Derivative Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Quantum Physics

Claudio Calosi, Jessica Wilson

Tushar Menon

Claudio Calosi, Jessica Wilson

David Glick, Baptiste Le Bihan

The question of whether Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) justifies the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy has recently come to the fore. Metaphysical indeterminacy has been argued to emerge from three sources: coherent superpositions, the indefinite number of branches in the quantum multiverse and the nature of these branches. This paper reviews the evidence and concludes that those arguments don't rely on EQM alone and rest on metaphysical auxiliary assumptions that transcend the physics of EQM. We show how EQM can be ontologically interpreted without positing metaphysical indeterminacy by adopting a deflationary attitude towards branches. Two ways of developing the deflationary view are then proposed: one where branches are eliminated, and another where they are reduced to the universal quantum state.

Tushar Menon

I propose a technique for identifying fundamental properties using structures already present in physical theories. I argue that, in conjunction with a particular naturalistic commitment, that I dub `algebraic naturalism', these structures can be used to generate a standard of metaphysical determinacy. This standard can be used to rule out the possibility of a virulent strain of `deep' metaphysical indeterminacy that has been imputed to quantum mechanics.