If a quantum state is prescriptive then what state should an agent assign, what expectations does this justify, and what are the grounds for those expectations? I address these questions and introduce a third important idea—decoherence. A subsystem of a system assigned an entangled state may be assigned a mixed state represented by a density operator. Quantum state assignment is an objective matter, but the correct assignment must be relativized to the physical situation of an actual or hypothetical agent for whom its prescription offers good advice, since differently situated agents have access to different information. However this situation is described, it is true, empirically significant magnitude claims that make the description correct, while others provide the objective grounds for the agent’s expectations. Quantum models of environmental decoherence certify the empirical significance of these magnitude claims while also licensing application of the Born rule to others without mentioning measurement.
If a quantum state is prescriptive then what state should an agent assign, what expectations does this justify, and what are the grounds for those expectations? I address these questions and introduce a third important idea—decoherence. A subsystem of a system assigned an entangled state may be assigned a mixed state represented by a density operator. Quantum state assignment is an objective matter, but the correct assignment must be relativized to the physical situation of an actual or hypothetical agent for whom its prescription offers good advice, since differently situated agents have access to different information. However this situation is described, it is true, empirically significant magnitude claims that make the description correct, while others provide the objective grounds for the agent’s expectations. Quantum models of environmental decoherence certify the empirical significance of these magnitude claims while also licensing application of the Born rule to others without mentioning measurement.
If a quantum state completely specified the properties of a system to which it was assigned then application of quantum theory to an interaction intended to correlate properties of a measured system to those of a measuring device would leave that device recording no determinate outcome, contrary to what we observe. This is the quantum measurement problem. But the problem does not arise if the function of a quantum state assignment is not descriptive but prescriptive, so that all quantum state assignments are relational. Models of decoherence can certify the empirical significance of rival claims about which measurement outcome a device records, but their application does not explain but presupposes that exactly one such claim is true. The reality criterion which Einstein and colleagues applied to show the incompleteness of quantum description of reality is inapplicable to their chosen system while a slightly modified criterion is false.
A quantum state, via the Born Rule, assigns probabilities to the different possible values of observables of a quantum system. It is only in virtue of these probabilities — or, alternatively, expectation values — that quantum mechanics is empirically testable. Since assigning a state to a system means assigning probabilities to the values of observables, it may seem natural to read Peierls’ claim that the state ‘represents our knowledge of the system’ (Peierls [1991], p. 19) as a shorthand for saying that the state represents our knowledge of these probabilities. The latter view is sometimes even straightforwardly identified with the epistemic conception of states, for example by Marchildon, who claims that ‘[i]n the epistemic view [of quantum states], the state vector (or wave function or density matrix) does not represent the objective state of a microscopic system […], but rather our knowledge of the probabilities of outcomes of future measurements’ (Marchildon [2004], p. 1454). However, according to an argument due to Fuchs and endorsed by Timpson, 31 the idea that quantum states represent our knowledge about quantum probabilities should not be regarded as the core claim of the epistemic conception of quantum states, simply because, as they argue, this idea is in fact incompatible with the latter. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
The quantum theory of decoherence plays an important role in a pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory. It governs the descriptive content of claims about values of physical magnitudes and offers advice on when to use quantum probabilities as a guide to their truth. The content of a claim is to be understood in terms of its role in inferences. This promises a better treatment of meaning than that of Bohr. Quantum theory models physical systems with no mention of measurement: it is decoherence, not measurement, that licenses application of Born's probability rule. So quantum theory also offers advice on its own application. I show how this works in a simple model of decoherence, and then in applications to both laboratory experiments and natural systems. Applications to quantum field theory and the measurement problem will be discussed elsewhere.
I take a pragmatist perspective on quantum theory. This is not a view of the world described by quantum theory. In this view quantum theory itself does not describe the physical world, nor our observatons, experiences or opinions of it. Instead, the theory offers reliable advice on when to expect an event of one kind or another, and on how strongly to expect each possible outcome of that event. The actual outcome is a perspectival fact: a fact relative to a physical context of assessment. Measurement outcomes and quantum states are both perspectival. By noticing that each must be relativized to an appropriate physical context one can resolve the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocal action. But if the outcome of a quantum measurement is not an absolute fact, then why shoud the statistics of such outcomes give us any objective reason to accept quantum theory? One can describe extensions of the scenario of Wigner's friend in which a statement expressing the outcome of a quantum measurement would be true relative to one such context but not relative to another. However, physical conditions in our world prevent us from realizing such scenarios. Since the outcome of every actual quantum measurement is certified at what is essentially a single context of assessment, the outcome relative to that context is an objective fact in the only sense that matters for science. We should accept quantum theory because the statistics these outcomes display are just those it leads us to expect.
Beyond state vectors We cannot always assign a definite state vector |ψ〉 to a quantum system Q. It may be that Q is part of a composite system RQ that is in an entangled state |Ψ (RQ) 〉. Or it may be that our knowledge of the preparation of Q is insufficient to determine a particular state |ψ〉. Consider, for instance, a qubit sent from Alice to Bob during the BB84 key distribution protocol from Section 4.4. The state of this qubit could be |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 or |−〉, each with equal likelihood. In either case – whether Q is a subsystem of an entangled system, or the state of Q is determined by a probabilistic process – we cannot specify a quantum state vector |ψ〉 for Q. Nevertheless, in either case we are in a position to make statistical predictions about the outcomes of measurements on Q. In this chapter we describe the mathematical machinery for doing this. Mixtures of states Suppose the state of Q arises by a random process, so that the state |ψ α 〉 is prepared with probability p α . The possible states |ψ α 〉 need not be orthogonal (as you can see in the BB84 example above). We call this situation a mixture of the states |ψ α 〉, or a mixed state for short. One way to interpret a mixed state is to return to the idea of an ensemble of systems, which we introduced in Section 3.3.
Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabilities for physical events: both state and probability are objective—not because they represent elements of physical reality, but because each exerts normative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements (about values of magnitudes) that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not “collapse” on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violation of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate “spooky” non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner’s friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.