The idea of new-type articles, named “Perspectives”, announced recently by some leading journals, is suggested to be approached for the controversial question of quantum mechanics interpretation. Firstly, it is revealed briefly the unsatisfactory situation of the nowadays predominant doctrine about that question. Then some basic elements of the proposed approach are presented. Those elements refer to (i) uncertainty relations, (ii) distinction between own tasks of quantum mechanics and description of quantum measurements, (iii) defects of collapse scenarios for measurements, and (iv) depiction of quantum measurements as data transmission stochastic processes. The essay closes with some concluding remarks.
The idea of new-type articles, named “Perspectives”, announced recently by some leading journals, is suggested to be approached for the controversial question of quantum mechanics interpretation. Firstly, it is revealed briefly the unsatisfactory situation of the nowadays predominant doctrine about that question. Then some basic elements of the proposed approach are presented. Those elements refer to (i) uncertainty relations, (ii) distinction between own tasks of quantum mechanics and description of quantum measurements, (iii) defects of collapse scenarios for measurements, and (iv) depiction of quantum measurements as data transmission stochastic processes. The essay closes with some concluding remarks.
A survey is made of the hitherto proposed answers to the following crucial questions arising in the physical interpretation of the mathematical formalism of wave mechanics: (I) What is the meaning of the dynamical variables and of their eigenvalues? (II) What is the meaning of the wave function? (III) What is the nature and origin of Heisenberg's uncertainty relations? (IV) What is the nature of the systems dealt with by wave mechanics? Taking into account the interpretations that have been proposed in the last few years, a surprisingly large number of answers is found. The present situation in quantum mechanics is compared with similar crises in the past history of physics. The mere multiplicity of consistent interpretations of quantum mechanics is regarded as a warning against the dogmatic adherence to any one of them, to the exclusion of new possibilities.
It is proposed a possible new approach of quantum measurements (QMS), disconnected of the traditional interpretation of uncertainty relations and independent of any appeal to the strange idea of collapse (reduction) of wave functions. The new approach regards QMS as a statistical samplings (but not as simple detection acts) and their description as a distinct task, independent of actual procedures of quantum mechanics. A QMS is described by means of transformations of probability density and probability current, from intrinsic into recorded readings. The quantum observables appear as random variables, described by usual operators and valuable through probabilistic numerical parameters (mean values, correlations and standard deviations). The values of the respective parameters are not the same in the two mentioned readings. Then the measurement uncertainties (errors) are described by means of the changes in the alluded values. The new QMS approach is illustrated through an one-dimensional example.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
Discussions on uncertainty relations (UR) and quantum measurements (QMS) persisted until nowadays in publications about quantum mechanics (QM). They originate mainly from the conventional interpretation of UR (CIUR). In the most of the QM literarure, it is underestimated the fact that, over the years, a lot of deficiencies regarding CIUR were signaled. As a rule the alluded deficiencies were remarked disparately and discussed as punctual and non-essential questions. Here we approach an investigation of the mentioned deficiencies collected in a conclusive ensemble. Subsequently we expose a reconsideration of the major problems referring to UR and QMS. We reveal that all the basic presumption of CIUR are troubled by insurmountable deficiencies which require the indubitable failure of CIUR and its necessary abandonment. Therefore the UR must be deprived of their statute of crucial pieces for physics. So, the aboriginal versions of UR appear as being in postures of either (i) thought-experimental fictions or (ii) simple QM formulae and, any other versions of them, have no connection with the QMS. Then the QMS must be viewed as an additional subject comparatively with the usual questions of QM. For a theoretical description of QMS we propose an informationtransmission model, in which the quantum observables are considered as random variables. Our approach directs to natural solutions and simplifications for many problems regarding UR and QMS.
This survey tries to investigate the truths and deficiencies of prevalent philosophy about Uncertainty Relations (UR) and Quantum Measurements (QMS). The respective philosophy, known as being eclipsed by unfinished controversies, is revealed to be grounded on six basic precepts. But one finds that all the respective precepts are discredited by insurmountable deficiencies. So, in regard to UR, the alluded philosophy discloses oneself to be an unjustified mythology. Then UR appear either as short-lived historical conventions or as simple and limited mathematical formulas, without any essential significance for physics. Such a finding reinforces the Dirac's prediction that UR "`in their present form will not survive in the physics of future"'. The noted facets of UR motivate reconsiderations of associated debates on QMS. Mainly one reveals that, properly, UR have not any essential connection with genuine descriptions of QMS. For such descriptions, it is necessary that, mathematically, the quantum observables to be considered as random variables. The measuring scenarios with a single sampling, such are wave function collapse or Schrodinger's cat thought experiment, are revealed as being useless exercises. We propose to describe QMS as transmission processes for stochastic data. Note that the above-announced revaluation of UR and QMS philosophy does not disturb in any way the practical framework of the usual quantum mechanics.
This paper deals with the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the nature of physical theory, and the future of physics. First, the question of why there are so many different interpretations of quantum mechanics proposed and accepted by outstanding quantum experts is treated. This requires a discussion of the relation between physics and philosophy and drawing a distinction between a physical formalism and a physical explanation. The Copenhagen interpretation is considered, criticized, and found to be unsatisfactory in some respects. Finally, an interpretation that contains ideas from previous interpretations but which may itself be new, is proposed. Hopefully, this is superior to the previous interpretations. It has, I believe, the advantage of logical clarity. In the process of doing this, I introduce a theory of levels of physical theory, according to which microscopic physical theory, as it develops in successive stages, becomes more and more adaptable to explaining—or at least taking cognizance of—fundamental biological or ultimately psychological phenomena.