Abstract We investigate the quantization of nonlinear Cournot duopoly games by applying the Li–Du–Massar and Frackiewicz quantum schemes. We shall analyze the quantum equilibrium quantities and quantum equilibrium profits of nonlinear quantum Cournot duopoly games by using the qualitative analysis.
Abstract Drawing inspiration from the Frackiewicz and Li-Du-Massar quantum schemes, we provide some multiplayer generalizations of their techniques. Initially, we introduce a multiplayer version of the Frackiewicz quantum scheme, and give quantum Cournot oligopoly games with both three and n players. Our findings indicate that quantum equilibrium profits decrease monotonically with increasing entanglement levels of environments participated by oneself, but increase monotonically with the entanglement levels of other players. Subsequently, we present a multiplayer extension of the Li-Du-Massar quantum scheme, and analyze quantum Cournot oligopoly games with three and n players. We observe that quantum equilibrium profit exhibits a positive correlation with entanglement levels. Furthermore, the quantum equilibrium quantity and profit exhibit a negative correlation with the number of players for both multiplayer quantum schemes.
Abstract This letter explores the quantum version of a Cournot duopoly game with general isoelastic demand and asymmetric production costs by applying Li-Du-Massar's minimal quantization rules, and it especially analyzes the existence region of quantum equilibrium, and the influences of quantum entanglement , difference in marginal costs ( k ) and elasticity of demand on the optimal profits of both firms. The results show that the existence region decreases with γ and k increasing. A larger elasticity of demand can destroy the profits of both firms. If positive γ and k are more favourable to the profits of two firms. If the first firm's profit increases with γ increasing for fixed k , but decreases with k increasing for fixed γ . The second firm's profit increases with k increasing for any fixed γ . As to the influences of γ on the second firm's profit, when k is less than a critical value, it increases with γ increasing, otherwise it decreases with γ increasing for fixed k .
The aim of this paper is to investigate Cournot-type competition in the quantum domain with the use of the Li-Du-Massar scheme for continuous-variable quantum games. We derive a formula which, in a simple way, determines a unique Nash equilibrium. The result concerns a large class of Cournot duopoly problems including the competition, where the demand and cost functions are not necessary linear. Further, we show that the Nash equilibrium converges to a Pareto-optimal strategy profile as the quantum correlation increases. In addition to illustrating how the formula works, we provide the readers with two examples.
The aim of this paper is to discuss in some detail the two different quantum schemes for duopoly problems. We investigate under what conditions one of the schemes is more reasonable that the other one. Using the Cournot's duopoly example we show that the current quantum schemes require a slight refinement so that they output the classical game in a particular case. Then we show how the amendment changes the way of studying the quantum games with respect to Nash equilibria. Finally, we define another scheme for the Cournot's duopoly in terms of quantum computation.