Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) defines cryptographic algorithms designed to resist the advent of the quan-tum computer. Most public-key cryptosystems today are vulnerable to quantum attackers, so a global-scaletransition to PQC is expected. As a result, several entities foment efforts in PQC standardization, research,development, creation of Work Groups (WGs), and issuing adoption recommendations. However, there isa long road to broad PQC adoption in practice. This position paper motivates ongoing and future researchon this topic. It describes why migrating to PQC is necessary and gathers evidence that the “hybrid mode”can help the migration process. Finally, it stresses that there are risks yet to be considered by the literature.Quantum-safe protocols are being evaluated, but more attention (and awareness) is needed for the softwareand protocols at the application layer. Lastly, this position paper gives further recommendations for a smotherPQC migration
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) defines cryptographic algorithms designed to resist the advent of the quan-tum computer. Most public-key cryptosystems today are vulnerable to quantum attackers, so a global-scaletransition to PQC is expected. As a result, several entities foment efforts in PQC standardization, research,development, creation of Work Groups (WGs), and issuing adoption recommendations. However, there isa long road to broad PQC adoption in practice. This position paper motivates ongoing and future researchon this topic. It describes why migrating to PQC is necessary and gathers evidence that the “hybrid mode”can help the migration process. Finally, it stresses that there are risks yet to be considered by the literature.Quantum-safe protocols are being evaluated, but more attention (and awareness) is needed for the softwareand protocols at the application layer. Lastly, this position paper gives further recommendations for a smotherPQC migration
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current cryptographic systems, particularly public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks like Shor's algorithm. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) aims to develop and standardize quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms to secure digital communications in the quantum era. This paper examines the current landscape of PQC, focusing on the evaluation and standardization efforts led by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We analyze the major families of quantum-resistant algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based cryptography, discussing their security guarantees, performance trade-offs, and implementation challenges. Furthermore, we review NIST's PQC standardization process, highlighting selected finalists and alternate candidates, and explore the ongoing transition challenges in adopting these algorithms across industries. Finally, we discuss future directions for PQC research, including hybrid cryptographic systems and the need for continued cryptanalysis to ensure long-term security. This work provides a comprehensive overview of the progress and challenges in deploying quantum-resistant cryptography to safeguard against emerging quantum threats.
The threats are existential to the traditional cryptosystems of public keys, including RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), due to the rapid progress in quantum computing. Such algorithms as the Shor and Grover algorithms prove that as soon as large scale quantum computers are achieved, these classical cryptographic protocols will not provide any privacy and integrity to online communication. This has created an emergency to find post-quantum cryptography (PQC), or quantum-safe cryptography, which will resist attacks by both classical and quantum attackers. The paper is a review of the latest research and development in post-quantum cryptographic algorithms and their implementation in current security systems. We organize quantum-safe methods into significant organizations such as lattice-based, hash-based, multivariate polynomial-based and code-based encrypted communications. Each type has been evaluated critically based on computational efficiency, key sizes, speed of encryption/decryption and security proofs. The survey also examines the current standardization activities happening in the world and especially the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC competition, which lists candidate algorithms that have advanced to standard adoption. Besides this, the paper addresses hybrid cryptographic designs that use both classical and post-quantum bases in ensuring a seamless migration in the transition phase. Internet security protocols like TLS, VPNs and blockchain consensus as applications of PQC are examined in detail. Lastly, we pinpoint open research issues, which include creating lightweight PQC to support resource-constrained IoT devices, balancing performance and strong security assurances, and interoperability between the new PQC algorithms and existing infrastructures. Through detailed survey we inform the future of researchers, practitioners, and policymakers on the preparation of the post-quantum era of secure digital communications.
Cryptographic algorithms are an essential measure to ensure confidentiality and integrity of internet communication. The development of quantum computers (QCs) and their potential to utilize Shor’s Law, is increasingly recognized as a threat to asymmetric cryptography. In response, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is gaining prominence as a notable field of research aiming to standardize quantum resistant algorithms before the operational usage of QCs. This paper is addressed to people with preliminary knowledge in the field of cryptography and QC. Based on a literature review, the authors provide an overview of challenges faced by the research community and elaborate the advancements in addressing post-quantum threats. A migration strategy from classical cryptosystems to PQC systems is in development, but obstacles such as time constraints and improper implementation complicate the process. Full implementation could take a decade or more. Until then, our paper aims to create awareness for potential challenges when transitioning towards PQC. As categorization scheme for these potential obstacles, we refer to a well- established model in cybersecurity – the McCumber Cube. Conclusions embrace preparing for risks of improper implementation and deriving a multi-step migration. Special attention is expected to be needed for data migration of existing data sets. As a request for future research in PQC, the authors identified the process of implementing post-cryptography standards, e.g., from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and an assessment of the perceived readiness of industry to adapt.
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a rapidly developing field that addresses the potential threat quantum computers pose to the security of current cryptographic algorithms. With the rapid advancement of quantum computing technologies, it has become imperative to identify and standardize new cryptographic techniques that can withstand attacks from quantum computers. This paper explores the motivation behind PQC and provides an overview of the experimental research conducted in the field. It highlights the vulnerabilities of traditional cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA and ECC, to quantum attacks and emphasizes the need for transitioning to quantum-resistant alternatives. The experiments conducted in the PQC domain encompass the evaluation and analysis of candidate algorithms submitted to the NIST PQC competition. These experiments involve comprehensive security assessments, performance evaluations, and code audits to ensure the suitability and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms in real-world scenarios. This paper provides guidelines for organizations and practitioners adopting PQC. It discusses considerations for selecting and implementing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, including security levels, algorithmic characteristics, performance tradeoffs, and integration challenges. It also outlines the importance of a smooth transition from classical to post-quantum cryptographic systems and highlights the need for standardization efforts to ensure interoperability and compatibility.
As quantum computing advances, current cryptographic protocols are increasingly vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly those based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) like RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). This paper presents a comprehensive review of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) as a solution to protect digital systems in the quantum era. We provide an in-depth analysis of various quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, including lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, isogeny-based, and multivariate approaches. The review highlights the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization process, highlighting key algorithms, such as CRYSTALS–Kyber, CRYSTALS–Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+, and discusses the strengths, vulnerabilities, and implementation challenges of the leading algorithms. In addition, we explore transition strategies for organizations, emphasizing hybrid cryptography to ensure backward compatibility during migration. This study offers key insights into the future of cryptographic standards and the critical steps necessary to prepare for the transition from classical to quantum-resistant systems.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is driven by the threat posed by quantum computers, particularly the harvest-now-decrypt-later attack. PQC aims to prepare classical systems and hardware to become resilient against quantum attacks. This research discusses the system vulnerabilities, the need to migrate to PQC, and how to integrate this migration. PQC has become one of the solutions for addressing today’s vulnerabilities and threats while increasing security. The paper concludes that harvest-now-decrypt-later, Q-Day attacks, and new quantum attacks are today’s most critical threats, which can be addressed by deploying PQC solutions and, thus, increasing security. This research proposes a conceptual multi-phased model framework for the migration. The framework first addresses system objectives, goals and assets, then ranks assets based on the highest sensitivity. Crypto-Agility is achieved via the automation of PQC migration, such as the automation of re-keying endpoints, followed by the automation of auditing and testing of each migration stage. Human judgment is required to review the migration process. Once one asset is successfully transitioned, the framework goes to the next highest asset; otherwise, testing is repeated. This is expected to help systems migrate at the lowest cost and with the fewest consequences. However, the limitation of PQC migration is its high resource cost, time, requirement of human professionals, burden on existing systems, and financial expenses. Lastly, the paper recommends creating an ML model to help rank a system’s data and vulnerabilities. Moreover, the paper recommends conducting experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed framework. In addition, the paper recommends performing migration in relation to a real-world company.