This book deals with the interdependence of the phenomenological and conceptual levels of experience.This interdependence is most objectively demonstrated by the complementarity of quantum physics.When examining the basic function of ordinary language within quantum physics it is seen that complementarity is fundamental to human comprehension itself, particularly to the interaction of language and mind.
This book deals with the interdependence of the phenomenological and conceptual levels of experience.This interdependence is most objectively demonstrated by the complementarity of quantum physics.When examining the basic function of ordinary language within quantum physics it is seen that complementarity is fundamental to human comprehension itself, particularly to the interaction of language and mind.
From the preceding exposition it follows that not only physics but natural science as a whole is basically dependent on ordinary language. The complementarity of quantum physics displays the fundamental interdependence of observation and description of natural phenomena, and the very objectivity of natural science relies directly on the differentiation of experiences into external and private phenomena afforded by ordinary language. Because of the extreme smallness of the quantum of action the complementarity of physical phenomena is not experienced either in daily life or in classical physics. But the interdependence of observation and description of phenomena prevails as much in classical science as in quantum physics. The very aim of experimental investigation is to perform observations in those particular ways which make possible the communication of information sufficient for the reproduction of the observed phenomena. Concordantly the elementary physical variables, which are indispensable to any systematic analysis in natural science, are defined through reference to measuring arrangements constructed so as to be unambiguously describable in ordinary language. Thus no scientific formula, law, or result of measurement can be given objective significance independent of ordinary language. Through every hierarchy of descriptions in natural science ordinary language penetrates as the unambiguity of propositions.
Among philosophers in particular the principle of complementarity has been considered an unreasonable limitation of natural science, and Niels Bohr’s exposition of the inevitability of a statistical description when accounting for atomic phenomena has been regarded as a renouncement directly opposed to the very spirit of scientific investigation. Indeed, fundamental limitations in the range of applicability of the causal spacetime description of physical phenomena do exist, but quantum physics is precisely the generalization of the conceptual frame of classical physics which has converted these limitations into a springboard for investigations which are among the most fruitful in the history of science. Far from raising a barrier for scientific investigation, quantum physics has extended the scope of natural science to a degree that was unimaginable before its advent. Natural science now encompasses such different objects as the constituents of atoms, processes in remote galaxies, and psycho-chemical phenomena in man. Biochemistry and psychopharmacology, for instance, both rely on one of the most important results of quantum physics: the periodical system of the elements, which is fundamental to all modern chemistry. Furthermore atomic physics and chemistry are basic sciences for technology and thus contribute to the continuous development of instruments of observation for all branches of natural science.
The part of ordinary language dealing with external phenomena is the primary means of description in scientific investigations where the principal objects are so large that they can easily be observed by the naked eye. Obvious examples are zoology, botany, and geology. But the more the observed phenomena differ from the occurrences of everyday life, the more ordinary language is replaced by scientific terminology. The shift of the central part of communication from ordinary language through specialized technical languages towards abstract mathematical meta-languages seems to be inherent in the scientific method itself. The primary objects for scientific examination must necessarily be directly observable and the point of departure must be the description afforded by ordinary language. But the idea of scientific experimentation is precisely to obtain an insight that transcends the mere verbal description of phenomena, and hence ordinary language alone cannot produce an adequate analysis of experimental recordings.
There are two languages in which we speak about what it means to be. The first is the language of physics. It speaks of wave functions and probability amplitudes, of coherence and decoherence, of superposition and collapse. It describes the world from outside — as an object to be measured, predicted, controlled. In this language, the brain is an electrochemical system, neurons are signal processors, and consciousness is either an emergent property or an illusion to be explained away. The second is the language of experience. It speaks of pain and joy, of fear and love, of the redness of red and the taste of morning coffee. It describes the world from inside — as something lived, felt, undergone. In this language, the brain is not experienced at all. What is experienced is: being here, in this moment, as this self. For four hundred years, since Descartes split mind from matter, we have assumed these languages describe different things. The physical and the mental. The objective and the subjective. The measurable and the ineffable. This book argues that assumption is wrong. The two languages describe the same thing. Not two things that mysteriously interact. Not two aspects that somehow correlate. The same thing — seen from different angles. This is not a metaphor. It is not an analogy. It is not a poetic gesture toward unity. It is a claim about the structure of reality.
From the preceding exposition it follows that the quantum statistical representation of an individual atomic system does not imply any renunciation regarding further knowledge about the system. On the contrary the statistical character of quantum physics directly reflects the fundamental non-causal appearance of quantal recordings, and through the discovery of the complementarity of quantal phenomena a complete but necessarily statistical description of the atom has been accomplished. Furthermore quantum physics has afforded a statistical description of macroscopic bodies through their representation as assemblies of huge numbers of identical atomic systems, and, apart from accounting in a more fundamental way for the properties already described in classical physics(the correspondence principle, p. 36), quantum statistics explains several macroscopic phenomena which cannot be understood within the conceptual frame of classical physics only. It must be maintained, however, that when observing the properties of individual atomic objects the macroscopic observational apparatus cannot be represented in terms of atomic constituents because this would destroy the unambiguity of the description. The observational apparatus fulfils its basic function of being the spacetime frame of reference for the quantal recordings precisely through its description in classical physics alone. However, when refraining from the analysis of individual quantal processes it is possible to apply quantum statistics to macroscopic phenomena, that is, the causality of classical physical phenomena can be interpreted in the quantum formalism as the statistical result of the interplay of enormous numbers of atomic processes. It is possible, then, to talk of statistical causality as a fundamental aspect of physical reality.
This book presents the most comprehensive study yet of a problem that has puzzled physicists and philosophers since the 1930s. The standard theory of quantum mechanics is in one sense the most successful physical theory ever, predicting the behaviour of the basic constituents of all physical things; no other theory has ever made such accurate empirical predictions. However, if one tries to understand the theory as providing a complete and accurate framework for the description of the behaviour of all physical interactions, it becomes evident that the theory is ambiguous, or even logically inconsistent. The most notable attempt to formulate the theory so as to deal with this problem, the quantum measurement problem, was initiated by Hugh Everett III in the 1950s. This book gives a careful and challenging examination and evaluation of the work of Everett and those who have followed him. The informal approach, minimizing technicality, makes the book accessible and illuminating for philosophers and physicists alike.