Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD)

Hybrid Post-Quantum Enhanced TLS 1.3 on Embedded Devices

Dominik Marchsreiter, Johanna Sepúlveda

Published Aug 1, 2022• 22 citations

Abstract

Most of todays Internet connections are protected through the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Its client-server handshake mechanism provides authentication, privacy and data integrity between communicating applications. It is also the security base for the 5G connectivity. While currently considered secure, the dawn of quantum computing represents a threat for TLS. In order to prepare for such an event, TLS must integrate quantum-secure (post-quantum) cryptography (PQC). The use of hybrid approaches, that combines PQC and traditional cryptography are recommended by security agencies. Efficient PQC integration at TLS requires the exploration of a wide set of design parameters and platforms. To this end this work presents the following contributions. First, wide evaluation of PQC-enhanced TLS hybrid protocols, using end-to-end communication latency as metric. Second, the exploration and benchmarking in constrained embedded devices. Third, a wide traffic analysis, including the impact and behavior of PQC-enhanced hybrid TLS in real practical scenarios.

DOI: 10.1109/dsd57027.2022.00127

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