keys generated from the state sequences of transmitter-to receiver 1 and transmitter-to-receiver 2 channels and send the XOR-ed key along with the confidential message. We furthermore analyze the trade-off between the achievable secrecy rate and the probing cost constraint. We conclude that there is a linear dependency between the key rate and probing cost constraint.