The development of the Internet of Things has facilitated the rapid development of various industries. With the improvement in people’s living standards, people’s health requirements are steadily improving. However, owing to the scarcity of medical and health care resources in some areas, the demand for remote surgery has gradually increased. In this paper, we investigate remote surgery in the healthcare environment. Surgeons can operate robotic arms to perform remote surgery for patients, which substantially facilitates successful surgeries and saves lives. Recently, Kamil et al. proposed a secure protocol for surgery in the healthcare environment. However, after cryptanalyzing their protocol, we deduced that their protocols are vulnerable to temporary value disclosure and insider attacks. Therefore, we design an improved authentication and key agreement protocol for remote surgeries in the healthcare environment. Accordingly, we adopt the real or random (ROR) model and an automatic verification tool Proverif to verify the security of our protocol. Via security analysis and performance comparison, it is confirmed that our protocol is a relatively secure protocol.
The development of the Internet of Things has facilitated the rapid development of various industries. With the improvement in people’s living standards, people’s health requirements are steadily improving. However, owing to the scarcity of medical and health care resources in some areas, the demand for remote surgery has gradually increased. In this paper, we investigate remote surgery in the healthcare environment. Surgeons can operate robotic arms to perform remote surgery for patients, which substantially facilitates successful surgeries and saves lives. Recently, Kamil et al. proposed a secure protocol for surgery in the healthcare environment. However, after cryptanalyzing their protocol, we deduced that their protocols are vulnerable to temporary value disclosure and insider attacks. Therefore, we design an improved authentication and key agreement protocol for remote surgeries in the healthcare environment. Accordingly, we adopt the real or random (ROR) model and an automatic verification tool Proverif to verify the security of our protocol. Via security analysis and performance comparison, it is confirmed that our protocol is a relatively secure protocol.
E-health has risen to popularity with the advancement in technology. Technological innovations have made it feasible for doctors around the world to provide healthcare assistance remotely. Medical practitioners perform sensitive surgeries by sitting at different corners of the world. Healthcare is a very delicate field with human lives at stake at all times. The remote devices that are used to perform surgeries need to function accurately and any mishap can claim a life. Thus, only authentic users, in this case the doctors, should be allowed to have control of the robotic surgery devices. Several authentication protocols are presented in the literature to secure critical remote health applications. One such protocol was proposed by Kamil et al. in 2021 for authentication and key agreement between a remote surgeon and robotic arm in tactile Internet environment via a gateway. In this paper, we analyse Kamil et al's protocol and prove that their protocol is not secure against known session specific temporary information (ephemeral secrets) attack and impersonation attack. We also point out some additional security issues, such as weak authentication and traceability. As a result, Kamil et al.'s protocol is not suitable for critical health applications.
With the recent advancements in wireless communications, Tactile Internet (TI) has witnessed a major blow. TI is considered the next big evolution that will provide real-time control in industrial setups, particularly in the domain of tele-surgery. However, in remote-surgery ecosystems the transmission of data is prone to different attack vectors. Thus, to realize the true potential of secure tele-surgery under the umbrella of TI, it is required to design a secure authentication and key agreement protocol for tele-surgery. In this paper, we present an effective and secure mutual authentication and session establishment protocol for TI-driven remote surgery setups. The designed protocol enables secure communications between the surgeon, robotic arm, and the trusted authority (TA); where the protocol leverages the advantages of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and biometrics. The protocol operates along the following three phases: i) setup phase, ii) registration phase, and iii) mutual authentication and key agreement phase. During the third phase, the surgeon and the robotic arm mutually authenticate each other with the help of the TA. Further, the security features of the designed protocol have been established using formal and informal means. The obtained results indicate the resiliency of the protocol against offline password guessing attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, denial of service attacks, etc.
The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) is a network of medical devices, hardware infrastructure, and software that accumulates real-time data through remote monitoring and minimizes doctor-patient interaction, enhancing the quality of remedies. However, the facile availability and accessibility of data over the web have given rise to serious information security and credibility issues in the IoMT. Recently, Chen et al. [1] proposed a provably secure authenticated key agreement protocol for remote patient monitoring in IoMT. However, after revisiting their scheme, we found security flaws such as user impersonation, ephemeral secret leakage attacks, denial-of-service attacks, and session key disclosure attacks. Therefore, this paper presents cryptanalysis as well as an improvement of Chen et al. 's scheme that strives to furnish protocols with robust security in opposition to the mentioned attacks. The security and effectiveness are displayed through informal analysis and evaluation with other existing state-of-the-art metrics like computational and commu-nication cost. At last, the findings project the superiority of the proposed improved scheme.
The Internet of Things (IoT) is among the most promising technologies of the future, and its development has garnered attention worldwide. However, the rise of the IoT has been accompanied by a proportionate increase in security concerns regarding communication between IoT entities. Recently, Alzahrani et al. proposed an identity-based authentication and key agreement protocol for an IoT environment, wherein a physically unclonable function was employed. They claimed that their protocol can resist various types of attacks; however, after thorough analysis, we determined it to be ineffective against privileged internal attacks, physical IoT device capture attacks, stolen-verifier attacks, and known temporary information exposure attacks. To resolve these security weaknesses, we propose a new authentication and key agreement protocol. In addition, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol is provably secure in real-or-random (ROR) model and Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic, resisting known attacks while incurring low communication and computation costs.
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is the application of the Internet of Things (IoT) in the industrial field. IIoT allows users to remotely access industrial equipment and the data in it, which also brings certain challenges to the security of industrial data. Authentication and key agreement protocols are very effective security technologies in the matter of protecting industrial data. There is a large amount of research work on authentication protocols in IIoT, but most of the protocols have security weaknesses. Recently, Rafique et al. proposed a multi-factor protocol in IIoT that can accomplish authentication and session key establishment through a gateway. Rafique et al. claimed that their protocol is secure, unfortunately, we carefully analyze the protocol of Rafique et al. and find some security flaws, i.e., it is vulnerable to insider attack and known session-specific temporary information (KSSTI) attack, and unable to provide forward security. We explore the factors of insecurity and propose an enhanced multi-factor secure authentication and key agreement protocol in IIoT. The new protocol improves the security of the protocol while using only symmetric cryptography, hash function, and XOR operation. Formal security analysis and informal security discussions demonstrate that the new protocol is resistant to a variety of known attacks. After performance analysis, our protocol has lower computational cost, and increases no significant communication cost, while providing more secure and robust properties.
At present, the great progress made by the Internet of Things (IoT) has led to the emergence of the Internet of Drones (IoD). IoD is an extension of the IoT, which is used to control and manipulate drones entering the flight area. Now, the fifth-generation mobile communication technology (5G) has been introduced into the IoD; it can transmit ultra-high-definition data, make the drones respond to ground commands faster and provide more secure data transmission in the IoD. However, because the drones communicate on the public channel, they are vulnerable to security attacks; furthermore, drones can be easily captured by attackers. Therefore, to solve the security problem of the IoD, Hussain et al. recently proposed a three-party authentication protocol in an IoD environment. The protocol is applied to the supervision of smart cities and collects real-time data about the smart city through drones. However, we find that the protocol is vulnerable to drone capture attacks, privileged insider attacks and session key disclosure attacks. Based on the security of the above protocol, we designed an improved protocol. Through informal analysis, we proved that the protocol could resist known security attacks. In addition, we used the real-oracle random model and ProVerif tool to prove the security and effectiveness of the protocol. Finally, through comparison, we conclude that the protocol is secure compared with recent protocols.