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Lecture notes in computer science

Integrating and Evaluating Quantum-safe TLS in Database Applications

Anselme Tueno, David Boehm, Shin Ho Choe

Published Jan 1, 2022• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-10684-2_15

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Quantum computers pose a significant threat to widely used cryptographic schemes, making it crucial to urgently shift to post-quantum protocols that ensure the long-term security of communications. This paper presents a framework for facilitating the transition to a quantum-resistant web by enabling the evaluation of the impact of integrating post-quantum and hybrid cryptographic primitives in the TLS protocol. By leveraging the OpenSSL library, the framework enables the seamless evaluation and comparison of key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) and signature schemes provided by the Open Quantum Safe project. The proposed framework is used to analyze different TLS configurations involving classic, hybrid and post-quantum primitives, with a focus on those selected by NIST. The study concentrates on evaluating the performance impact and the data overhead introduced by configurations involving primitives at different security levels. It starts by benchmarking standalone cryptographic primitives and continues with the evaluation of TLS configurations with hybrid and post-quantum KEMs under controlled network conditions, as this is the first natural step for a transition to a quantum-safe TLS. An impact analysis on real-world scenarios follows. Finally, our evaluation concentrates on providing insight into the cost of shifting to TLS configurations involving only hybrid or post-quantum primitives.
This paper presents QuanChan, a full-stack, post-quantum anonymous communication platform that builds upon the secure storage backend introduced in Part I. As NIST finalizes its first post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards, the engineering challenge has shifted from theoretical implementation to real-world, deployable web applications. QuanChan addresses this by moving the cryptographic trust boundary directly into the user's browser. Key architectural features and contributions include: Browser-Resident Identity: User identity is rooted locally using ML-DSA-87, allowing deterministic cross-device recovery via a 12-word seed phrase without centralized username/password databases. Post-Quantum Direct Messaging: Client-side encryption utilizing ML-KEM-1024 for key encapsulation and AES-256-GCM for payload encryption ensures message secrecy independent of server trust. Application-Layer Integrity: Dilithium5-signed thread and message snapshots allow the frontend WASM module to independently verify content integrity. Cryptographic Honesty in Transport: Addresses real-world proxy challenges (e.g., Cloudflare TLS termination) by introducing runtime disclosure endpoints (/api/crypto/tls-proof) that report actual observed handshake properties rather than relying on assumed static configurations. Identity-Bound Moderation: Introduces an auditable, role-based moderation system (including founder tokens and persistent badges) tied entirely to stable cryptographic identity hashes. By integrating these standardized PQC primitives across the identity, messaging, and operational layers, QuanChan serves as a practical engineering case study for deploying verifiable, quantum-safe applications in modern proxied environments.
Quantum computers could break currently used asymmetric cryptographic schemes in a few years using Shor's algorithm. They are used in numerous protocols and applications to secure authenticity as well as key agreement, and quantum-safe alternatives are urgently needed. NIST therefore initiated a standardization process. This requires intensive evaluation, also with regard to performance and integrability. Here, the integration into TLS 1.3 plays an important role, since it is used for 90% of all Internet connections. In the present work, algorithms for quantum-safe key exchange during TLS 1.3 handshake were reviewed. The focus is on the influence of dedicated network parameters such as transmission rate or packet loss in order to gain insights regarding the suitability of the algorithms under corresponding network conditions. For the implementation, a framework by Paquin et al. was extended to emulate network scenarios and capture the handshake duration for selected algorithms. It is shown that the evaluated candidates Kyber, Saber and NTRU as well as the alternative NTRU Prime have a very good overall performance and partly undercut the handshake duration of the classical ECDH. The choice of a higher security level or hybrid variants does not make a significant difference here. This is not the case with alternatives such as FrodoKEM, SIKE, HQC or BIKE, which have individual disadvantages and whose respective performance varies greatly depending on the security level and hybrid implementation. This is especially true for the data-intensive algorithm FrodoKEM. In general, the prevailing network characteristics should be taken into account when choosing scheme and variant. Further it becomes clear that the performance of the handshake is influenced by external factors such as TCP mechanisms or MTU, which could compensate for possible disadvantages due to PQC if configured appropriately.