Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View.

Bas C. van Fraassen, Steven French

Willem M. de Muynck

Stephan Harrison, Philip Dunham

Recent philosophical discussions on the nature of geomorphology ( Bassett 1994 ; Richards 1994 ; Rhoads 1994 ) have concluded that the way forward in geomorphological explanation is through either an empiricist or a realist approach. This paper draws lessons from quantum mechanics and the related concepts of decoherence and entanglement to explore the theoretical limitations of both of these existing approaches to geomorphology. It is suggested that empiricist and realist approaches are misguided in their attempts to view the researcher as being in some way ‘detached’ from the reality of the environmental system under investigation. Instead, this reality is viewed here as being consciousness‐dependent. The paper also challenges the claims to represent ‘truth’, and the deterministic view of causation, which are inherent within empiricist and realist approaches. It concludes by suggesting that an idealist approach to geomorphology – one that recognizes the primacy of consciousness – can better appreciate the unpredictable and probabilistic nature of the world.

William Clemard Wineland

Richard Dawid

Moritz Schlick’s interpretation of the causality principle is based on his understanding of quantum mechanics and on his conviction that quantum mechanics strongly supports an empiricist reading of causation in his sense. The present chapter compares the empiricist position held by Schlick with Bas van Fraassen’s more recent conception of constructive empiricism. It is pointed out that the development of philosophy of science from Schlick’s understanding of logical empiricism to constructive empiricism reflects a difference between the understanding of quantum mechanics endorsed by Schlick and the understanding that had been established by the time of van Fraassen’s writing.

Bas C. van Fraassen

Abstract Although this criterion is implicitly rejected in certain philosophical developments (Leibniz on contingent truth, supervenience views in philosophy of mind), it is in the Copenhagen development of quantum theory that this rejection is clearly exemplified. The famous Measurement Problem in the philosophy of quantum mechanics is not a problem from an empiricist point of view. What it marks is the methodological rejection of the Appearance from Reality Criterion in this new science. Whether or not physical science will maintain this form, the character of this episode in the history of science entails a new view of the norms that govern scientific practice.