Ambient backscatter communication (AmBC) enables ultra-low-power communications by backscattering ambient radio frequency (RF) signals and harvesting energy simultaneously. It has emerged as a cutting-edge technology for supporting a variety of Internet of Things (IoT) applications. However, existing research lacks effective secret key sharing schemes for safeguarding communications between resource-constrained backscatter devices (BDs) in AmBC systems. In this paper, we present, Tri-Channel, a novel physical layer key generation scheme between two BDs by multiplying downlink signals and backscatter signals to obtain the information of a triangle channel as a shared random secret source for key generation. In particular, we analyze the security of our scheme under both passive and active attacks, concretely Eavesdropping Attack (EA), Control Channel Attack (CCA), Signal Manipulative Attack (SMA), and Untrusted RF-Source Attack (URSA). Through theoretical analysis and simulations by comparing with a traditional scheme (named Tradi-Channel), we found that our scheme consistently outperforms the Tradi-Channel under the EA and two active attacks (CCA and SMA). In addition, it shows better security performance under URSA, which is proposed based on the unauthenticated characteristic of BDs in Tri-Channel, even though URSA is more vital than SMA. Concretely, Tri-Channel’s secret key rate (SKR) outperforms Tradi-Channel’s under the above four passive and active attacks. This implies that our scheme is advanced in terms of both security and efficiency of key generation. Numerous extensive simulations further prove our theoretical analysis results.
Ambient backscatter communication (AmBC) enables ultra-low-power communications by backscattering ambient radio frequency (RF) signals and harvesting energy simultaneously. It has emerged as a cutting-edge technology for supporting a variety of Internet of Things (IoT) applications. However, existing research lacks effective secret key sharing schemes for safeguarding communications between resource-constrained backscatter devices (BDs) in AmBC systems. In this paper, we present, Tri-Channel, a novel physical layer key generation scheme between two BDs by multiplying downlink signals and backscatter signals to obtain the information of a triangle channel as a shared random secret source for key generation. In particular, we analyze the security of our scheme under both passive and active attacks, concretely Eavesdropping Attack (EA), Control Channel Attack (CCA), Signal Manipulative Attack (SMA), and Untrusted RF-Source Attack (URSA). Through theoretical analysis and simulations by comparing with a traditional scheme (named Tradi-Channel), we found that our scheme consistently outperforms the Tradi-Channel under the EA and two active attacks (CCA and SMA). In addition, it shows better security performance under URSA, which is proposed based on the unauthenticated characteristic of BDs in Tri-Channel, even though URSA is more vital than SMA. Concretely, Tri-Channel’s secret key rate (SKR) outperforms Tradi-Channel’s under the above four passive and active attacks. This implies that our scheme is advanced in terms of both security and efficiency of key generation. Numerous extensive simulations further prove our theoretical analysis results.
Ambient backscatter communication (AmBC), which enables energy harvesting and ultra-low-power communication by utilizing ambient radio frequency (RF) signals, has emerged as a cutting-edge technology to realize numerous Internet of Things (IoT) applications. However, the current literature lacks efficient secret key sharing solutions for resource-limited devices in AmBC systems to protect the backscatter communications, especially for private data transmission. Thus, we propose a novel physical layer key generation scheme between backscatter devices (BDs) by exploiting received superposed ambient signals. Based on the repeated patterns (i.e., cyclic prefix in OFDM symbols) in ambient RF signals, we present a joint transceiver design of BD backscatter waveform and BD receiver to extract the downlink signal and the backscatter signal from the superposed signals. By multiplying the downlink signal and the backscatter signal, we can actually obtain the triangle channel information as a shared random secret source for key generation. Besides, we study the trade-off between the rate of secret key generation and harvested energy by modeling it as a joint optimization problem. Finally, extensive numerical simulations are provided to evaluate the key generation performance, energy harvesting performance, and their trade-offs under various system settings.
The necessity for ultra-low-power consumption devices that enable the Internet of Things (IoT) networks to be more energy efficient, leads to considering Ambient Backscatter Communication (AmBC). Such devices exploit ambient radio-frequency signals to communicate and harvest energy. Though, the physical layer key generation (PLKG) scheme that enables AmBC to generate a secret key for data encryption, is vulnerable to injection attacks. Under such a menace, an attacker injects predefined signals and contributes to the PLKG. Thereby, it possesses a part of the generated bits and uses brute force attack to compromise the entire key. Inspired by that, we carefully prove the vulnerability of the existing PLKG approach in AmBC to injection attack. Then, we propose the employment of a smart device that aims at detecting the attack and canceling the malicious signal. Furthermore, we propose a new strategy that enables legitimate devices to utilize the entire received ambient signal for PLKG while exploiting the malicious signal for energy harvesting. Hence, the attacker becomes the victim. Finally, we provide numerical simulations that accentuate the consequence of the menace and the effectiveness of our security method, even though only 80% of the injected signal is removed. Besides, we prove the efficacy of our energy harvesting strategy.
Abstract: Physical layer key generation, leveraging the reciprocity and randomness of wireless fading channels, has garnered significant research interest in recent years. While theoretical studies have demonstrated its potential to generate informationtheoretically secure keys, challenges remain in translating theory into practice. This paper provides an overview of the physical layer key generation process and discusses its practical challenges. Various passive and active attacks are analyzed and evaluated through numerical studies. A new key generation scheme using random probing signals and combining usergenerated randomness with channel randomness is introduced to counteract active attacks. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves higher security strength than existing schemes using constant probing signals under active attacks. Secret-key generation relying on wireless channel reciprocity is an intriguing solution as it can be efficiently implemented at the physical layer of emerging wireless communication networks, while providing information-theoretic security guarantees. In this paper, we investigate and compare the secret-key capacity based on the sampling of the entire complex channel state information (CSI) or only its envelope, the received signal strength (RSS).
Internet-of-Things (IoT) networks generally contain resource-constrained devices that require an energy-efficient key generation procedure to producing secure keys at a faster rate. The physical characteristics of the wireless channel can be exploited to secure communication within IoT networks. In particular, secret keys can be generated by leveraging on the randomness of the wireless physical channel between two communicating parties. The conventional mechanism of generating keys at the physical layer, i.e., using channel probing, quantization, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification, may not be preferable for IoT devices. In addition, in some cases IoT devices may be deployed in static environments, wherein the channel coherence time is too high to generate keys at a faster rate and with the desired randomness. This study proposes a mapping table-based key distribution scheme for IoT environments, wherein multiple characteristics of the random channel are combined to improve not only the key generation rate (KGR) but also the key agreement rate (KAR) and bit error rate (BER). In the proposed scheme, both the channel magnitude and the phase are exploited in the key generation process. The proposed scheme is immune to channel estimation errors while providing sufficient randomness in the static environment. Additionally, the scheme is thoroughly investigated for different scenarios including the case of a smarter eavesdropper, which attempts to estimate the channel between the legitimate nodes. This case verifies the robustness of the proposed scheme in different settings and attack models.
Secret key generation based on channel characteristics is an effective physical-layer security method for 5G wireless networks. The issues of how to ensure the high key generation rate and correlation of the secret key under active attack are needed to be addressed. In this paper, a new practical secret key generation scheme with high rate and correlation is proposed. In our proposed scheme, Alice and Bob transmit independent random sequences instead of known training sequences or probing signals; neither Alice nor Bob can decode these random sequences or estimate the channel. User's random sequences together with the channel effects are used as common random source to generate the secret key. With this solution, legitimate users are able to share secret keys with sufficient length and high security under active attack. We evaluate the proposed scheme through both analytic and simulation studies. The results show that our proposed scheme achieves high key generation rate and key security, and is suitable for 5G wireless networks with resource-constrained devices.
This paper studies the secrecy outage performance (SOP) of an energy-harvesting multi-backscatter-device (BD) network in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. A dedicated radio-frequency source illuminates multiple BDs employing power splitting (PS), and the BD with the strongest source-to-BD channel is opportunistically selected for confidential backscatter transmission. Unlike conventional secure backscatter communication models that assume an always-active BD, we explicitly impose a practical circuit-activation constraint requiring the selected BD to harvest sufficient energy before transmission. Consequently, the selected source-to-BD channel jointly determines circuit availability and the strengths of the legitimate and wiretap cascaded links. A tractable analytical framework for the SOP is developed by accounting for activation failure, secrecy-rate outage, opportunistic selection, PS, and Rayleigh fading. Since the activation constraint yields a non-zero lower integration bound, we derive a finite-sum approximation using the binomial expansion and Gaussian -Chebyshev quadrature. We further obtain a high-signal-to-noise-ratio expression that reveals a non-zero secrecy outage floor caused by the proportional scaling of the legitimate and eavesdropping links. Monte Carlo simulations validate the analysis and show that increasing the number of candidate BDs improves secrecy performance, particularly in energy-limited regimes, but with diminishing returns. The results also reveal the trade-off between circuit activation and backscattered-signal strength and quantify the effects of the activation threshold, PS coefficient, and channel conditions on secrecy performance. Keywords: Energy harvesting, backscatter communication, physical layer security, secrecy outage probability, power splitting