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International Conference on Information, Communication and Automation Technologies (ICAT)

Simulations of Denial of Service Attacks in Quantum Key Distribution Networks

Emir Dervisevic, Filip Lauterbach, Patrik Burdiak, Jan Rozhon, Martina Slívová, Matej Plakalovic, Mirza Hamza, Peppino Fazio, Miroslav Vozn̆ák, Miralem Mehić

Published Jun 16, 2022• 18 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A QKD network can be considered an add-on technology to a standard communication network that provides IT-secure cryptographic keys as a service. As a result, security challenges resulting in the suspension of functional work must be addressed. This study analyzes a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the Key Management System (KMS), one of the critical components of the QKD network in charge of key management and key provisioning to authorized consumers. Through simulation methods performed in the QKDNetSim, we show that legitimate customers experience significantly worse service during an excessive DoS attack on KMS.

DOI
10.1109/icat54566.2022.9811238

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A QKD network can be considered an add-on technology to a standard communication network that provides IT-secure cryptographic keys as a service. As a result, security challenges resulting in the suspension of functional work must be addressed. This study analyzes a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the Key Management System (KMS), one of the critical components of the QKD network in charge of key management and key provisioning to authorized consumers. Through simulation methods performed in the QKDNetSim, we show that legitimate customers experience significantly worse service during an excessive DoS attack on KMS.
A QKD network provides an additional security layer for IT-secure cryptographic key distribution that is added to existing conventional networks. Thus, QKD network components must be resilient to security challenges from conventional network environments. This paper provided solutions for realizing a Key Management System to avoid DoS attacks, and our solution allows applications to function securely in environments with a reduced amount of keys. In addition, we have provided approaches for allocating and managing QKD resources to avoid malicious key reservations. Simulation experiments verified the proposed solutions.
The Key Management System (KMS) is an important component in scaling up from link-to-link key generation to large key distribution networks. In this work we provide an overview of a KMS in the context of Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN) and give a thorough summary of the functionality of a KMS in such an application. Beyond classical QKDNs, we discuss Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) hybridization techniques at the KMS level. These methods add an additional layer of security against quantum computer driven attacks. We also discuss selected topics regarding the development, deployment and operation of components for such security infrastructure. In addition, relevant standards in the realm of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) are outlined and analyzed. As some of the necessary interfaces have not been standardized, namely the interface between two KMS instances and the interface between the KMS and the Software Defined Network (SDN) Agent, we propose APIs for these two cases. The design of the interface between the KMS and QKD modules is discussed and, considering their resource constraints, a push mode for the ETSI GS QKD 004 standard is proposed. Finally, implementation details of a prototype KMS are outlined and trade-offs are discussed.
Within quantum networks (employing quantum key distribution - QKD), the attacker has no chance to get hold of the established keys (most commonly used as one time pads) without being detected by the communicating parties. So the attacker might change his strategy to denial of service in order to inhibit the efficient usage of the quantum-key-distribution-links and one-time-pad-encryption and hence to force the use of classical (a)symmetric cryptography. In this paper we will propose a method for strengthening classical cryptographic algorithms by the use of small amounts of one time pads, so that these algorithms can be used for an emergency operation when suffering a Denial-of-Service attack and during the time needed to fix it. Additional scenarios of using the presented approach include the down time of QKD-links or QKD-devices in case of failure or maintenance.
Secure communication makes the widespread use of telecommunication networks and services possible. With the constant progress of computing and mathematics, new cryptographic methods are being diligently developed. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a promising technology that provides an Information-Theoretically Secure (ITS) solution to the secret-key agreement problem between two remote parties. QKD networks based on trusted relay nodes are built to provide service to a larger number of parties at arbitrary distances. They function as an add-on technology to traditional networks, generating, managing, distributing, and supplying ITS cryptographic keys. Since key resources are limited, integrating QKD network services into critical infrastructures necessitates effective key management. As a result, this article provides a comprehensive review of key management approaches for trusted-relay QKD networks. They are analyzed to facilitate the identification of potential strategies and accelerate the future development of QKD networks.
In this article, we investigate the issue of authenticating the classical post-processing components of a QKD protocol through an insecure channel. Our analysis starts with state-of-the-art solutions and subsequently introduces an authentication scheme aiming at both Information Theoretic Security and resiliency from particular denial-of-service attacks targeting the authentication procedure. The proposed strategy combines -Almost Strongly Universal hashing for unconditional protection and computationally-secure Message Authentication Codes for DoS detection capability. Specifically, we consider the protocol security in a typical QKD scenario, taking into account partially weak authentication keys. Moreover, we add practical considerations related to authentication parameters and experimentally evaluate the performance of the proposed system in terms of computational complexity and key consumption in a reasonable use case.
This work proposes a key security product and a dynamic threshold detection method to detect replay attacks during the delivery of quantum keys under non-quantum cryptography. This work discusses the security challenges of quantum key distribution (QKD) in wireless public communication networks, focusing on the need for robust measures against both quantum and non-quantum threats. QKD, based on the principles of quantum mechanics, provides a theoretically unconditionally secure method for key exchange due to the non-clonability of quantum states. Despite its potential for future communication security, QKD in wireless networks faces vulnerabilities, particularly to denial of service (DoS) attacks and eavesdropping. We focus on the openness of wireless communication, which makes QKD susceptible to interference and destruction during transmission, with DoS attacks capable of disrupting the QKD system's normal operation by consuming bandwidth with spurious signals or requests. Eavesdropping is a more nuanced threat, where an attacker may intercept wireless signals for gaining key information. To address these issues, we propose a security testing architecture and method for QKD networks. By simulating various network conditions and attacks, we analyze the changes of the detection indicator to assess network security according to an evaluation model. A dynamic threshold method based on the quantum key security protocol (QKSP) is introduced to identify network attacks, with optimal fault detection rates achieved at an eavesdropping ratio of 30% and n = 1. This work concludes by presenting a detection metric for fault detection rates to determine the system's security environment, providing a basis for judging the security of the quantum key transmission process.