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Photonics

Low-Rate Denial-of-Service Attack Detection: Defense Strategy Based on Spectral Estimation for CV-QKD

Enze Dai, Duan Huang, Ling Zhang

Published May 24, 2022• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Although continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) systems have unconditional security in theory, there are still many cyber attacking strategies proposed that exploit the loopholes of hardware devices and algorithms. At present, few studies have focused on attacks using algorithm vulnerabilities. The low-rate denial-of-service (LDoS) attack is precisely an algorithm-loophole based hacking strategy, which attacks by manipulating a channel’s transmittance T. In this paper, we take advantage of the feature that the power spectral density (PSD) of LDoS attacks in low frequency band is higher than normal traffic’s to detect whether there are LDoS attacks. We put forward a detection method based on the Bartlett spectral estimation approach and discuss its feasibility from two aspects, the estimation consistency and the detection accuracy. Our experiment results demonstrate that the method can effectively detect LDoS attacks and maintain the consistency of estimation. In addition, compared with the traditional method based on the wavelet transform and Hurst index estimations, our method has higher detection accuracy and stronger pertinence. We anticipate our method may provide an insight into how to detect an LDoS attack in a CVQKD system.

DOI
10.3390/photonics9060365

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Although continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) systems have unconditional security in theory, there are still many cyber attacking strategies proposed that exploit the loopholes of hardware devices and algorithms. At present, few studies have focused on attacks using algorithm vulnerabilities. The low-rate denial-of-service (LDoS) attack is precisely an algorithm-loophole based hacking strategy, which attacks by manipulating a channel’s transmittance T. In this paper, we take advantage of the feature that the power spectral density (PSD) of LDoS attacks in low frequency band is higher than normal traffic’s to detect whether there are LDoS attacks. We put forward a detection method based on the Bartlett spectral estimation approach and discuss its feasibility from two aspects, the estimation consistency and the detection accuracy. Our experiment results demonstrate that the method can effectively detect LDoS attacks and maintain the consistency of estimation. In addition, compared with the traditional method based on the wavelet transform and Hurst index estimations, our method has higher detection accuracy and stronger pertinence. We anticipate our method may provide an insight into how to detect an LDoS attack in a CVQKD system.
In the practical Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD) system, there is a large gap between the ideal theoretical model and the actual physical system. There are still some inevitable flaws, which give quantum hackers the opportunity to manipulate the channel in complex communication environments and launch Denial of Service attacks on the quantum channel. Therefore, a DoS attack-aware defense scheme for the CVQKD system based on convolutional neural networks (CNN) is proposed. The simulation results show that the proposed model can effectively detect DoS attacks launched by quantum hackers in CVQKD system in a complex communication environment, and the model has strong robustness due to the addition of the attention mechanism module. In addition, multiple sets of comparative experiments show that compared with the existing artificial neural network model, the CNN-based model has higher accuracy and stability.
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) has attracted extensive attention due to its compatibility and low costs. However, bandwidth mismatch exists to varying degrees between the transmitter and receiver. This may prevent frequency components carrying modulation information from being fully perceived by the legitimate party. In this paper, we identify a practical security loophole caused by bandwidth mismatch and propose a corresponding spectral attack scheme. Different from previous approaches that exploit security loopholes to conceal the excess noise introduced by intercept-resend attacks, this scheme can directly obtain raw-key information without introducing additional disturbances. A proof-of-principle attack on a CVQKD system with filtering operation is constructed to verify the feasibility. Experimental results indicate that Eve can obtain enough information to render the system insecure if this practical security loophole is ignored. Based on the identified security loophole, corresponding defense strategies are proposed. This work helps bridge the gap between theoretical models and practical implementations, providing a reference for defense design in practical quantum communication systems.
Despite significant advancements in continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD), practical CV-QKD systems can be compromised by various attacks. Consequently, identifying new attack vectors and countermeasures for CV-QKD implementations is important for the continued robustness of CV-QKD. In particular, as CV-QKD relies on a public quantum channel, vulnerability to communication disruption persists from potential adversaries employing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Inspired by DoS attacks, this paper introduces a threat in CV-QKD called the channel amplification (CA) attack, wherein Eve manipulates the communication channel through amplification. We specifically model this attack in a CV-QKD optical fiber setup. To counter this threat, we propose a detection and mitigation strategy. Detection involves a machine learning (ML) model based on a decision tree classifier, classifying various channel tampering attacks, including CA and DoS attacks. For mitigation, Bob, postselects quadrature data by classifying the attack type and frequency. Our ML model exhibits high accuracy in distinguishing and categorizing these attacks. The CA attack's impact on the secret key rate (SKR) is explored concerning Eve's location and the relative intensity noise of the local oscillator (LO). The proposed mitigation strategy improves the attacked SKR for CA attacks and, in some cases, for hybrid CA-DoS attacks. Our study marks an application of both ML classification and postselection in this context. These findings are important for enhancing the robustness of CV-QKD systems against emerging threats on the channel. Published by the American Physical Society 2024
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) is a mature technology that can theoretically provide an unconditional security guarantee. However, a practical CVQKD system may be vulnerable to various quantum hacking attacks due to imperfect devices and insufficient assumptions. In this paper, we propose a universal defense strategy called a machine-learning-based attack detection scheme (MADS). Leveraging the combined advantages of density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN) and multiclass support vector machines (MCSVMs), MADS demonstrates remarkable effectiveness in detecting quantum hacking attacks. Specifically, we first establish a set of attack-related features to extract feature vectors. These vectors are then utilized as input data for DBSCAN to identify and remove any noise or outliers. Finally, the trained MCSVMs are employed to classify and predict the processed data. The predicted results can immediately determine whether or not to generate a final secret key. Simulation results show that the proposed MADS can efficiently detect most quantum hacking attacks and revise the overestimated secret key rates caused by a CVQKD system without any defense strategy to obtain a tighter security bound.
Abstract The practical security of a continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system is compromised by various attack strategies. The existing countermeasures against these attacks are to exploit different real-time monitoring modules to prevent different types of attacks, which significantly depend on the accuracy of the estimated excess noise and lack a universal defense method. In this paper, we propose a defense strategy for CVQKD systems to address these disadvantages and resist most of the known attack types. We investigate several features of the pulses that would be affected by different types of attacks, derive a feature vector based on these features as the input of an artificial neural network (ANN) model, and show the training and testing process of the ANN model for attack detection and classification. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme can effectively detect most of the known attacks at the cost of reducing a small part of secret keys and transmission distance. It establishes a universal attack detection model by simply monitoring several features of the pulses without knowing the exact type of attack in advance.
Discretely modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution (DM CV-QKD) protocols, while promising for extended transmission distances, face significant security threats in practice due to discrepancies between theoretical and actual system models. A critical vulnerability lies in the differential detector, which can be exploited by an eavesdropper to launch saturation attacks. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of saturation attacks specifically targeting DM CV-QKD systems and propose a novel machine learning-based defense scheme utilizing the K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) algorithm for attack detection. The simulation results confirmed that saturation attacks can undermine the actual security of the DM CVQKD system. The defense scheme proposed in this paper can accurately identify the probability of saturation attacks at 96.5%, and has been proven to be effective in defending against saturation attacks.