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Secure passive RFID tag with seal

Faranak Nekoogar

Published Jan 23, 2023• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

A secure passive RFID tag system comprises at least one base station and at least one passive RFID tag. The tag includes a fiber optic cable with the cable ends sealed within the tag and the middle portion forming an external loop. The loop may be secured to at least portions of an object. The tag transmits and receives an optical signal through the fiber optic cable, and the cable is configured to be damaged or broken in response to removal or tampering attempts, wherein the optical signal is significantly altered if the cable is damaged or broken. The tag transmits the optical signal in response to receiving a radio signal from the base station and compares the transmitted optical signal to the received optical signal. If the transmitted optical signal and the received optical signal are identical, the tag transmits an affirmative radio signal to the base station.

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A secure passive RFID tag system comprises at least one base station and at least one passive RFID tag. The tag includes a fiber optic cable with the cable ends sealed within the tag and the middle portion forming an external loop. The loop may be secured to at least portions of an object. The tag transmits and receives an optical signal through the fiber optic cable, and the cable is configured to be damaged or broken in response to removal or tampering attempts, wherein the optical signal is significantly altered if the cable is damaged or broken. The tag transmits the optical signal in response to receiving a radio signal from the base station and compares the transmitted optical signal to the received optical signal. If the transmitted optical signal and the received optical signal are identical, the tag transmits an affirmative radio signal to the base station.
Described herein are various technologies pertaining to detecting tampering of a seal based upon quantum optical communication via a communications channel comprising the seal. A plurality of pulses of light encoded with random data are transmitted on the communications channel, whereupon they are received and their data values measured. The measured data values of the pulses are then compared to the known transmitted data to determine a correlation statistic between the transmitted and received data values. Tampering with the seal can be detected based upon identifying that the correlation statistic has dropped below a threshold non-tampered level of correlation between transmitted and received values.
The present disclosure relates to an interconnect system for interfacing an electronic subsystem to a qubit package, wherein the qubit package has a plurality of independent qubits. The system makes use of an optical fiber cable having a plurality of optical fibers, which is interfaced to the electronic subsystem. A 3D optical structure is used which has a plurality of internal waveguides, and which is configured to interface the optical fiber cable to the qubit package. The 3D optical structure further has at least one subsystem for using the plurality of waveguides to receive signals of a first type from at least one of the qubits package or the optical fiber cable, to convert the signals from the first type to a second type, and to transmit the signals in the second type to the other one of the fiber optic cable or the qubit package.
본 논문에서는 데이터베이스, 리더 그리고 태그 간의 모든 통신 채널이 안전하지 않은 비보호 채널(insecure channel)임을 가정하여 비보호 채널상의 안전한 RFID 상호인증 프로토콜을 제안했다. 제안한 프로토콜은 안전한 단방향 해쉬함수를 사용했고, DB에서 태그 ID를 검색하는데 걸리는 시간과 해쉬 연산량의 부담을 개선하는 것이 목적이다. 또한, RFID 상호인증 프로토콜이 보장해야 할 기본적인 보안사항들뿐만 아니라 전방향 안전성(Forward Security)도 함께 제공하며, 태그에서 난수를 생성하지 않음으로써, 태그에서의 처리량의 부담을 줄이고자 한다. In this paper, we proposed a new secure RFID(Radio Frequency IDentification) mutual authentication protocol on insecure communication channel which assumed that all communication channels between the database, the reader and the tag are insecure communication channels. The proposed protocol used a secure one-way hash function and the goal is to improve search time of a tag ID and overload of hash calculational load in DB. In addition, the proposed protocol supports not only basic security requirements to be provided by RFID mutual authentication protocol but also forward secrecy, and the tag does not generate a random number to reduce overload of processing capacity in it.
Passive radio-frequency identification (RFID) communication raises new transmission secrecy protection challenges, since passive tags stored information lack effective information protection mechanisms. Due to constraints of passive tags, such as limited computation and storage capabilities, security solutions based on the physical-layer security (PLS) are promising candidates compared to those based on conventional lightweight cryptography. Unlike existing endeavors on PLS of RFID wireless communication, we consider an RFID system in the presence of a special proactive eavesdropper, which is able to both enhance the information wiretap and interfere with the information detection at the RFID reader simultaneously by broadcasting its own continuous-wave (CW) signal. To defend against proactive eavesdropping attacks, we propose a wiretap-channel-conscious artificial-noise (AN)-aided secure transmission scheme for the RFID reader, which first estimates both legitimate and wiretap channels and then superimposes an AN signal on the CW signal to confuse the proactive eavesdropper. The transmit power and power allocation between the AN signal and the CW signal are optimized to maximize the secrecy rate. Furthermore, we model the attack and defense process between the proactive eavesdropper and the RFID reader as a hierarchical security game and prove it can achieve the equilibrium. The simulation results show the superiority of our proposed scheme in terms of the secrecy rate and the interactions between the RFID reader and the proactive eavesdropper.