Interpretation II

Marcus Elstner

R. I. G. Hughes, Peter Gibbins

Preface 1. Meta-physics Part I: 2. Quantum mechanics for natural philosophers (I) 3. Wave-particle duality 4. The Copenhagen interpretation (I) 5. The Copenhagen interpretation (II): Einstein versus Bohr Part II: 6. Quantum mechanics for natural philosophers (II) 7. Projection postulates 8. Nonlocality and hidden variables 9. A user-friendly quantum logic 10. Quantum logic: what it can and can't do Conclusion Notes References Index.

Adán Cabello, Mile Gu, Otfried Gühne +2 more

The interpretation of quantum theory is one of the longest-standing debates in physics. Type I interpretations see quantum probabilities as determined by intrinsic properties of the observed system. Type II see them as relational experiences between an observer and the system. It is usually believed that a decision between these two options cannot be made simply on purely physical grounds but requires an act of metaphysical judgment. Here we show that, under some assumptions, the problem is decidable using thermodynamics. We prove that type I interpretations are incompatible with the following assumptions: (i) The choice of which measurement is performed can be made randomly and independently of the system under observation, (ii) the system has limited memory, and (iii) Landauer's erasure principle holds.

Marcus Elstner

Virendra Singh

We begin by discussing ``What exists?'', i.e. ontology, in Classical Physics which provided a description of physical phenomena at the macroscopic level. The microworld however necessitates a introduction of Quantum ideas for its understanding. It is almost certain that the world is quantum mechanical at both microscopic as well as at macroscopic level. The problem of ontology of a Quantum world is a difficult one. It also depends on which interpretation is used. We first discuss some interpretations in which Quantum Mechanics does not provide a complete framework but has to be supplemented by extra ingredients e.g. (i) Copenhagen group of interpretations associated with the names of Niels Bohr, Heisenberg, von-Neumann, and (ii) de-Broglie-Bohm interpretations. We then look at some interpretations in which Quantum mechanics is supposed to provide the entire framework such as (i) Everett-deWitt many world, (ii) quantum histories interpretations. We conclude with some remarks on the rigidity of the formalism of quantum mechanics, which is sharp contrast to it's ontological fluidity.

Marcus Elstner