International Conference on Computer Science and Engineering (UBMK)
Performance Evaluation of TLS 1.3 Handshake on Resource-Constrained Devices Using NIST's Third Round Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms and Digital Signatures
Towards the end of the 20. century, quantum computing came into sight by the main effect of Shor's Algorithm. While this algorithm offers a solution for the factorization problem, which makes it exponentially faster, it alongside becomes a critical threat for the encryption schemes since mostly their security mechanisms rely on the difficulty of integer factorization or discrete log problems. Despite it is not known when advanced quantum computers will show up, yet, once it is developed, most existing cryptography will be rendered useless, which means all existing information security will be vulnerable. Owing to this risky situation, The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standardization process for the development of PQC schemes. In this paper, we have chosen three key encapsulation mechanisms and two digital signature algorithms with different parameter sets from the round three submissions. We measured their TLS 1.3 handshake performance using two resource-constrained devices and compared it to that of classical encryption and digital signature schemes. Experiment results showed that post-quantum algorithms come with an extra message overhead while their handshake delay values are promising.
Towards the end of the 20. century, quantum computing came into sight by the main effect of Shor's Algorithm. While this algorithm offers a solution for the factorization problem, which makes it exponentially faster, it alongside becomes a critical threat for the encryption schemes since mostly their security mechanisms rely on the difficulty of integer factorization or discrete log problems. Despite it is not known when advanced quantum computers will show up, yet, once it is developed, most existing cryptography will be rendered useless, which means all existing information security will be vulnerable. Owing to this risky situation, The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standardization process for the development of PQC schemes. In this paper, we have chosen three key encapsulation mechanisms and two digital signature algorithms with different parameter sets from the round three submissions. We measured their TLS 1.3 handshake performance using two resource-constrained devices and compared it to that of classical encryption and digital signature schemes. Experiment results showed that post-quantum algorithms come with an extra message overhead while their handshake delay values are promising.
Advances in quantum computers may pose a significant threat to existing public-key encryption methods, which are crucial to the current infrastructure of cyber security. Both RSA and ECDSA, the two most widely used security algorithms today, may be (in principle) solved by the Shor algorithm in polynomial time due to its ability to efficiently solve the discrete logarithm problem, potentially making present infrastructures insecure against a quantum attack. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) reacted with the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standardization process to develop and optimize a series of post-quantum algorithms (PQAs) based on difficult mathematical problems that are not susceptible to being solved by Shor’s algorithm. Whilst high-powered computers can run these PQAs efficiently, further work is needed to investigate and benchmark the performance of these algorithms on lower-powered (constrained) devices and the ease with which they may be integrated into existing protocols such as TLS. This paper provides quantitative benchmark and handshake performance data for the most recently selected PQAs from NIST, tested on a Raspberry Pi 4 device to simulate today’s IoT (Internet of Things) devices, and provides quantitative comparisons with previous benchmarking data on a range of constrained systems. CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium are shown to be the most efficient PQAs in the key encapsulation and signature algorithms, respectively, with Falcon providing the optimal TLS handshake size.
Quantum Computers (QCs) differ radically from traditional computers and can efficiently solve mathematical problems fundamental to our current cryptographic algorithms. Although existing QCs need to accommodate more qubits to break cryptographic algorithms, the concern of ''Store-Now-Decrypt-Later'' (i.e., adversaries store encrypted data today and decrypt them once powerful QCs become available) highlights the necessity to adopt quantum-safe approaches as soon as possible. In this work, we investigate the performance impact of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) on TLS 1.3. Different signature algorithms and key agreements (as proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)) are examined through black- and white-box measurements to get precise handshake latencies and computational costs per participating library. We emulated loss, bandwidth, and delay to analyze constrained environments. Our results reveal that HQC and Kyber are on par with our current state-of-the-art, while Dilithium and Falcon are even faster. We observed no performance drawback from using hybrid algorithms; moreover, on higher NIST security levels, PQC outperformed any algorithm in use today. Hence, we conclude that post-quantum TLS is suitable for adoption in today's systems.
In recent years, there has been steady progress in the creation of quantum computers. If large-scale quantum computers are implemented, they will threaten the security of many widely used public-key cryptosystems. Key-establishment schemes and digital signatures based on factorization, discrete logarithms, and elliptic curve cryptography will be most affected. Symmetric cryptographic primitives such as block ciphers and hash functions will be broken only slightly. As a result, there has been an intensification of research on finding public-key cryptosystems that would be secure against cryptanalysts with both quantum and classical computers. This area is often called post-quantum cryptography (PQC), or sometimes quantum-resistant cryptography. The goal is to design schemes that can be deployed in existing communication networks and protocols without significant changes. The National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of selecting one or more public-key cryptographic algorithms through an open competition. New public-key cryptography standards will define one or more additional digital signatures, public-key encryption, and key-establishment algorithms. It is assumed that these algorithms will be able to protect confidential information well in the near future, including after the advent of quantum computers. After three rounds of evaluation and analysis, NIST has selected the first algorithms that will be standardized as a result of the PQC standardization process. The purpose of this article is to review and analyze the state of NIST's post-quantum cryptography standardization evaluation and selection process. The article summarizes each of the 15 candidate algorithms from the third round and identifies the algorithms selected for standardization, as well as those that will continue to be evaluated in the fourth round of analysis. Although the third round is coming to an end and NIST will begin developing the first PQC standards, standardization efforts in this area will continue for some time. This should not be interpreted as meaning that users should wait to adopt post-quantum algorithms. NIST looks forward to the rapid implementation of these first standardized algorithms and will issue future guidance on the transition. The transition will undoubtedly have many complexities, and there will be challenges for some use cases such as IoT devices or certificate transparency.
We benchmark the TLS 1.3 handshake using post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, including both key encapsulation mechanisms and digital signature schemes, and compare them against traditional, non-quantum-safe counterparts. Our evaluation covers all FIPS-approved post-quantum standards (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA), as well as a selection of digital signature schemes from second-round candidates of the NIST PQC competition that are available in the liboqs library from the Open Quantum Safe project. To assess real-world performance, we simulate various network conditions (rate, delay, and losses) and analyze the impact of post-quantum cryptography on TLS connection latency.
Recent developments in quantum computing have shed light on the shortcomings of the conventional public cryptosystem. Even while Shor's algorithm cannot yet be implemented on quantum computers, it indicates that asymmetric key encryption will not be practicable or secure in the near future. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has started looking for a post-quantum encryption algorithm that is resistant to the development of future quantum computers as a response to this security concern. The current focus is on standardizing asymmetric cryptography that should be impenetrable by a quantum computer. This has become increasingly important in recent years. Currently, the process of standardizing asymmetric cryptography is coming very close to being finished. This study evaluated the performance of two post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms, both of which were selected as NIST fourth-round finalists. The research assessed the key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation operations, providing insights into their efficiency and suitability for real-world applications. Further research and standardization efforts are required to enable secure and efficient post-quantum encryption. When selecting appropriate post-quantum encryption algorithms for specific applications, factors such as security levels, performance requirements, key sizes, and platform compatibility should be taken into account. This paper provides helpful insight for post-quantum cryptography researchers and practitioners, assisting in the decision-making process for selecting appropriate algorithms to protect confidential data in the age of quantum computing.
The emergence of large-scale quantum computing presents an imminent threat to contemporary public-key cryptosystems, with quantum algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm capable of efficiently breaking RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). This vulnerability has catalyzed accelerated standardization efforts for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and global security stakeholders. While theoretical security analysis of these quantum-resistant algorithms has advanced considerably, comprehensive real-world performance benchmarks spanning diverse computing environments—from high-performance cloud infrastructure to severely resource-constrained IoT devices—remain insufficient for informed deployment planning. This paper presents the most extensive cross-platform empirical evaluation to date of NIST-selected PQC algorithms, including CRYSTALS-Kyber and NTRU for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), alongside BIKE as a code-based alternative, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon for digital signatures. Our systematic benchmarking framework measures computational latency, memory utilization, key sizes, and protocol overhead across multiple security levels (NIST Levels 1, 3, and 5) in three distinct hardware environments and various network conditions. Results demonstrate that contemporary server architectures can implement these algorithms with negligible performance impact (<5% additional latency), making immediate adoption feasible for cloud services. In contrast, resource-constrained devices experience more significant overhead, with computational demands varying by up to 12× between algorithms at equivalent security levels, highlighting the importance of algorithm selection for edge deployments. Beyond standalone algorithm performance, we analyze integration challenges within existing security protocols, revealing that naive implementation of PQC in TLS 1.3 can increase handshake size by up to 7× compared to classical approaches. To address this, we propose and evaluate three optimization strategies that reduce bandwidth requirements by 40–60% without compromising security guarantees. Our investigation further encompasses memory-constrained implementation techniques, side-channel resistance measures, and hybrid classical-quantum approaches for transitional deployments. Based on these comprehensive findings, we present a risk-based migration framework and algorithm selection guidelines tailored to specific use cases, including financial transactions, secure firmware updates, vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, and IoT fleet management. This practical roadmap enables organizations to strategically prioritize systems for quantum-resistant upgrades based on data sensitivity, resource constraints, and technical feasibility. Our results conclusively demonstrate that PQC is deployment-ready for most applications, provided that implementations are carefully optimized for the specific performance characteristics and security requirements of target environments. We also identify several remaining research challenges for the community, including further optimization for ultra-constrained devices, standardization of hybrid schemes, and hardware acceleration opportunities.