In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the human and social sciences towards contemporary natural science. In this regard, we can talk about a kind of “natural sciences turn” in these fields of knowledge. It is not just a matter of an active use of terminological and ideological baggage from the arsenal of natural sciences, but we can even talk about direct borrowing of argumentation. American researcher Karen Barad is one of the leading figures of this movement. Barad connects her theoretical conception of agential realism directly with quantum mechanics in its interpretation proposed by Niels Bohr. The article compares some of the key concepts of the Bohr vision of quantum mechanics, such as phenomenon, agency of observation with the reading acquired by these concepts in Barad’s agential realism. On a comparative analysis of the interpretation of these concepts by Bohr and Barad a number of problematic points of the concept of agential realism are revealed.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the human and social sciences towards contemporary natural science. In this regard, we can talk about a kind of “natural sciences turn” in these fields of knowledge. It is not just a matter of an active use of terminological and ideological baggage from the arsenal of natural sciences, but we can even talk about direct borrowing of argumentation. American researcher Karen Barad is one of the leading figures of this movement. Barad connects her theoretical conception of agential realism directly with quantum mechanics in its interpretation proposed by Niels Bohr. The article compares some of the key concepts of the Bohr vision of quantum mechanics, such as phenomenon, agency of observation with the reading acquired by these concepts in Barad’s agential realism. On a comparative analysis of the interpretation of these concepts by Bohr and Barad a number of problematic points of the concept of agential realism are revealed.
Abstract The last decade has seen an increasing number of references to quantum mechanics in the humanities and social sciences. This development has in particular been driven by Karen Barad’s agential realism: a theoretical framework that, based on Niels Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, aims to inform social theorizing. In dealing with notions such as agency, power, and embodiment as well as the relation between the material and the discursive level, the influence of agential realism in fields such as feminist science studies and posthumanism has been profound. However, no one has hitherto paused to assess agential realism’s proclaimed quantum mechanical origin including its relation to the writings of Niels Bohr. This is the task taken up here. We find that many of the implications that agential realism allegedly derives from a Bohrian interpretation of quantum mechanics dissent from Bohr’s own views and are in conflict with those of other interpretations of quantum mechanics. Agential realism is at best consistent with quantum mechanics and consequently, it does not capture what quantum mechanics in any strict sense implies for social science or any other domain of inquiry. Agential realism may be interesting and thought provoking from the perspective of social theorizing, but it is neither sanctioned by quantum mechanics nor by Bohr’s authority. This conclusion not only holds for agential realism in particular, it also serves as a general warning against the other attempts to use quantum mechanics in social theorizing.
The article deals with the approach to understanding science and technology as well as natural and cultural practices developed by the American philosopher Karen Barad in the concept of agential realism. The peculiarity of her approach consists in referring as a starting point to quantum mechanics in its interpretation, which was proposed by Niels Bohr. Barad proposes a reinterpretation of Bohr's propositions through revealing their ontological content. In this regard, the article addresses the epistemological and ontological problems that quantum physics has faced, such as the conditions for the possibility of an objective description of the world, the nature of measurement, and the relationship between language and the material world. Discussed is the shift that Barad argues is asserted in Bohr's philosophy-physics, which consists of quantum mechanics moving from the linguistic concepts in which the world of classical science was represented to what Barad calls material-discursive practices through which the world is articulated and explained. The possibilities of a different interpretation of Niels Bohr's philosophy-physics are considered.
K. Barad proposes "agential realism" as a unified approach to natural and social phenomena. The position is inspired by quantum mechanics and in particular the phenomenon of quantum entanglement. Barad also sees similarities between her approach, N. Bohr's view and C. Rovelli's relational quantum mechanics. In our view, agential realism is a kind of ontological correlationism, not a realism. The analogy with the Bohr and Rovelli approaches is only partial. Agential realism is a wrong interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is also unsuitable for social theorizing, for which taking into account the sensitivity of ontology to the context is fundamental. As an alternative, we propose a contextual quantum realism that rejects substantive dualisms (as does Barad), but at the same time accepts the categorical dualism of the real and the ideal. Our approach also allows one to better understand Bohr's position and to correct Rovelli's relational quantum mechanics.
This essay offers a critical reading of Karen Barad’s and Heinrich Päs’ interpretations of quantum mechanics, using a Categorial Differentiation approach to science and religion, which is inspired by Wittgenstein and van Fraassen. Barad and Päs are ontological realists, but their philosophies of quantum mechanics depart from what I call scientistic realist interpretations of quantum mechanics, which are mainstream in the analytic philosophy of physics. After an overview of the ontological turn in the philosophy of quantum mechanics and explaining the basic difference between scientistic and existential kinds of realism, I examine the central features of Barad’s agential realism and Päs’ quantum monism. The Categorial Differentiation approach, which offers a normative perspective on the relationship between science and religion, is introduced, and its relevance for the philosophy (and theology) of quantum mechanics is explained. I conclude the essay with a critical analysis of Barad’s and Päs’ interpretations from this Wittgensteinian perspective, focusing on the ways in which they relate the science of quantum mechanics with their respective existential–moral visions.
In this paper it is argued that Barad's Agential Realism, an approach to quantum mechanics originating in the philosophy of Niels Bohr, can be the basis of a 'theory of everything' consistent with a proposal of Wheeler that observer-participancy is the foundation of everything. On the one hand, agential realism can be grounded in models of self-organisation such as the hypercycles of Eigen, while on the other agential realism, by virtue of the 'discursive practices' that constitute one aspect of the theory, implies the possibility of the generation of physical phenomena through acts of specification originating at a more fundamental level. Included in phenomena that may be generated by such a mechanism are the origin and evolution of life, and human capacities such as mathematical and musical intuition.
Niels Bohr, considered one of the fathers of quantum mechanics, formulated a complex interpretation \nof quantum mechanics that guided his understanding of quantum experiments. The contemporary dispute \nbetween realism and anti-realism, the two main approaches to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, \nis often based on different attitudes towards or even readings of Bohr. We propose that a better \nunderstanding of Bohr’s philosophical thought can contribute to the contemporary reconciliation of \nthese opposing philosophical views and thus to a better understanding of the quantum world. Unfortunately, \nin many contemporary interpretations, Bohr’s philosophical approach to quantum mechanics \nhas been misunderstood, re-interpreted or labelled as ambiguous. This is mostly due to the dispersion \nof Bohr’s complex and unique interpretation through different texts, never united in a single systematically \nconceptualized work. To comprehensively explain Bohr’s philosophical approach and his main \nphilosophical concepts, we consider the many similarities between Bohr’s and Husserl’s philosophical \napproach to science. Husserl developed his philosophical standpoint in a cultural context similar to \nBohr’s and shared Bohr’s objects of philosophical consideration as well as his approach to these objects. \nParallel reading of Bohr’s and Husserl’s texts reveals the closeness between Bohr’s ontological realism— \nepistemological anti-realism standpoint and Husserl’s phenomenological standpoint. This explains \ntheir similar views on the relationship between mathematical language, scientific method and Nature. \nWhile Bohr’s use of the term phenomenon is not equal to Husserl’s, Husserl’s rigorous philosophical \nexplanation of the term helps us to better understand Bohr’s use. Furthermore, the parallel reading \nfacilitates better understanding of one of Bohr’s main philosophical theses, often labelled as ambiguous \nand interpreted in different ways, that it is necessary to use classical concepts to describe quantum phenomena. \nWe claim that the thesis is connected with the advance of epistemological reconsideration of \nscience at the time of Bohr’s writing. Thus, Bohr considers some parts of argumentation as self-evident, \nwhile they are not evident to the contemporary reader. Husserl’s analysis of the relationship between science and the life-world offers a much-needed background for a comprehensive understanding of \nBohr’s thesis. The insight into the similarities between Bohr’s and Husserl’s philosophical approach \nto science and scientific phenomena enables a philosophically rigorous reading of Bohr’s texts; it can \neliminate some of the disagreements between realists and anti-realists and provide a firmer philosophical \nground for a dialog between them.