Post-quantum cryptography is a field of research that studies cryptographic transformations protected against attacks using quantum computers. For many years, lattice-based cryptography has become one of the most promising solutions to protect against the threat of quantum computing. An important feature of the post-quantum period in cryptography is the significant uncertainty about the source data for cryptanalysis and countermeasures in the capabilities of quantum computers, their mathematical support and software, as well as the application of quantum cryptanalysis to existing cryptocurrencies and cryptoprotocol. The main methods are mathematical methods of electronic signature, which have undergone significant analysis and justification in the process of extensive research by cryptologists and mathematicians at the highest level. The security of signature schemes depends strongly on the standard deviation of the discrete Gaussian distribution, which has a sampling algorithm. In this paper, the most common variants of sampling algorithms were considered and analyzed, because the quality of all algorithms depends significantly on the structure of the lattice for which sampling takes place. A comparison of the quality of lattice sampling algorithms is highlighted. In particular, the paper considers Klein's algorithms (its modification is the Thomas Prest and Dukas algorithm), Peikert's algorithm and the floating-point sampling algorithm. Klein's sampling algorithm, in particular its modification, namely, the Dukas-Prest algorithm, gives the smallest vectors. Theoretically, it is much better than Klein's algorithm on NTRU lattices, but it requires the use of floating-point arithmetic, which complicates greatly the analysis of its security and tocreation of software or hardware implementation.
Post-quantum cryptography is a field of research that studies cryptographic transformations protected against attacks using quantum computers. For many years, lattice-based cryptography has become one of the most promising solutions to protect against the threat of quantum computing. An important feature of the post-quantum period in cryptography is the significant uncertainty about the source data for cryptanalysis and countermeasures in the capabilities of quantum computers, their mathematical support and software, as well as the application of quantum cryptanalysis to existing cryptocurrencies and cryptoprotocol. The main methods are mathematical methods of electronic signature, which have undergone significant analysis and justification in the process of extensive research by cryptologists and mathematicians at the highest level. The security of signature schemes depends strongly on the standard deviation of the discrete Gaussian distribution, which has a sampling algorithm. In this paper, the most common variants of sampling algorithms were considered and analyzed, because the quality of all algorithms depends significantly on the structure of the lattice for which sampling takes place. A comparison of the quality of lattice sampling algorithms is highlighted. In particular, the paper considers Klein's algorithms (its modification is the Thomas Prest and Dukas algorithm), Peikert's algorithm and the floating-point sampling algorithm. Klein's sampling algorithm, in particular its modification, namely, the Dukas-Prest algorithm, gives the smallest vectors. Theoretically, it is much better than Klein's algorithm on NTRU lattices, but it requires the use of floating-point arithmetic, which complicates greatly the analysis of its security and tocreation of software or hardware implementation.
An important feature of the post-quantum period in cryptography is the significant uncertainty regarding the source data for cryptanalysis and counteraction in terms of the capabilities of quantum computers, their mathematical and software, as well as the application of quantum cryptanalysis to existing cryptotransformations and cryptoprotocols. Mathematical methods of digital signature (DS) have been chosen as the main methods of NIST USA, which have undergone significant analysis and substantiation in the process of extensive research by cryptographers and mathematicians at the highest level. They are described in detail and studied at the first stage of the US NIST International Competition. In the second round, a number of decisions were made to merge some candidates for the post-quantum DS standard. 9 candidates were left for further research at the 2nd round: Crystals-Dilithium, Falcon, GeMSS, LUOV, MQDSS, Picnic, qTESLA, Rainbow and SPHINCS+. Three of them (Dilithium, Falcon, qTeSLA) are based on the stability of algebraic lattices (Lattice-based), four (GeMSS, LUOV, MQDSS, Rainbow) are based on multivariate transformations (MQ-transformations), one (SPHINCS+) is based on the stability of hash-function, one (Picnic) is based on the stability of the hash-function and block stream ciphers. During the 2nd round of the US NIST Competition the following finalist algorithms and alternative algorithms were selected as digital signatures according to the results of research on promising post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. As finalists algorithms such DS algorithms as Crystals-Dilithium, Falcon and Rainbow. Alternative algorithms are GeMSS, Picnic and SPHINCS+ were selected. This paper studies the peculiarities of construction of the digital signature algorithm considered as a candidate for the promising post-quantum standard of the NIST PQC competition – Picnic, also it analyzes the protection of the algorithm from known attacks. Data from the comparison of post-quantum algorithms such as digital signature are given. The description of the Picnic algorithm and its parameters are given.
With the advent of quantum computing, research into post-quantum cryptography has gained significant attention. This is a novel branch of cryptography that utilizes algorithms and protocols designed to withstand attacks from quantum computers. Lattice theory represents a promising area within post-quantum cryptographic research. Two early examples of lattice-based cryptosystems are the GGH and NTRU schemes. These schemes are based on the challenge of finding the closest vector in a lattice and differ primarily in the type of lattice used. The NTRUSign protocol was developed by combining the strengths of both schemes. In 2008, another approach to lattice signatures was introduced by a group of authors. It is based on the hash-and-sign paradigm, in which a signature for a message is generated using a trapdoor. A year later, V. Lyubashevsky proposed another method for constructing lattice-based signatures that utilizes the Fiat — Shamir transform. However, due to the nature of the underlying lattice structure, the algorithm for signature generation produces a correct signature only with a certain probability. This is due to the use of a rejection sampling for security purposes. This paper presents an overview of existing lattice-based signature construction approaches and cryptographic schemes that are based on these approaches. A comparative analysis was conducted on these schemes, identifying the advantages and disadvantages of each method. Based on the results, optimal conditions for the application of each approach have been determined.
The security of classical public-key cryptosystems, which operate based on the computational intractability of integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems, is profoundly threatened by the rapid development of quantum computing. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has been proposed to improve security against quantum attacks. Lattice-based cryptography is widely regarded as one of the most promising PQC method because of its proven security, efficient implementation, and functional versatility, and it has achieved significant progress in both algorithmic design and engineering implementation in recent years. This paper presents a systematic survey of the status of research on lattice-based cryptographic algorithms. First, the fundamental theory of lattices and their core hard problems are discussed. Next, the technical characteristics and performance of encryption and key encapsulation mechanisms, digital signature schemes, and key exchange protocols constructed based on lattice hard problems are reviewed and compared. Subsequently, the principles and optimization paths of two key technologies for lattice cryptography implementation, namely polynomial multiplication using the fast Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) and pre-image sampling algorithms, are discussed. Finally, considering the PQC standardization process of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), an outlook on future research directions for lattice-based cryptography is presented. The research directions include the development of more "succinct" fundamental hard problems, strengthening security proofs, improving algorithm efficiency, and countering novel attacks. This review serves as a reference for promoting the practical deployment and further research of lattice-based cryptography.
An important feature of the post-quantum period in cryptography is the significant uncertainty about the input data for cryptanalysis and counteracting the capabilities of quantum computers, their mathematical and software, and the application of quantum cryptanalysis to existing cryptoprotocols and cryptotransformations. Mathematical electronic signature (ES) methods have been selected as the main methods in the work, which have undergone significant analysis and substantiation in the process of extensive research by cryptologists and mathematicians at the highest level. The article analyzes the existing electronic signature algorithms based on the lattices of stage 2 of the NIST competition. The possibility of using the post-quantum electronic signature mechanism based on algebraic lattices as the post-quantum national electronic signature standard is considered. It is proposed to use the post-quantum Сrystals-Dilithium algorithm as such electronic signature algorithm. The article considers this algorithm and substantiates the possibility of its application. The algorithm parameters and rules for their construction are considered. The differences and features of safe implementation of the algorithm in comparison with stage 1 are analyzed. The analysis is conducted and it is concluded that the Crystals-Dilithium algorithm can be taken as one of the candidates for the development of a national electronic signature standard using cryptographic algorithms, standardized in Ukraine, such as the hashing function described in DSTU 7564:2014. According to the authors of the article, the post-quantum period national standard of Ukraine should include at least 3 algorithms based on different types of mathematical transformations, which are recognized by the world cryptographic community as those that can provide the necessary level of stability in the conditions of quantum cryptanalysis.
Lattice-based cryptography is considered the most promising candidate for post-quantum public key cryptography such as key encapsulation and digital signature schemes. Accurate and efficient sampling of matrix / vector elements and polynomial coefficients from specified discrete probability distributions is crucial to the security and efficiency of lattice-based cryptography protocols. In this work, a design methodology is proposed to implement these sampling operations using currently available quantum computing hardware. Quantum circuits for sampling from uniform, trinary, binomial and discrete Gaussian distributions are presented. Implementation results obtained from simulation as well as measured from real cloud-based quantum hardware are also presented and analyzed. Although the proposed circuits require only few qubits, they implement practical distribution parameters used by various lattice-based protocols. This clearly demonstrates the immediate relevance of such quantum circuits in the context of currently available small-scale quantum computers, and they have the potential to enhance post-quantum cryptography implementations on quantum-enabled cloud environments.
Lattice-based cryptography is considered the most promising candidate for post-quantum public key cryptography such as key encapsulation and digital signature schemes. Accurate and efficient sampling of matrix / vector elements and polynomial coefficients from specified discrete probability distributions is crucial to the security and efficiency of lattice-based cryptography protocols. In this work, a design methodology is proposed to implement these sampling operations using currently available quantum computing hardware. Quantum circuits for sampling from uniform, trinary, binomial and discrete Gaussian distributions are presented. Implementation results obtained from simulation as well as measured from real cloud-based quantum hardware are also presented and analyzed. Although the proposed circuits require only few qubits, they implement practical distribution parameters used by various lattice-based protocols. This clearly demonstrates the immediate relevance of such quantum circuits in the context of currently available small-scale quantum computers, and they have the potential to enhance post-quantum cryptography implementations on quantum-enabled cloud environments.