The EPR argument points to the existence of additional variables that are necessary to complete standard quantum theory. It was dismissed by Bohr because it attributes physical reality to isolated microscopic systems, independently of the macroscopic measurement apparatus. Here, we transpose the EPR argument to macroscopic systems, assuming that they are in spatially extended Fock spin states and subject to spin measurements in remote regions of space. Bohr's refutation of the EPR argument does not seem to apply in this case, since the difference of scale between the microscopic measured system and the macroscopic measuring apparatus can no longer be invoked.
A critical reconsideration of the EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) paper shows that the EPR argument can be developed without using the concept of `element of physical reality', thus eliminating any philosophical element in the logical chains of the paper. Deprived of its philosophical ornament, the EPR argument plainly reduces to require what quantum mechanics can not do: to assign definite values to two incompatible physical quantities. Hidden variables theories built up according to Bell - type theorems are formulated on the basis of the assumption that the locality condition implies the statistical independence between two measurements space - like separated. This assumption is valid only with the additional one that statistical dependence between two measurements requires a causal connection between them. This additional assumption rules out the possibility that statistical dependence may due to an intrinsic property of the physical system under study. Therefore, hidden variables theories are built up with a restriction which leads them to be disproved by experiment. Quantum mechanical non - locality, invoked for describing EPR - type experiments, is strictly connected to the hypothesis (NDV hypothesis) according to which the twin photons of entangled pairs do not have a definite polarization before measurements. Both hypotheses are used only for describing EPR experiments and not for making predictions. Therefore, they can be dropped without reducing the predictive power of quantum mechanics concerning entangled photons pairs. Furthermore, both hypotheses can be experimentally tested by a modification of a standard experimental apparatus designed for studying entangled photons pairs.
The immense difference between Einstein locality and EPR locality is discussed. The latter provides a basis for establishing the nonlocal character of quantum theory, whereas the former does not. A model representing Heisenberg's idea of physical reality is introduced. It is nondeterministic and holistic: the objects, measuring devices, and their environment are treated as an inseparable entity, with, however, macroscopically localizable attributes. The EPR principle that no disturbance can propagate faster than light is imposed without assuming any structure incompatible with orthodox quantum thinking. This locality requirement renders the model incompatible with rudimentary predictions of quantum theory. A more general proof not depending on any model is also given. A recent argument that purports to show that quantum theory is compatible with EPR locality is examined. It illustrates the importance of the crucial one-world assumption. The significance for science of the failure of EPR locality is discussed.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox gives an argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics based on a plausible criterion for reality, as well as the assumption of locality. A general view is that the argument is compromised, because EPR's premises are falsified by Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) and Bell experiments. In this paper, we present an EPR argument based on premises not falsified by these experiments. First, we consider macroscopic EPR-Bohm, Bell, and GHZ experiments using spins ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ defined by two macroscopically distinct states. The analyzers that realize the unitary operations ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ determining the measurement settings $\ensuremath{\theta}$ are nonlinear devices creating macroscopic superposition states. We note two definitions of macroscopic realism (MR). For a system with two macroscopically distinct states available to it, MR posits a predetermined outcome for the measurement ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ distinguishing between the states. Deterministic macroscopic realism assumes MR for the system defined prior to the interaction ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ being carried out but is falsifiable by the macroscopic Bell and GHZ proposals. Motivated by arguments to uphold MR (without resorting to decoherence), as well as no-signaling and the properties of a meter, we define a set of premises referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) posits MR for the system after ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, at the time
tf---when the system is prepared with respect to the measurement basis, ready for a ``pointer'' measurement and readout. For this system, wMR posits that the outcome of ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ is determined and not changed by interactions that might subsequently occur at a remote system
B. The premise wMR also posits a weaker version of EPR's criterion for reality. Importantly, we show that the GHZ and Bell predictions are consistent with wMR. Yet, an EPR paradox arises for a macroscopic EPR-Bohm state, based on wMR. As considered by Schr\"odinger, it is possible to measure two complementary spins of system
A simultaneously, ``one by direct, the other by indirect measurement'': If we assume wMR, then once both settings are fixed, the outcomes of the two spins are both determined. We revisit the original EPR paradox and find a similar result: An EPR argument can be based on a set of premises, weak local realism, which we show are not falsifiable by GHZ or Bell experiments.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
Abstract If we reject the ‘spooky’ action at a distance that seems to be required in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, and which is highlighted by the EPR thought experiment, we must accept the EPR argument that the theory is somehow incomplete. In essence, this involves the rejection of the first postulate of quantum theory: the state of a quantum mechanical system is not completely described by the wave function or state vector.Einstein had hinted at a statistical interpretation. In his opinion, the squares of the wave functions or state vectors of quantum theory represented statistical probabilities obtained by averaging over a large number of real particles. The Copenhagen interpretation of the EPR experiment insists that the reality of the physical states that can be measured is defined by the nature of the interaction between two quantum particles and the nature of the experimental arrangement. A completely deterministic, locally real version of quantum theory demands that the physical states of the particles be established at the moment of their interaction and that the particles separate as individually real entities in those physical states. The physical states of the particles are prescribed by the physics of their interaction and independent of how we choose to set up the measuring instrument, and so no reference to the nature of the latter is necessary, except to define how the independently real particles interact with it. The instrument thus probes an observer-independent reality.