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SPIE Conference on Quantum and Nonlinear Optics

Study of a single-photon detector blinding attack with modulated bright light

Daniil S. Bulavkin, Ivan S. Sushchev, Kirill E. Bugai, Sergey A. Bogdanov, D.A. Dvoretskiy

Published Nov 27, 2022• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we present the research of the blinding attack on single photon avalanche diodes (SPAD) based on InGaAs structure which is used in quantum key distribution systems with modulated laser radiation. One of the variants of this attack is using continuous wave (CW) light but there is protection from it like monitoring of SPAD’s current. Thus, we use modulated CW radiations. Modulation allows us to establish parameters of blinding pulses. We studied the dependencies of the detector’s bias current on blinding pulse energy using different widths of light pulses in the range from 4ns to 20 ns than we applied various repetition rates which are 10 MHz, 5 MHz, 2.5 MHz, and 1MHz. Even we investigate this dependence using the not rectangular shape of pulses on repetition rates mentioned above.

DOI
10.1117/12.2641984

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In this paper, we present the research of the blinding attack on single photon avalanche diodes (SPAD) based on InGaAs structure which is used in quantum key distribution systems with modulated laser radiation. One of the variants of this attack is using continuous wave (CW) light but there is protection from it like monitoring of SPAD’s current. Thus, we use modulated CW radiations. Modulation allows us to establish parameters of blinding pulses. We studied the dependencies of the detector’s bias current on blinding pulse energy using different widths of light pulses in the range from 4ns to 20 ns than we applied various repetition rates which are 10 MHz, 5 MHz, 2.5 MHz, and 1MHz. Even we investigate this dependence using the not rectangular shape of pulses on repetition rates mentioned above.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD), rooted in quantum mechanics, offers information-theoretic security. However, practical systems open security threats due to imperfections, notably bright-light blinding attacks targeting single-photon detectors. Here, we propose a concise, robust defense strategy for protecting single-photon detectors in QKD systems against blinding attacks. Our strategy uses a dual approach: detecting the bias current of the avalanche photodiode (APD) to defend against continuous-wave blinding attacks, and monitoring the avalanche amplitude to protect against pulsed blinding attacks. By integrating these two branches, the proposed solution effectively identifies and mitigates a wide range of bright light injection attempts, significantly enhancing the resilience of QKD systems against various bright-light blinding attacks. This method fortifies the safeguards of quantum communications and offers a crucial contribution to the field of quantum information security.
We present a countermeasure against the detector blinding attack (DBA) utilizing statistical analysis of error and double-click events accumulated during a quantum key distribution session under randomized modulation of single-photon avalanche diode (SPAD) detection probabilities via gate voltage manipulation. Building upon prior work demonstrating the ineffectiveness of this countermeasure against continuous-wave (CW) DBA, we extend the analysis to evaluate its performance against pulsed DBA. Our findings reveal an approximately 13 dB increase in the trigger pulse energies difference between default and reduced gate voltage applied under pulsed DBA conditions compared to CW DBA. This heightened difference enables a re-evaluation of the feasibility of utilizing SPAD detection probability variations as a countermeasure and makes it possible to estimate the fraction of bits compromised by an adversary during pulsed DBA.
We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these detectors are controllable by the same attack used to hack passively-quenched and gated detectors. This demonstrates the generality of our attack and its possible applicability to eavsdropping the full secret key of all QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Moreover, the commercial detector model we tested (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR) exhibits two new blinding mechanisms in addition to the previously observed thermal blinding of the APD, namely: malfunctioning of the bias voltage control circuit, and overload of the DC/DC converter biasing the APD. These two new technical loopholes found just in one detector model suggest that this problem must be solved in general, by incorporating generally imperfect detectors into the security proof for QKD.
We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these detectors are controllable by the same attack used to hack passively-quenched and gated detectors. This demonstrates the generality of our attack and its possible applicability to eavsdropping the full secret key of all QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Moreover, the commercial detector model we tested (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR) exhibits two new blinding mechanisms in addition to the previously observed thermal blinding of the APD, namely: malfunctioning of the bias voltage control circuit, and overload of the DC/DC converter biasing the APD. These two new technical loopholes found just in one detector model suggest that this problem must be solved in general, by incorporating generally imperfect detectors into the security proof for QKD.
Single photon detectors (SPDs) based on passively quenched avalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than 1 nW. A bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum key distribution system containing such detectors is described in this paper. In this regime, all SPDs in the receiver Bob are uniformly blinded by continuous illumination coming from the eavesdropper Eve. When Eve needs a certain detector in Bob to produce a click, she modifies the polarization (or other parameters used to encode quantum states) of the light she sends to Bob such that the target detector stops receiving light, while the other detector(s) continue to be illuminated. The target detector regains single photon sensitivity and, when Eve modifies the polarization again, produces a single click. Thus, Eve has full control of Bob and can perform a successful intercept–resend attack. To check the feasibility of the attack, three different models of passively quenched detectors have been tested. In the experiment, I have simulated the intensity diagrams the detectors would receive in a real QKD system under attack. Control parameters and side effects are considered. It appears that the attack could be practically possible.
We derive the time-dependent photo-detection probability equation of a superconducting single photon detector (SSPD) to study the responsive property for a pulse train at high repetition rate. Using this equation, we analyze the characteristics of SSPDs when illuminated by bright pulses in blinding attack on a quantum key distribution (QKD). We obtain good agreement between expected values based on our equation and actual experimental values. Such a time-dependent probability analysis contributes to security analysis.