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Lecture notes in computer science

Tight Analysis of Decryption Failure Probability of Kyber in Reality

Boyue Fang, Weize Wang, Yunlei Zhao

Published Jan 1, 2022• 8 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-15777-6_9

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Probabilistic modeling of decryption-failure bounds in CRYSTALS-Kyber under the post-quantum threat model

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Abstract We present a probabilistic modeling framework for quantifying decryption-failure probability (DFP) in CRYSTALS–Kyber , the lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism standardized by National Institute of Standards and Technology as module-lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism. Our method combines exact tail computation of Kyber’s centered-binomial noise distribution using FFT-based convolution with principled comparisons to classical concentration inequalities such as Hoeffding and Bernstein. This hybrid analytical-computational approach yields implementation-independent upper bounds on DFP that are exponentially small in the security parameter. Specifically, we compute two-sided tails for aggregated noise variables, translate those into per-ciphertext failure probabilities through a transparent union bound, and determine the minimal reconciliation margins required to ensure DFP ⩽ 2 − λ for λ ∈ { 128 , 192 , 256 } . Across Kyber-like parameter regimes, Bernstein-type inequalities consistently overestimate risk compared to the exact probabilistic tails, which are several orders of magnitude smaller. The resulting gap highlights the conservatism of inequality-based analyses and clarifies the quantitative safety margins inherent to Kyber’s design. These findings contribute to the broader effort of modeling reliability in post-quantum cryptographic primitives using probabilistic and computational methodologies.

Machine Learning Science and Technology•Jan 29, 2026•1 citation
Abstract We present a probabilistic modeling framework for quantifying decryption-failure probability (DFP) in CRYSTALS–Kyber , the lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism standardized by National Institute of Standards and Technology as module-lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism. Our method combines exact tail computation of Kyber’s centered-binomial noise distribution using FFT-based convolution with principled comparisons to classical concentration inequalities such as Hoeffding and Bernstein. This hybrid analytical-computational approach yields implementation-independent upper bounds on DFP that are exponentially small in the security parameter. Specifically, we compute two-sided tails for aggregated noise variables, translate those into per-ciphertext failure probabilities through a transparent union bound, and determine the minimal reconciliation margins required to ensure DFP ⩽ 2 − λ for λ ∈ { 128 , 192 , 256 } . Across Kyber-like parameter regimes, Bernstein-type inequalities consistently overestimate risk compared to the exact probabilistic tails, which are several orders of magnitude smaller. The resulting gap highlights the conservatism of inequality-based analyses and clarifies the quantitative safety margins inherent to Kyber’s design. These findings contribute to the broader effort of modeling reliability in post-quantum cryptographic primitives using probabilistic and computational methodologies.