Euclidean theorems are indisputable in flat spaces, but do not hold in curved spaces. Likewise, Bell’s Theorem is true for jointly distributed variables in Kolmogorov probability spaces. Yet, quantum spin variables are not jointly distributed and cannot coexist in Kolmogorov spaces. They have different qualities and operate by different rules. Therefore, Bell’s Theorem does not entail that quantum theory is non-local. The question remains: what is the origin of quantum contextuality? Other theories (not quantum theory) need nonlocality or super-determinism to make similar predictions, because they cannot violate Bell-type inequalities, but why is quantum theory different? The answer is found in the analysis of quantum superposition, in the context of a much older debate about the ontology of linear wave superposition.
Euclidean theorems are indisputable in flat spaces, but do not hold in curved spaces. Likewise, Bell’s Theorem is true for jointly distributed variables in Kolmogorov probability spaces. Yet, quantum spin variables are not jointly distributed and cannot coexist in Kolmogorov spaces. They have different qualities and operate by different rules. Therefore, Bell’s Theorem does not entail that quantum theory is non-local. The question remains: what is the origin of quantum contextuality? Other theories (not quantum theory) need nonlocality or super-determinism to make similar predictions, because they cannot violate Bell-type inequalities, but why is quantum theory different? The answer is found in the analysis of quantum superposition, in the context of a much older debate about the ontology of linear wave superposition.
Bell's theorem is 50 years old. Still there is a controversy about its implications. Much of it has its roots in confusion regarding the premises from which the theorem can be derived. Some claim that a derivation of Bell's inequalities requires just locality assumption, and nothing more. Violations of the inequalities are then interpreted as ``nonlocality'' or ``quantum nonlocality''. We show that such claims are unfounded and that every derivation of Bell's inequalities requires a premise -- in addition to locality and freedom of choice -- which is either assumed tacitly, or unconsciously, or is embedded in a single compound condition (like Bell's ``local causality''). The premise is equivalent to the assumption of existence of additional variables which do not appear in the quantum formalism (in form of determinism, or joint probability for outcomes of all conceivable measurements, or ``additional causes`'', or ``hidden variables'', ``complete description of the state'' or counterfactual definiteness, etc.). A certain irony is that perhaps the main message of violation of Bell's inequalities is that our notion of locality should be based on an operationally well-defined no-signalling condition, rather than on local causality.
Among the various "no-go theorems" in the foundations of quantum mechanics, Bell inequalities are among the few, which do not implicitly rely on the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. Instead, Bell inequalities are commonly understood to rest on Kolmogorov's theory of probability and a "locality" assumption. Physical evidence supporting their violation is hence taken as evidence against at least one of these two assumptions.
This work provides a comprehensive analysis of the physical debate on Bell inequalities from the point of view of Kolmogorov's theory of probability, focusing on the Bell-Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt inequality (BCHSH inequality). The central contribution is the motivation and mathematical study of the notion of contextuality in Bell experiments: in so-called contextual Bell models the detectors themselves behave randomly and the distribution of the random detector parameters depends on the chosen detector settings. It is shown how even "classical" Bell experiments motivate such a description. The need to account for contextuality was pointed out before by de la Peña, Cetto, Brody, Lochak, Bohm, Hiley and others. A broad class of contextual models is proven to satisfy the BCHSH inequality, thereby generalizing a previous result by Gill and Lambare. Nonetheless, even under strong locality requirements, contextual Bell models may violate the BCHSH inequality: based on work by Popescu and Rohrlich, we consider a "proof of concept" example exhibiting the maximum possible violation.
Contrary to the much debated "loopholes" in empirical tests of Bell inequalities, contextuality thus reveals a conceptual misunderstanding in the physical conclusions commonly drawn from Bell inequality violations.
Abstract Quantum theory has accounted for a wide range of physical effects in systems ranging from microscopic to macroscopic. However, it is associated with various paradoxes—such as the well-known EPR example. Einstein’s suggestion that the theory was incomplete has led to numerous attempts to underpin quantum theory by a hidden variable theory, including the Bell approach. This approach was originally based on certain assumptions: (i) realism (ii) locality and (iii) non-contextuality. In its developed form, the theory involved only probabilities for outcome values of system observables. For systems involving two sub-systems, the hidden variable theory predicted that correlations between measurement outcomes of observable pairs of from different sub-systems would satisfy certain—such as the CHSH Bell inequality. The inequality was inconsistent with quantum theory predictions and with experiment. Hence, the question arose: Which of the three assumptions was invalid? A widely held view is that a non-local theory is needed—another is that hidden variable theory should be contextual. In this article, derivations of the CHSH Bell inequality based on various combinations of locality/non-locality and non-contextuality/contextuality assumptions are outlined, leading to the conclusion that for a hidden variable theory to underpin quantum theory, it must be both non-local and contextual. Non-locality or contextuality alone is insufficient. However, it is also concluded that the realism assumption is questionable. At present an alternative approach of augmenting quantum theory by adding additional features—such as the deterministic trajectories of Bohmian mechanics (also a non-local theory) may be a better route for completeness.
Bell's theorem is popularly stated as the inconsistency of quantum theory with local realism. Realism is here formalized by the ontological models framework, where elements of reality are points of a measurable space and probabilities obey the Kolmogorov axioms. In the Bell scenario, locally causal ontological models posit a common cause supporting a global valuation, a joint assignment of outcomes to all measurements at once, across incompatible contexts. Within this notion of realism, Bell's theorem makes any realist explanation of the quantum predictions conspiratorial: any mechanism, whether superluminal, superdeterministic, or retrocausal, must be finely tuned so as never to manifest operationally. We redefine realism through a new ontological framework that generalizes the standard one. The elements of reality, which we call records, are no longer points but relational parts of a point-free generalization of a topological space (sublocales of a locale). A record shared by two incompatible contexts establishes the sameness of a measurement across them, without such pairwise identities composing into a global valuation, and the common cause is then a web of such records. Within this framework, Bell's no-go theorem becomes a go theorem: local causality, restated for records, is no longer at odds with the quantum statistics. This is possible because modularity, the inclusion-exclusion law of classical probability, fails across incompatible contexts, so that the probability theory generalizes Kolmogorov's. We exhibit explicit models reproducing several quantum strategies, including the optimal CHSH violation. More broadly, locally causal models of this kind attain every Bell-CHSH value up to the algebraic maximum. A realist explanation of the quantum predictions need not be conspiratorial; every causal influence posited by these models is reflected in the operational predictions.
Bell’s inequality is an empirical constraint on theories with hidden variables, which Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen argued are needed to explain observed perfect correlations if keeping locality. One way to deal with the empirical violation of Bell’s inequality is by openly embracing nonlocality, in a theory like the pilot-wave theory. Nonetheless, recent proposals have revived the possibility that one can avoid nonlocality by resorting to superdeterministic theories. These are local hidden variables theories which violate statistical independence which is one assumption of Bell’s inequality. In this paper I compare and contrast these two hidden variable strategies: the pilot-wave theory and superdeterminism. I show that even if the former is nonlocal and the other is not, both are contextual. Nonetheless, in contrast with the pilot-wave theory, superdeterminist contextuality makes it impossible to test the theory (which therefore becomes unfalsifiable and unconfirmable) and renders the theory uninformative (measurement results tell us nothing about the system). It is questionable therefore whether a theory with these features is worth its costs.
It is known that "quantum non locality", leading to the violation of Bell's inequality and more generally of classical local realism, can be attributed to the conjunction of two properties, which we call here elementary locality and predictive completeness. Taking this point of view, we show again that quantum mechanics violates predictive completeness, allowing the making of contextual inferences, which can, in turn, explain why quantum non locality does not contradict relativistic causality. An important question remains: if the usual quantum state ψ is predictively incomplete, how do we complete it? We give here a set of new arguments to show that ψ should be completed indeed, not by looking for any "hidden variables", but rather by specifying the measurement context, which is required to define actual probabilities over a set of mutually exclusive physical events.