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Secure communications with low-orbit spacecraft using quantum cryptography

Richard Hughes

Published Jan 23, 2023• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

Apparatus and method for secure communication between an earth station and spacecraft. A laser outputs single pulses that are split into preceding bright pulses and delayed attenuated pulses, and polarized. A Pockels cell changes the polarization of the polarized delayed attenuated pulses according to a string of random numbers, a first polarization representing a "1," and a second polarization representing a "0." At the receiving station, a beamsplitter randomly directs the preceding bright pulses and the polarized delayed attenuated pulses onto longer and shorter paths, both terminating in a beamsplitter which directs the preceding bright pulses and a first portion of the polarized delayed attenuated pulses to a first detector, and a second portion of the polarized delayed attenuated pulses to a second detector to generate a key for secure communication between the earth station and the spacecraft.

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Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•Sep 28, 2006•4 citations
Apparatus and method for secure communication between an earth station and spacecraft. A laser outputs single pulses that are split into preceding bright pulses and delayed attenuated pulses, and polarized. A Pockels cell changes the polarization of the polarized delayed attenuated pulses according to a string of random numbers, a first polarization representing a "1," and a second polarization representing a "0." At the receiving station, a beamsplitter randomly directs the preceding bright pulses and the polarized delayed attenuated pulses onto longer and shorter paths, both terminating in a beamsplitter which directs the preceding bright pulses and a first portion of the polarized delayed attenuated pulses to a first detector, and a second portion of the polarized delayed attenuated pulses to a second detector to generate a key for secure communication between the earth station and the spacecraft.
A quantum cryptography apparatus securely generates a key to be used for secure transmission between a sender and a receiver connected by an atmospheric transmission link. A first laser outputs a timing bright light pulse; other lasers output polarized optical data pulses after having been enabled by a random bit generator. Output optics transmit output light from the lasers that is received by receiving optics. A first beam splitter receives light from the receiving optics, where a received timing bright light pulse is directed to a delay circuit for establishing a timing window for receiving light from the lasers and where an optical data pulse from one of the lasers has a probability of being either transmitted by the beam splitter or reflected by the beam splitter. A first polarizer receives transmitted optical data pulses to output one data bit value and a second polarizer receives reflected optical data pulses to output a second data bit value. A computer receives pulses representing receipt of a timing bright timing pulse and the first and second data bit values, where receipt of the first and second data bit values is indexed by the bright timing pulse.
Geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) satellites can extend the transmission distance of the quantum states and the intercrossing time between the satellites and the ground, which will greatly promote the application spatial scale of quantum communications. In this work we report the first experimental test of transmission of photonic polarization states from a GEO SJ-20 satellite at more than 36,000 km distance to the Li-jiang ground station at Yun-nan Observatory. The test equipment carried on the satellite can send four kinds of photonic polarization states at 50 MHz pulse frequency. A 1.76 m telescope and related optical system in the ground station are used to receive the photonic polarization states, and then these polarization states are probed by the superconducting nanowire single photon detector. The test results show that the optical attenuation between the GEO satellite and the ground station is 100 ˜ 110 dB and the channel bit error rate is 2%–8%, which meet the security criteria of quantum key distribution and quantum secure direct communication.
Described herein are various technologies pertaining to detecting tampering of a seal based upon quantum optical communication via a communications channel comprising the seal. A plurality of pulses of light encoded with random data are transmitted on the communications channel, whereupon they are received and their data values measured. The measured data values of the pulses are then compared to the known transmitted data to determine a correlation statistic between the transmitted and received data values. Tampering with the seal can be detected based upon identifying that the correlation statistic has dropped below a threshold non-tampered level of correlation between transmitted and received values.
In the age of information and globalisation, secure communication as well as the protection of sensitive data against unauthorised access are of utmost importance. Quantum cryptography currently provides the only way to exchange a cryptographic key between two parties in an unconditionally secure fashion. Owing to losses and noise of today's optical fibre and detector technology, at present quantum cryptography is limited to distances below a few 100 km. In principle, larger distances could be subdivided into shorter segments, but the required quantum repeaters are still beyond current technology. An alternative approach for bridging larger distances is a satellite-based system, that would enable secret key exchange between two arbitrary points on the globe using free-space optical communication. The aim of the presented experiment was to investigate the feasibility of satellite-based global quantum key distribution. In this context, a free-space quantum key distribution experiment over a real distance of 144 km was performed. The transmitter and the receiver were situated in 2500 m altitude on the Canary Islands of La Palma and Tenerife, respectively. The small and compact transmitter unit generated attenuated laser pulses, that were sent to the receiver via a 15-cm optical telescope. The receiver unit for polarisation analysis and detection of the sent pulses was integrated into an existing mirror telescope designed for classical optical satellite communications. To ensure the required stability and efficiency of the optical link in the presence of atmospheric turbulence, the two telescopes were equipped with a bi-directional automatic tracking system. Still, due to stray light and high optical attenuation, secure key exchange would not be possible using attenuated pulses in connection with the standard BB84 protocol. The photon number statistics of attenuated pulses follows a Poissonian distribution. Hence, by removing a photon from all pulses containing two or more photons, an eavesdropper could measure its polarisation without disturbing the polarisation state of the remaining pulse. In this way, he can gain information about the key without introducing detectable errors. To protect against such attacks, the presented experiment employed the recently developed method of using additional "decoy" states, i.e., the the intensity of the pulses created by the transmitter were varied in a random manner. By analysing the detection probabilities of the different pulses individually, a photon-number-splitting attack can be detected. Thanks to the decoy-state analysis, the secrecy of the resulting quantum key could be ensured despite the Poissonian nature of the emitted pulses. For a channel attenuation as high as 35 dB, a secret key rate of up to 250 bit/s was achieved. Our outdoor experiment was carried out under real atmospheric conditions and with a channel attenuation comparable to an optical link from ground to a satellite in low earth orbit. Hence, it definitely shows the feasibility of satellite-based quantum key distribution using a technologically comparatively simple system.
Quantum communication transmitters include beacon lasers that transmit a beacon optical signal in a predetermined state of polarization such as one of the states of polarization of a quantum communication basis. Changes in the beacon polarization are detected at a receiver, and a retarder is adjusted so that the states of polarization in a received quantum communication optical signal are matched to basis polarizations. The beacon and QC signals can be at different wavelengths so that the beacon does not interfere with detection and decoding of the QC optical signal.
We report on the experimental implementation of a BB84-type quantum key distribution protocol over a 144 km free-space link using weak coherent laser pulses. The security was assured by employing decoy state analysis, and optimization of the link transmission was achieved with bi-directional active telescope tracking. This enabled us to distribute a secure key at a rate of 11 bits/s at an attenuation of about 35 dB. Utilizing a simple transmitter setup and an optical ground station capable of tracking spacecraft in low earth orbit, this outdoor experiment demonstrates the feasibility of global key distribution via satellites.