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International Interdisciplinary PhD Workshop (IIPhDW)

A Quantum-Safe Public-Key-Algorithms Approach with Lattice-Based Scheme

Bastian Eich, Olaf Grote, Andreas Ahrens

Published May 3, 2023• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The most challenging application of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is the distribution of provably secure cryptographic keys and quantum-safe algorithms. Public-key Encryption (PKE), Key-establishment Mechanisms (KEM), and Digital Signature Algorithms (DSA) are necessary cryptographic mechanisms to use common encryption communication through insecure or untrusted networks. This paper proposes a provably quantum-resilient secure key agreement mechanism based on the most promising lattice-based cryptographic scheme and the Module Learning-with-Rounding (MLWR) problem. The main contribution of this paper is to construct a modified framework on classical computers for study and test-bed purposes.

DOI
10.1109/iiphdw54739.2023.10124431

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Post-Quantum Module Learning with Rounding-Based Public Key Encryption Using Incomplete Number Theoretic Transform

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Post Quantum Cryptographic (PQC) techniques are widely used in encryption standards and digital signatures. Lattice-based post-quantum cryptographic techniques have been reported in the last decades. The present work proposes an optimized quantum-safe lattice public key encryption (PKE) scheme based on the Module Learning with Rounding (MLWR) problem, enhanced by the use of Incomplete Number Theoretic Transform (NTT). The objective of the proposed scheme is to achieve efficient encryption and decryption while maintaining robust security in accordance with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommendations. The incomplete NTT relaxes the modulus q requirement, enables a smaller modulus for efficient arithmetic, and reduces computational complexity. This approach results in significant improvements in the speed of key generation, encryption, and decryption with a marked reduction in rejection probability, compared to schemes utilizing complete NTT. The proposed scheme demonstrates competitive performance against other lattice-based encryption schemes such as Kyber and Frodo. It shows lower encryption and decryption times while offering comparable security levels. Proposed scheme is at least a hundred times faster than Frodo lattice-based public-key encryption schemes. For NIST-recommended security level, in proposed scheme, each encryption needs an average of 300K CPU cycles, and each decryption needs 120K CPU cycles. Additionally, modulus 7937 enables a reduction in key and ciphertext sizes, optimizing the scheme for practical deployment in resource-constrained environments. Performance evaluations confirm the practicality of the scheme with substantial reductions in computational overhead, making it a highly efficient and secure candidate for post-quantum encryption.

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Quantum Resilience: Lattice-Based Cryptography for the Post-RSA Era

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The advent of quantum computing poses a significant existential threat to current public-key cryptographic standards, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which underpin global digital security. Shor's algorithm, if implemented on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, can efficiently break these foundational schemes, rendering vast amounts of encrypted data vulnerable. This paper investigates lattice-based cryptography as a robust and promising candidate for post-quantum security. We provide a comprehensive analysis of its theoretical underpinnings, focusing on hard problems like the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and Learning With Errors (LWE), which are believed to be intractable even for quantum adversaries. Through a detailed literature review and methodological exposition, we examine the construction principles of prominent lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and digital signature schemes, such as Kyber and Dilithium, highlighting their inherent security properties and performance characteristics. Our results demonstrate that lattice-based schemes offer competitive efficiency, compact key sizes, and strong security guarantees against both classical and quantum attacks, positioning them as essential building blocks for the post-RSA cryptographic landscape. The discussion elaborates on the practical implications, standardization efforts by NIST, and the challenges associated with the transition to quantum-resilient cryptographic infrastructure. We conclude that lattice-based cryptography is a cornerstone of quantum resilience, critical for securing future digital communications and data integrity.

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Lattice-based PKEs/KEMs

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The invention of public-key cryptography (PKC) by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 is one of two milestones marking the beginning of modern cryptography. The security of a PKC system requires that it should be infeasible to compute the private key from a given public key, which in turn is typically guaranteed by the difficulty in solving some cryptographic-friendly mathematical problems. Among those problems, the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems play pivotal roles in the development of public-key cryptography. In particular, the assumption that there is no polynomial time (classical) algorithm that solves the above two problems constitutes the basis for the security of almost all currently used public-key cryptosystems, such as RSA and ElGamal. However, Shor [1] found an efficient quantum solving algorithm for the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems in 1994, which would destroy the security basis for most real deployed PKC systems if large-scale quantum computers become available. The rapid development of quantum technology in recent years suggests that we are getting closer to the quantum crisis of current PKC systems. As a response to the quantum crisis, the research community has made many efforts to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) that are believed to resist quantum computer attacks. Lattice-based cryptography is one of the main directions in this area, and has become the most promising PQC candidate for standardization. The research of lattice-based cryptography dates back to the seminal work of Ajtai [2], which first based the security of cryptographic primitives on the difficulty of solving some lattice problems such as the approximate shortest vector problem and the closest vector problem. After more than two decades of development, lattice-based cryptography has gained substantial progress. In theory, we have witnessed the construction of many powerful cryptographic primitives that were not known before. In practice, the public key size of lattice-based cryptosystems has been significantly reduced from several gigabytes to a few kilobytes. For current applications and standardization, key exchanges, public-key encryptions (PKEs) and signatures are the most desired lattice-based cryptosystems, where the first two are often used to ensure information secrecy, while the last provides information authentication. Note that public-key encryptions are equivalent to two-round key exchanges, also known as the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). In the following, we focus on lattice-based PKEs/KEMs. The design principle of lattice-based PKEs/KEMs follows two approaches: a trapdoor one-way function and an approximate commutative one-way function. In the first approach, a trapdoor one-way function f and its trapdoor f−1 are generated as the public key and private key. A plaintext m is encrypted as c = f(m), and the ciphertext is decrypted as m = f−1(c). The NTRU scheme and its variants follow such an approach. In the second approach, an approximate commutative function fs and a random input a are generated, the public key is (a, b = fs(a)) and the private key is s. A plaintext m is encrypted as c1 = gr(a), c2 = gr(b) + E(m), where r is a random element, g is an approximate commutative one-way function and E is the encoding of an error-correction code. The ciphertext (c1, c2) is decrypted as m = D(c2 − fs(c1)), where D is the decoding of an error-correction code. The correctness of decryption is guaranteed by the approximate commutative property (gr(b) = gr(fs(a)) ≈ fs(gr(a)) = fs(c1)) and the error-correction code. Learning with errors (LWE) problem-based PKE/KEM schemes and their variants follow such an approach. The standardization of PQC has received substantial support from national funding agencies, such as the European Union projects PQCrypto and SAFEcrypto. The USA National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) started the post-quantum standardization project in 2012, organized a worldwide ‘competition’ in 2016 and plans to deliver draft standards before 2024. After two rounds of evaluation, seven schemes were accepted as the round-three candidates on 22 July 2020, of which five are lattice-based schemes. In 2017, the International organization for standardization started a study project of post-quantum cryptography named SD8. Most LWE-based PKE schemes such as Kyber and LAC follow the Lindner-Peikert framework [3] up to the choices of ring structure, noise distribution and parameters. 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LAC [5] uses several techniques to reduce the modulus as small as possible: it uses a byte-level modulus, embeds powerful error-correcting codes to maximize the noise-modulus rate, provides a different style of modulus to avoid potential attacks for special polynomial ring structures and optimizes the polynomial multiplication algorithm of the bit-level secret and noise. Based on these techniques, LAC reduces the public key to 544–1056 bytes and the ciphertext to 664–1464 bytes. Meanwhile, it achieves similar computational performance compared with NTT technique schemes. By observing the asymmetries in lattice-based cryptosystems, Zhang and Yu et al. [6] proposed asymmetric MLWE and asymmetric MSIS problems, which yield further size-optimized KEMs and signature schemes to those from standard counterparts. 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In the only password setting, Zhang and Yu [8] presented a two-round PAKE framework from the splittable-PKEs that can be instantiated from lattices. The only known AKE that does not rely on lattice-based PKEs/KEMs was given in Ref. [9], which has two-round messages and provides implicit authentication. This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (6197239 to X.L.; 62022018 and 61932019 to J.Z.) and the National Key Research and Development Program of China (2018YFB0804105 to J.Z.). Conflict of interest statement. None declared.

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The quick progress of quantum computing is a considerable risk to the classical cryptography of the public key and, the creation of quantum-resistant analogs is necessary.This paper provides a generalized architecture of post-quantum cryptographic schemes, by using lattice problems, especially Learning with Errors (LWE) and Ring-LWE (RLWE).The suggested architecture combines the secure public-key encryption and key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) with the implementation in the IoT, blockchain, and cloud setup.An original latticebased encryption design is developed that hybridizes with classical cryptographic primitives to

Journal of Discrete Mathematical Sciences and Cryptography•Oct 31, 2026•0 citations
The most challenging application of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is the distribution of provably secure cryptographic keys and quantum-safe algorithms. Public-key Encryption (PKE), Key-establishment Mechanisms (KEM), and Digital Signature Algorithms (DSA) are necessary cryptographic mechanisms to use common encryption communication through insecure or untrusted networks. This paper proposes a provably quantum-resilient secure key agreement mechanism based on the most promising lattice-based cryptographic scheme and the Module Learning-with-Rounding (MLWR) problem. The main contribution of this paper is to construct a modified framework on classical computers for study and test-bed purposes.
Post Quantum Cryptographic (PQC) techniques are widely used in encryption standards and digital signatures. Lattice-based post-quantum cryptographic techniques have been reported in the last decades. The present work proposes an optimized quantum-safe lattice public key encryption (PKE) scheme based on the Module Learning with Rounding (MLWR) problem, enhanced by the use of Incomplete Number Theoretic Transform (NTT). The objective of the proposed scheme is to achieve efficient encryption and decryption while maintaining robust security in accordance with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommendations. The incomplete NTT relaxes the modulus q requirement, enables a smaller modulus for efficient arithmetic, and reduces computational complexity. This approach results in significant improvements in the speed of key generation, encryption, and decryption with a marked reduction in rejection probability, compared to schemes utilizing complete NTT. The proposed scheme demonstrates competitive performance against other lattice-based encryption schemes such as Kyber and Frodo. It shows lower encryption and decryption times while offering comparable security levels. Proposed scheme is at least a hundred times faster than Frodo lattice-based public-key encryption schemes. For NIST-recommended security level, in proposed scheme, each encryption needs an average of 300K CPU cycles, and each decryption needs 120K CPU cycles. Additionally, modulus 7937 enables a reduction in key and ciphertext sizes, optimizing the scheme for practical deployment in resource-constrained environments. Performance evaluations confirm the practicality of the scheme with substantial reductions in computational overhead, making it a highly efficient and secure candidate for post-quantum encryption.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant existential threat to current public-key cryptographic standards, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which underpin global digital security. Shor's algorithm, if implemented on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, can efficiently break these foundational schemes, rendering vast amounts of encrypted data vulnerable. This paper investigates lattice-based cryptography as a robust and promising candidate for post-quantum security. We provide a comprehensive analysis of its theoretical underpinnings, focusing on hard problems like the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and Learning With Errors (LWE), which are believed to be intractable even for quantum adversaries. Through a detailed literature review and methodological exposition, we examine the construction principles of prominent lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and digital signature schemes, such as Kyber and Dilithium, highlighting their inherent security properties and performance characteristics. Our results demonstrate that lattice-based schemes offer competitive efficiency, compact key sizes, and strong security guarantees against both classical and quantum attacks, positioning them as essential building blocks for the post-RSA cryptographic landscape. The discussion elaborates on the practical implications, standardization efforts by NIST, and the challenges associated with the transition to quantum-resilient cryptographic infrastructure. We conclude that lattice-based cryptography is a cornerstone of quantum resilience, critical for securing future digital communications and data integrity.
The invention of public-key cryptography (PKC) by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 is one of two milestones marking the beginning of modern cryptography. The security of a PKC system requires that it should be infeasible to compute the private key from a given public key, which in turn is typically guaranteed by the difficulty in solving some cryptographic-friendly mathematical problems. Among those problems, the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems play pivotal roles in the development of public-key cryptography. In particular, the assumption that there is no polynomial time (classical) algorithm that solves the above two problems constitutes the basis for the security of almost all currently used public-key cryptosystems, such as RSA and ElGamal. However, Shor [1] found an efficient quantum solving algorithm for the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems in 1994, which would destroy the security basis for most real deployed PKC systems if large-scale quantum computers become available. The rapid development of quantum technology in recent years suggests that we are getting closer to the quantum crisis of current PKC systems. As a response to the quantum crisis, the research community has made many efforts to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) that are believed to resist quantum computer attacks. Lattice-based cryptography is one of the main directions in this area, and has become the most promising PQC candidate for standardization. The research of lattice-based cryptography dates back to the seminal work of Ajtai [2], which first based the security of cryptographic primitives on the difficulty of solving some lattice problems such as the approximate shortest vector problem and the closest vector problem. After more than two decades of development, lattice-based cryptography has gained substantial progress. In theory, we have witnessed the construction of many powerful cryptographic primitives that were not known before. In practice, the public key size of lattice-based cryptosystems has been significantly reduced from several gigabytes to a few kilobytes. For current applications and standardization, key exchanges, public-key encryptions (PKEs) and signatures are the most desired lattice-based cryptosystems, where the first two are often used to ensure information secrecy, while the last provides information authentication. Note that public-key encryptions are equivalent to two-round key exchanges, also known as the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). In the following, we focus on lattice-based PKEs/KEMs. The design principle of lattice-based PKEs/KEMs follows two approaches: a trapdoor one-way function and an approximate commutative one-way function. In the first approach, a trapdoor one-way function f and its trapdoor f−1 are generated as the public key and private key. A plaintext m is encrypted as c = f(m), and the ciphertext is decrypted as m = f−1(c). The NTRU scheme and its variants follow such an approach. In the second approach, an approximate commutative function fs and a random input a are generated, the public key is (a, b = fs(a)) and the private key is s. A plaintext m is encrypted as c1 = gr(a), c2 = gr(b) + E(m), where r is a random element, g is an approximate commutative one-way function and E is the encoding of an error-correction code. The ciphertext (c1, c2) is decrypted as m = D(c2 − fs(c1)), where D is the decoding of an error-correction code. The correctness of decryption is guaranteed by the approximate commutative property (gr(b) = gr(fs(a)) ≈ fs(gr(a)) = fs(c1)) and the error-correction code. Learning with errors (LWE) problem-based PKE/KEM schemes and their variants follow such an approach. The standardization of PQC has received substantial support from national funding agencies, such as the European Union projects PQCrypto and SAFEcrypto. The USA National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) started the post-quantum standardization project in 2012, organized a worldwide ‘competition’ in 2016 and plans to deliver draft standards before 2024. After two rounds of evaluation, seven schemes were accepted as the round-three candidates on 22 July 2020, of which five are lattice-based schemes. In 2017, the International organization for standardization started a study project of post-quantum cryptography named SD8. Most LWE-based PKE schemes such as Kyber and LAC follow the Lindner-Peikert framework [3] up to the choices of ring structure, noise distribution and parameters. As the size of noise in lattice-based PKEs/EKMs is typically larger than the lower bits of the ciphertext, many schemes often artificially drop a few lower bits to optimize the practical performance without significantly increasing the final decryption noise. Kyber [4] is one of the most promising PKE/KEM candidates in the NIST PQC standardization, whose security is provably based on the difficulty of so-called module LWE (MLWE) problems. The use of MLWE allowed Kyber to obtain additional flexibility and security advantages, while keeping the same efficiency as those based on the ring-LWE problems. The strategy of dropping some lower bits is used to compress both the public-key and ciphertext sizes. For a targeted 128-bit quantum security, the public-key and ciphertext sizes of Kyber is around a single kilobyte. LAC [5] uses several techniques to reduce the modulus as small as possible: it uses a byte-level modulus, embeds powerful error-correcting codes to maximize the noise-modulus rate, provides a different style of modulus to avoid potential attacks for special polynomial ring structures and optimizes the polynomial multiplication algorithm of the bit-level secret and noise. Based on these techniques, LAC reduces the public key to 544–1056 bytes and the ciphertext to 664–1464 bytes. Meanwhile, it achieves similar computational performance compared with NTT technique schemes. By observing the asymmetries in lattice-based cryptosystems, Zhang and Yu et al. [6] proposed asymmetric MLWE and asymmetric MSIS problems, which yield further size-optimized KEMs and signature schemes to those from standard counterparts. Compared to the seven NIST round-three candidates at Category III security, their KEM scheme has parameters (public key + ciphertext size) smaller than Classic McEliece, CRYSTALS-Kyber, NTRU and Saber; their signature scheme has parameters (public key + signature size) smaller than CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Rainbow, but slightly larger than FALCON, where CRYSTALS-Kyber, NTRU, Saber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium and FALCON are lattice-based schemes. One important application of lattice-based PKEs/KEMs is to build authenticated key exchange (AKE), which could provide additional authentication to the established session key. There are several generic ways to construct AKE from lattice-based PKEs/KEMs. In the PKE setting, Xue and Lu et al. [7] proposed a more compact KEM-based framework via a new primitive named ‘2-key KEM’, which shares some item between different ciphertexts. In the only password setting, Zhang and Yu [8] presented a two-round PAKE framework from the splittable-PKEs that can be instantiated from lattices. The only known AKE that does not rely on lattice-based PKEs/KEMs was given in Ref. [9], which has two-round messages and provides implicit authentication. This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (6197239 to X.L.; 62022018 and 61932019 to J.Z.) and the National Key Research and Development Program of China (2018YFB0804105 to J.Z.). Conflict of interest statement. None declared.
The imminent threat posed by the advent of quantum computers to contemporary public-key cryptographic schemes, such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), necessitates a fundamental shift in cryptographic paradigms. Shor's algorithm, specifically, presents a catastrophic vulnerability to these foundational security protocols, underpinning global digital communication and commerce. This paper provides a comprehensive exploration into lattice-based cryptography as a robust and promising candidate for a post-quantum cryptographic future. We delve into the mathematical underpinnings of lattices, elucidating the computational hardness of problems like the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, which form the bedrock of their security. The paper reviews the historical development of lattice-based schemes, their theoretical advantages, and their practical implications, particularly in the context of the ongoing NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization process. We analyze the construction of key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) and digital signature schemes from lattice problems, comparing their performance characteristics and security guarantees against classical methods. The work argues that lattice-based cryptography offers a compelling alternative to RSA, providing not only quantum resistance but also presenting attractive features in terms of efficiency, design simplicity, and versatility for various cryptographic primitives. The discussion extends to implementation challenges, security analysis, and the broader implications for the global migration towards a quantum-secure cryptographic infrastructure.
Cryptography underpins the security of modern digital infrastructure, from cloud services to health data. However, many widely deployed systems will become vulnerable after the advent of scalable quantum computing. Although quantum-safe cryptographic primitives have been developed, such as lattice-based digital signature algorithms (DSAs) and key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), their unique structural and performance characteristics make them unsuitable for existing protocols. In this work, we introduce a quantum-safe single-shot protocol for machine-to-machine authentication and authorization that is specifically designed to leverage the strengths of lattice-based DSAs and KEMs. Operating entirely over insecure channels, this protocol enables the forward-secure establishment of tokens in constrained environments. By demonstrating how new quantum-safe cryptographic primitives can be incorporated into secure systems, this study lays the groundwork for scalable, resilient, and future-proof identity infrastructures in a quantum-enabled world.
The quick progress of quantum computing is a considerable risk to the classical cryptography of the public key and, the creation of quantum-resistant analogs is necessary.This paper provides a generalized architecture of post-quantum cryptographic schemes, by using lattice problems, especially Learning with Errors (LWE) and Ring-LWE (RLWE).The suggested architecture combines the secure public-key encryption and key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) with the implementation in the IoT, blockchain, and cloud setup.An original latticebased encryption design is developed that hybridizes with classical cryptographic primitives to