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Incredulous Stares: Uncovering Uncertainty in the Everettian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Isaac Wilkins

Published Jan 1, 2022• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.36934/tr2022_246

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Some theories of quantum mechanical phenomena endorse wave function realism, according to which the physical space we inhabit is very different from the physical space we appear to inhabit. In this paper I explore an argument against wave function realism that appeals to a type of simplicity that, although often overlooked, plays a crucial role in scientific theory choice. The type of simplicity in question is simplicity of fit between the way a theory says the world is and the way the world appears to be. This argument can be understood as one way of spelling out the so‐called “incredulous stare objection” that is sometimes leveled against surprising metaphysical theories.
The status of the uncertainty relations varies between the different interpretations of quantum mechanics. The aim of the current paper is to explore their meanings within a certain neo-Everettian many worlds interpretation. We will also look at questions that have been linked with the uncertainty relations since Heisenberg's uncertainty principle: those of joint and repeated measurement of non-commuting (or otherwise `incompatible') observables. This will have implications beyond the uncertainty relations, as we will see the fundamentally different way in which statistical statements are interpreted in the neo-Everett theory that we use.
In Bradley ([2011b]), I offered an analysis of Sleeping Beauty and the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics (EQM). I argued that one can avoid a kind of easy confirmation of EQM by paying attention to observation selection effects, that halfers are right about Sleeping Beauty, and that thirders cannot avoid easy confirmation for the truth of EQM. Wilson ([forthcoming]) agrees with my analysis of observation selection effects in EQM, but goes on to, first, defend Elga’s ([2000]) thirder argument on Sleeping Beauty and, second, argue that the analogy I draw between Sleeping Beauty and EQM fails. I will argue that neither point succeeds. 1 Introduction2 Background3 Wilson’s Argument for ⅓ in Sleeping Beauty4 Reply: Explaining Away the Crazy5 Wilson's Argument for the Breakdown of the Analogy6 Reply: The Irrelevance of Chance7 Conclusion