The article is devoted to identifying algorithms for unauthorized actions of an illegitimate user on optoelectronic components of ground and space communication stations, in cases where an attacking entity pre-scans the protected perimeter in search of critical vulnerabilities. Under scanning, the authors accept the technical process of extracting the most useful knowledge, both about the system and the data circulating in it. The methodology outlined in the study is aimed at identifying an attacker acting on two main quantum states of particles - Glauber states and incoherent ones. The most vulnerable component in both cases is the avalanche photodetector, which corresponds to the attack - “blindness”. Detection of an illegitimate user is possible due to a deep analysis of time slots, mainly in manual mode, automatic detection cannot be implemented today due to its low development. The research materials contain a descriptive part of four scenarios where an attacker has unlimited computing power in the form of software and hardware. At the same time, the order of the attacker's goals is defined as: scanning the system, detecting vulnerabilities, implementing security threats, penetrating the network and stealing data.
The article is devoted to identifying algorithms for unauthorized actions of an illegitimate user on optoelectronic components of ground and space communication stations, in cases where an attacking entity pre-scans the protected perimeter in search of critical vulnerabilities. Under scanning, the authors accept the technical process of extracting the most useful knowledge, both about the system and the data circulating in it. The methodology outlined in the study is aimed at identifying an attacker acting on two main quantum states of particles - Glauber states and incoherent ones. The most vulnerable component in both cases is the avalanche photodetector, which corresponds to the attack - “blindness”. Detection of an illegitimate user is possible due to a deep analysis of time slots, mainly in manual mode, automatic detection cannot be implemented today due to its low development. The research materials contain a descriptive part of four scenarios where an attacker has unlimited computing power in the form of software and hardware. At the same time, the order of the attacker's goals is defined as: scanning the system, detecting vulnerabilities, implementing security threats, penetrating the network and stealing data.
Purpose of the article: development of new methods, algorithms and models to detect unauthorized actions of an intruder/s in relation to broadcast data represented in the form of one-photon pure states of light particles, which will allow: to strengthen the secrecy of basic security keys, improve procedures for data exchange and processing by legitimate users of the telecommunications system, expand the functionality of existing technological solutions in their classic representation. Research method: system analysis, information security assessment method. The result: risks of critical system errors for procedures of basic states measurement results matching and supposed potential possibilities of attacker to realize vulnerabilities through active phase of attacks with explicit critical outcome are presented. It is established that translation of mixed single-photon states and imposition on receiving hardware is explicitly uncontrolled, unaccountable and not contained in any algorithm of quantum protocols, which, according to the authors, is the most critical vulnerability of modern cryptographic systems based on quantum mechanics. A way to solve problems of “silent” scanning and to counteract hidden active attacks on quantum channel and particle states is proposed. The essence of the solution consists in non-orthogonality of states of a random basis vector and duplication of a main communication channel containing an information path on pulse signals broadcasting, where a known number of synchro-sentences in a backup line allows to trace an attacker. Fundamental is the knowledge of the primary-natural errors occurring at each of the stages of the formation of the main security key.
Quantum computing, which uses quantum physics’ superposition and entanglement, has the potential to revolutionize a number of disciplines, including material science, cryptography, and optimization. But the emergence of quantum computing also brings serious security risks, putting cryptography measures to the test and opening up new vulnerabilities. This work offers a thorough examination of these security risks in information processing using quantum computing. We investigate quantum-specific attacks that take advantage of quantum systems’ unique properties, going beyond cryptographic flaws. Quantum side-channel attacks on quantum hardware and quantum spying attempts on quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols highlight the practical issues in protecting quantum communication networks. Long-term dangers to data privacy and integrity also arise from the possibility of data gathering for future decryption, in which attackers gather and store encrypted data now in anticipation of being able to decrypt it later with more potent quantum computers. We first investigate the threats that quantum algorithms bring to the security of the cryptographic protocols in use today. Shor’s method jeopardizes the security of popular public-key cryptosystems such as RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman because it can solve discrete logarithms and factor large integers quickly. Grover’s approach, similarly, weakens the security of symmetric-key cryptography systems by essentially halving their key strength while providing a quadratic speedup for brute-force searches. In order to mitigate these risks, we address the creation and application of post-quantum cryptography algorithms that are resistant to quantum assaults. For quantum communication networks, better QKD methods and infrastructure that is resistant to quantum emulation are crucial security considerations. Proactively developing responses and staying ahead of emerging dangers require constant research and observation. In summary, while quantum computing holds immense potential, it also introduces new security challenges that require resolution to protect information processing systems. This analysis emphasizes how critical it is to switch to cryptography techniques that are resistant to quantum computing and to put in place comprehensive security measures in order to protect against the constantly changing danger landscape that this technology poses. This chapter provides a concise overview of the key concepts that a comprehensive study would encompass.
The paper examines the latest research and trends in safeguarding data transmission through stateof-the-art cryptographic techniques. It details the encryption and decryption process using the one-timepad method, also known as the Vernam cipher, renowned for its unparalleled security. The work showcasescommon challenges addressed by quantum cryptography, which encompasses concepts like outcomeunpredictability, quantum entanglement, and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. The paper discussesthe use of symmetric algorithms for data encryption and sets forth standards for encryption keys that ensurethe absolute confidentiality of data exchange. It provides a concise history of quantum communicationsand cryptography development, highlighting the critical need for ongoing research in this domain.A pivotal aspect of cryptographic security, the distribution of encryption keys to legitimate users, is underscored.Quantum cryptography presents a method for generating and sharing keys derived from quantummechanical principles, integral to quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Contemporary QKD systemsundergo extensive scrutiny, including their susceptibility to various attack types, with most research aimedat identifying potential weaknesses in quantum protocols, often due to technical flaws in QKD systemcomponents. The study addresses a technique for unauthorized access to QKD systems during detectorcalibration. Furthermore, the paper explores a strategy for illicitly infiltrating the operations of a quantumkey distribution system in calibration mode and suggests a defensive approach. Field research findingsare presented, revealing that QKD systems are prone to vulnerabilities not only during quantum protocolexecution but also throughout other crucial operational phases. The identified attack method enablesthe unauthorized acquisition of data from a quantum communication channel and the manipulation ofsystem operations. A design for auto-compensating optical communication systems is proposed to protectthe calibration process against unauthorized breaches. The impact of sync pulses, reduced to singlephotonlevels, on accurately detecting timing intervals with an optical signal is demonstrated. The articleconcludes with experimental results that exhibit variances between theoretical expectations and the actualperformance of individual components within a quantum communication system.
Purpose of the study: development and research of an algorithm for detecting an optical signal for synchronizing stations of a quantum key distribution system with increased protection against unauthorized access. Methods of research: probability distribution, statistical analysis, single-photon detection. Results: the importance of the time synchronization process, which is implemented through high-precision detection of an optical signal, is substantiated. An optical signal detection algorithm for a synchronization method with increased protection against unauthorized access is investigated. An improved algorithm for analyzing the time domain of synchronization signal propagation using avalanche photodetectors is proposed. It is shown that the proposed algorithm allows using avalanche photodetectors in the single photon counting mode. An analysis of the time characteristics of the developed synchronization algorithm is carried out and an analytical expression for calculating the time delay of detection is presented, which provides a sequential analysis of time windows taking into account the tunable recovery time of the photodetector. The analytical expression can be used for engineering calculations when designing a QKD system. The proposed algorithm significantly reduces the likelihood of unauthorized access to the synchronization process and allows determining the time parameters of the signal window with a given accuracy, which is critical for the subsequent operation of the quantum key distribution system. Scientific novelty: an algorithm for detecting an optical signal during synchronization is proposed, which is characterized by increased protection against unauthorized access. An analytical expression for engineering calculations of the delay of detection during synchronization is presented.
The fundamental quantum mechanics prohibitions on the measurability of quantum states allow secure key distribution between spatially remote users to be performed. Experimental and commercial implementations of quantum cryptography systems, however, use components that exist at the current technology level, in particular, one-photon avalanche photodetectors. These detectors are subject to the blinding effect. It was shown that all the known basic quantum key distribution protocols and systems based on them are vulnerable to attacks with blinding of photodetectors. In such attacks, an eavesdropper knows all the key transferred, does not produce errors at the reception side, and remains undetected. Three protocols of quantum key distribution stable toward such attacks are suggested. The security of keys and detection of eavesdropping attempts are guaranteed by the internal structure of protocols themselves rather than additional technical improvements.
In the description of quantum key distribution systems, much attention is paid to the operation of quantum cryptography protocols. The main problem is the insufficient study of the synchronization process of quantum key distribution systems. This paper contains a general description of quantum cryptography principles. A two-line fiber-optic quantum key distribution system with phase coding of photon states in transceiver and coding station synchronization mode was examined. A quantum key distribution system was built on the basis of the scheme with automatic compensation of polarization mode distortions. Single-photon avalanche diodes were used as optical radiation detecting devices. It was estimated how the parameters used in quantum key distribution systems of optical detectors affect the detection of the time frame with attenuated optical pulse in synchronization mode with respect to its probabilistic and time-domain characteristics. A design method was given for the process that detects the time frame that includes an optical pulse during synchronization. This paper describes the main quantum communication channel attack methods by removing a portion of optical emission. This paper describes the developed synchronization algorithm that takes into account the time required to restore the photodetector’s operation state after the photon has been registered during synchronization. The computer simulation results of the developed synchronization algorithm were analyzed. The efficiency of the developed algorithm with respect to synchronization process protection from unauthorized gathering of optical emission is demonstrated herein.