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International Conference on Numerical Simulation of Optoelectronic Devices (NUSOD)

Polarization-randomized gateway against detector-blinding hacks of quantum key distribution

Salem F. Hegazy, Salah S. A. Obayya, Bahaa E. A. Saleh

Published Sep 12, 2022• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A quantum key distribution system -employing a key time-bin qubit and a security-pass polarization-randomized qubit- is shown to overcome a wide class of intercept-resend attacks adopting the use of faked-state light; including attacks based on blinding of single-photon avalanche detectors (SPADs).
DOI
10.1109/nusod54938.2022.9894829

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Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) have been shown to be subject to various detector side-channel attacks that compromise the promised unconditional security. Most notable is a general class of attacks adopting the use of faked-state photons as in the detector-control and, more broadly, the intercept-resend attacks. In this paper, we present a simple scheme to overcome such class of attacks: A legitimate user, Bob, uses a polarization randomizer at his gateway to distort an ancillary polarization of a phase-encoded photon in a bidirectional QKD configuration. Passing through the randomizer once on the way to his partner, Alice, and again in the opposite direction, the polarization qubit of the genuine photon is immune to randomization. However, the polarization state of a photon from an intruder, Eve, to Bob is randomized and hence directed to a detector in a different path, whereupon it triggers an alert. We demonstrate theoretically and experimentally that, using commercial off-the-shelf detectors, it can be made impossible for Eve to avoid triggering the alert, no matter what faked-state of light she uses.
Abstract An attack exploiting single-photon avalanche diode (SPAD) blinding is one of the effective methods of ‘quantum hacking’ (Lydersen et al 2010 Nat. Photon . 4 686) or cracking quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. This attack was experimentally demonstrated for various QKD systems based on both phase and polarization coding. After such an attack, the eavesdropper knows the whole key, has not produced errors, and is not detected. So far this attack is the only one that was demonstrated in the explicit form on many real QKD systems. It is important that these demonstrations were actually performed in reality, i.e. not in speculations as some other attacks. Therefore, the presence of vulnerability in QKD systems based on polarization coding is an existing fact, rather than just a potential threat. It is often assumed that all systems regardless of the encoding method are vulnerable to such an attack. However, in the case of phase coding, some essential features of photocount statistics on the receiving side make a difference. In this Letter we prove that detector blinding attack, when acts on QKD systems with phase coding, leads to a distortion of the photocounts statistics so the eavesdropper may always be detected. Moreover, one does not need to change the design of the QKD system and/or its control electronics, as it is sufficient to amend only the processing of the quantum states registration results to make the system secure. At the same time, polarization coding-based systems remain vulnerable to such an attack and do not guarantee key security.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD), rooted in quantum mechanics, offers information-theoretic security. However, practical systems open security threats due to imperfections, notably bright-light blinding attacks targeting single-photon detectors. Here, we propose a concise, robust defense strategy for protecting single-photon detectors in QKD systems against blinding attacks. Our strategy uses a dual approach: detecting the bias current of the avalanche photodiode (APD) to defend against continuous-wave blinding attacks, and monitoring the avalanche amplitude to protect against pulsed blinding attacks. By integrating these two branches, the proposed solution effectively identifies and mitigates a wide range of bright light injection attempts, significantly enhancing the resilience of QKD systems against various bright-light blinding attacks. This method fortifies the safeguards of quantum communications and offers a crucial contribution to the field of quantum information security.
Detection-time-bin-shift (DTBS) is a scheme that projects the measurement bases or measured photon values into detection time-bins and then time division multiplexes a single photon detector in a quantum key distribution (QKD) system. This scheme can simplify the structure of a QKD system, reduce its cost and overcome the security problems caused by the dead-time introduced self-correlation and the unbalanced characteristics of detectors. In this paper, we present several DTBS schemes for QKD systems based on attenuated laser pulses and entangled photon sources. We study the security issues of these DTBS schemes, especially the time-bin-shift intercept-resend attack and its countermeasures. A fiber-based DTBS QKD system has been developed and its results are presented in this paper.
We propose and experimentally demonstrate a scheme to render the detection apparatus of a quantum key distribution system immune to the main classes of hacking attacks in which the eavesdropper explores the back-door opened by the single-photon detectors. The countermeasure is based on the creation of modes that are not deterministically accessible to the eavesdropper. We experimentally show that the use of beamsplitters and extra single-photon detectors at the receiver station passively creates randomized spatial modes that erase any knowledge the eavesdropper might have gained when using bright-light faked states. Additionally, we experimentally show a detector-scrambling approach where the random selection of the detector used for each measurement-equivalent to an active spatial mode randomization-hashes out the side-channel open by the detection efficiency mismatch-based attacks. The proposed combined countermeasure represents a practical and readily implementable solution against the main classes of quantum hacking attacks aimed on the single-photon detector so far, without intervening on the inner working of the devices.