The promise of scalable quantum computing is causing major upheaval in the domain of cryptography and security. In this perspective paper, we review the progress towards the realization of large-scale quantum computing. We further summarize the imminent threats towards existing cryptographic primitives. To address this challenges, there is a consolidated effort towards the standardization of new cryptographic primitives, namely post-quantum cryptography (PQC). We discuss the underlying mathematical problems that define different classes of PQC candidates, and their resistance to an adversary having access to large Quantum computer. In parallel to this thread of research, several classical cryptographic primitives have been ported to the Quantum world as well. We discuss, in that context - Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) and True Random Number Generator (TRNG). For those implementations, we take a sneak preview in the resulting implementation-related vulnerabilities.
The promise of scalable quantum computing is causing major upheaval in the domain of cryptography and security. In this perspective paper, we review the progress towards the realization of large-scale quantum computing. We further summarize the imminent threats towards existing cryptographic primitives. To address this challenges, there is a consolidated effort towards the standardization of new cryptographic primitives, namely post-quantum cryptography (PQC). We discuss the underlying mathematical problems that define different classes of PQC candidates, and their resistance to an adversary having access to large Quantum computer. In parallel to this thread of research, several classical cryptographic primitives have been ported to the Quantum world as well. We discuss, in that context - Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) and True Random Number Generator (TRNG). For those implementations, we take a sneak preview in the resulting implementation-related vulnerabilities.
Cryptography and security are experiencing a period of profound change due to the potential for scalable quantum computing. Here we take a look back at how far we’ve come in our quest to make large-scale quantum computing a reality. We also provide a brief overview of the current cryptographic primitives and the dangers they face. New cryptographic primitives, known as post-quantum cryptography (PQC), are being standardized in an attempt to overcome these difficulties. We talk about the mathematical issues that characterize various types of PQC candidates and how they can withstand an attack from a hostile party with access to a powerful quantum computer. This line of inquiry has occurred with the porting of numerous conventional cryptography primitives to the quantum realm. This is the setting in which we talk about TRNG, Physically Enclosable Function, and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). We get a sneak peek at the implementation-related vulnerabilities that result from such implementations.
With the rapid advancement regarding quantum computing, traditional cryptographic systems face an existential threat because of their reliance concerning mathematical challenges which may be addressed effectively solved using quantum algorithms like the one developed by Shor. This imminent risk has driven extensive research into quantum-resistant cryptography (PQC), that seeks to develop encryption methods resilient against attacks powered by quantum computing. This study offers a thorough literature survey on high-level security techniques in quantum security for PQC, analysing past and current research efforts in this domain. We first examine the vulnerabilities of classical cryptographic protocols, including public-key encryption methods such as RSA (developed by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) and ECC (which uses elliptic curve mathematics), and traditional cryptographic hashing methods, against quantum adversaries. The study then explores the foundational approaches to quantum-secure cryptography, including lattice-based, hash-based, multivariate polynomial, code-based, and isogeny-based encryption methods that possess emerged as promising candidates for standardization. The survey highlights key challenges in the real-world application of PQC, including performance trade-offs, key size overhead, and deployment complexities. We conclude by identifying future research directions during the creation of scalable, efficient, and provably secure cryptographic methods designed to withstand quantum attacks techniques. As the shift toward the quantum-resilient era approaches, this survey aims to provide a clear and structured comprehension of the evolving the domain of quantum security for PQC.
The rapid growth of quantum computing poses a critical threat to classical cryptographic systems. That is due in large part to the fact that they represent efficient solutions for some of the most challenging mathematical problems such as integer factoring or finding discrete logarithms. Schemes currently in wide use including RSA, Diffie–Hellman, and elliptic curve cryptography are particularly susceptible to being attacked by quantum computers, using algorithms like Shor's Algorithm and Grover's Algorithm. The advent of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) provides a promising potential answer to providing longterm security from adversaries using quantum computing capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive state-of-the-art review of various PQC techniques currently being researched, including lattice-based methods, code-based methods, multivariate methods, hash-based methods, and isogeny-based methods. key challenges that will need to be addressed include computational overhead, large key sizes and implementation complexity. Furthermore the study reviews the current standardization efforts by the National Institute of Standards and Technology related to PQC and discusses some of the very specific practical considerations that need to be considered before widely deploying these techniques. The paper concludes by a complete list of existing research challenges and proposed future work that will assist in the development of efficient and scalable systems that will resist attacks from quantum computers.
The emergence of quantum computing has provided new paradigms for cryptography. On the one hand, it poses significant new threats to existing classically cryptographic systems, requiring the community to define new security models that capture what a quantum adversary can do. On the other hand, it gives us new tools to design cryptographic protocols, with weaker assumptions than in the classical world, or even protocols that are impossible classically. In this survey, we first give an overview of new security definitions for classical cryptography, considering quantum adversaries who can either only use local quantum computation (post-quantum security), or even send quantum messages and in particular have access to oracle in superposition (quantum security). We explore these new notions through the examples of commitments, zero-knowledge proofs, encryption, and signatures. Then, we present what is arguably the most famous application of quantum cryptography: quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that take advantage of unique properties of quantum mechanics to provide secure communication unconditionally. We also explore cryptography beyond QKD, focusing on unclonable cryptography: a family of cryptographic functionalities, built with quantum states, and designed to be resistant to counterfeit by leveraging the “no-cloning” theorem. We examine in particular quantum money, but also the recent notions of unclonable encryption and copy-protection, including related variants. By presenting a comprehensive survey of these topics, this paper aims to provide a thorough understanding of the current landscape and future potential of quantum cryptography.
Quantum computing poses a significant threat to conventional cryptographic systems that rely on the difficulty of mathematical problems such as integer factorization and discrete logarithms. These systems underpin much of the current security infrastructure, including public key cryptography and digital signatures. As quantum computers approach practical viability, there is an urgent need to transition to quantum-resistant cryptographic solutions that can secure digital communications against adversaries equipped with quantum capabilities. This paper explores the landscape of quantum-resistant cryptography, focusing on those algorithms that have emerged either as standards or as leading algorithm. Furthermore, the paper examines the progress of standardization efforts, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) initiative, and the implications of deploying these algorithms in existing systems. By addressing the practical considerations for adoption, this study aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the current state and future directions of quantum-resistant cryptography, ensuring robust security in a post-quantum world.
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a rapidly developing field that addresses the potential threat quantum computers pose to the security of current cryptographic algorithms. With the rapid advancement of quantum computing technologies, it has become imperative to identify and standardize new cryptographic techniques that can withstand attacks from quantum computers. This paper explores the motivation behind PQC and provides an overview of the experimental research conducted in the field. It highlights the vulnerabilities of traditional cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA and ECC, to quantum attacks and emphasizes the need for transitioning to quantum-resistant alternatives. The experiments conducted in the PQC domain encompass the evaluation and analysis of candidate algorithms submitted to the NIST PQC competition. These experiments involve comprehensive security assessments, performance evaluations, and code audits to ensure the suitability and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms in real-world scenarios. This paper provides guidelines for organizations and practitioners adopting PQC. It discusses considerations for selecting and implementing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, including security levels, algorithmic characteristics, performance tradeoffs, and integration challenges. It also outlines the importance of a smooth transition from classical to post-quantum cryptographic systems and highlights the need for standardization efforts to ensure interoperability and compatibility.