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Lecture notes in networks and systems

Secured Quantum Key Distribution Encircling Profuse Attacks and Countermeasures

Veerraju Gampala, Balajee Maram, A. Suja Alphonse

Published Sep 28, 2022• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-981-19-4193-1_22

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The optical beam splitter is an essential device used for decoding in quantum key distribution. The impact of optical beam splitters on the security of quantum key distribution was studied, and it was found that the realistic device characteristics closely influence the error rate introduced by the wavelength-dependent attack on optical beam splitters. A countermeasure, combining device selection and error rate over-threshold alarms, is proposed to protect against such attacks. Beam splitters made of mirror coatings are recommended, and the variation of splitting ratio should be restricted to lower than 1 dB at 1260–1700 nm. For the partial attack scenario where the eavesdropper attacks only a portion of the quantum signal, a modified secure key rate formula is proposed to eliminate the revealed information of the attacked portion. Numerical results show that the QKD system adopting this countermeasure exhibits good performance with a secure key rate of over 10 kbps at 100 km and a maximum transmission distance of over 150 km, with only a small difference from the no-attack scenario. Additionally, a countermeasure to monitor the light intensity of different wavelengths is proposed to protect against the wavelength-dependent attack on optical beam splitters.
We demonstrate a practical countermeasure against a well-known class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems that exploit detection efficiency mismatch, where the receiver's detectors do not exhibit identical responses to incoming photons across all degrees of freedom. This class of quantum hacking strategies is broad and significantly includes the time-shift attack, which targets an arrival-time-dependent side channel at the receiver. The four-state countermeasure, previously only proven to be secure in theory, is implemented here on a GHz-clocked prototype QKD system and evaluated for its security and performance. We show that its presence enables almost complete recovery of the system's ideal secret key rate. Our results provide strong justification for adopting this countermeasure as a standard component in future scalable and practical QKD systems.
In a practical quantum key distribution(QKD) system, imperfect equipment, especially the single-photon detector,can be eavesdropped on by a blinding attack. However, the original blinding attack may be discovered by directly detecting the current. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic blinding attack model, where Eve probabilistically applies a blinding attack without being caught by using only an existing intuitive countermeasure. More precisely, our countermeasure solves the problem of how to define the bound in the limitation of precision of current detection, and then we prove security of the practical system by considering the current parameter. Meanwhile, we discuss the bound of the quantum bit error rate(QBER) introduced by Eve, by which Eve can acquire information without the countermeasure.