This paper discusses the fundamental assumptions and background of the consistent histories (CH) approach to quantum mechanics. The focus of the paper is on the concept of frameworks. It is proposed that frameworks should be interpreted objectively as observer-independent realities. Two further options are considered: a hidden-variables variant of the CH approach, and a many-worlds version, which considers each individual history belonging to a given family as describing a separate world. The latter interpretation is subsequently compared and contrasted with the standard many-worlds interpretation. Finally, the solution to the measurement problem offered by the many-worlds variant of CH is analyzed and amended.
This paper discusses the fundamental assumptions and background of the consistent histories (CH) approach to quantum mechanics. The focus of the paper is on the concept of frameworks. It is proposed that frameworks should be interpreted objectively as observer-independent realities. Two further options are considered: a hidden-variables variant of the CH approach, and a many-worlds version, which considers each individual history belonging to a given family as describing a separate world. The latter interpretation is subsequently compared and contrasted with the standard many-worlds interpretation. Finally, the solution to the measurement problem offered by the many-worlds variant of CH is analyzed and amended.
The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism attempts to construct a quantum framework which can be used without the need to introduce observers external to the studied system. The prime motivation in mind is the application of the formalism to the universe as a whole. In order to achieve this, CH maintains that a formulation of quantum mechanics should allow for the assignment of probabilities to alternative histories of a system. Therefore, it provides an observer-independent criterion to decide which sets of histories can be given probabilities and states rules to determine them. The framework establishes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account of a system. Furthermore, the version of CH first presented in [1, 2] proposes an "evolutionary" explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work critically evaluates claims to the effect that the formalism offered in [1, 2] solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, it is pointed out that the interpretation of the proposed framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. The claim of this work is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality.
Abstract: The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechani-cal framework which could be applied even to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative histories of a quantum system. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account, but that different realms can be mutually incom-patible. Finally, some of its proponents offer an “evolutionary ” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational prob-lems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality. 1
In response to recent criticisms by Okon and Sudarsky, various aspects of the consistent histories (CH) resolution of the quantum measurement problem(s) are discussed using a simple Stern-Gerlach device, and compared with the alternative approaches to the measurement problem provided by spontaneous localization (GRW), Bohmian mechanics, many worlds, and standard (textbook) quantum mechanics. Among these CH is unique in solving the second measurement problem: inferring from the measurement outcome a property of the measured system at a time before the measurement took place, as is done routinely by experimental physicists. The main respect in which CH differs from other quantum interpretations is in allowing multiple stochastic descriptions of a given measurement situation, from which one (or more) can be selected on the basis of its utility. This requires abandoning a principle (termed unicity), central to classical physics, that at any instant of time there is only a single correct description of the world.
The consistent histories reformulation of quantum mechanics was developed by Robert Griffiths, given a formal logical systematization by Roland Omn\`{e}s, and under the label `decoherent histories', was independently developed by Murray Gell-Mann and James Hartle and extended to quantum cosmology. Criticisms of CH involve issues of meaning, truth, objectivity, and coherence, a mixture of philosophy and physics. We will briefly consider the original formulation of CH and some basic objections. The reply to these objections, like the objections themselves, involves a mixture of physics and philosophy. These replies support an evaluation of the CH formulation as a replacement for the measurement, or orthodox, interpretation.
A measurement-independent formulation of quantum mechanics called ‘regular histories’ (RH) is presented, able to reproduce the predictions of the standard formalism without the need to for a quantum-classical divide or the presence of an observer. It applies to closed systems and features no wave-function collapse. Weights are assigned only to histories satisfying a criterion called ‘regularity’. As the set of regular histories is not closed under the Boolean operations this requires a new con- cept of weight, called ‘likelihood’. Remarkably, this single change is enough to overcome many of the well-known obstacles to a sensible interpretation of quantum mechanics. For example, Bell’s theorem, which makes essential use of probabilities, places no constraints on the locality properties of a theory based on likelihoods. Indeed, RH is both counter- factually definite and free from action-at-a-distance. Moreover, in RH the meaningful histories are exactly those that can be witnessed at least in principle. Since it is especially difficult to make sense of the concept of probability for histories whose occurrence is intrinsically indeterminable, this makes likelihoods easier to justify than probabilities. Interaction with the environment causes the kinds of histories relevant at the macroscopic scale of human experience to be witnessable and indeed to generate Boolean algebras of witnessable histories, on which likelihoods reduce to ordinary probabilities. Further- more, a formal notion of inference defined on regular histories satisfies, when restricted to such Boolean algebras, the classical axioms of implication, explaining our perception of a largely classical world. Even in the context of general quantum histories the rules of reasoning in RH are remark- ably intuitive. Classical logic must only be amended to reflect the fundamental premise that one cannot meaningfully talk about the occurrence of unwitnessable histories. Crucially, different histories with the same ‘physical content’ can be interpreted in the same way and independently of the family in which they are expressed. RH thereby rectifies a critical flaw of its inspiration, the consistent histories (CH) approach, which requires either an as yet unknown set selection rule or a paradigm shift towards an un- conventional picture of reality whose elements are histories-with-respect-to-a-framework. It can be argued that RH compares favourably with other proposed interpretations of quantum mechanics in that it resolves the measurement problem while retaining an essentially classical worldview without parallel universes, a framework-dependent reality or action-at-a-distance.
Observer dependence is central to Quantum Mechanics; in particular if we associate consistent sets with observer worldviews we can think of the Consistent Histories (CH) interpretation as a formalisation of observer dependence. However we lack a theory of the observers themselves. In this paper we begin by building such a theory within General Relativity (GR), and find that this framework bears close mathematical resemblance to the treatment of consistent sets in CH. We therefore adapt the CHSH framework to identify the `gap' between the classical and quantum theories. We find that the CHSH argument does not hold on a curved background, so that the inequality may be violated by classical theories.