Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

CRC Press eBooks

Open Realism

Bernard d’Espagnat

Published May 4, 2018• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This chapter has some kind of a philosophical admixture in it. It Concerns on two preliminary remarks in order. The first bears on the very word "realism", the second remark is of a more practical nature. All statements in physics are, of course, objective. But this assertion is, to some extent, there are two distinct types of objectivity, strong and weak objectivity. The environment theory is aimed at being more than a purely "phenomenalistic" theory since, (contrary to, e.g., Bohr's approach) it imparts a meaning to the notion of the quantum state of the instrument independently of whether or not the latter is used as such. It is based on the quite crucial remark that macroscopic systems of even quite a small size (such as dust specks) have such a dense energy spectrum that they never can be considered as totally isolated from environment.

DOI
10.1201/9780429503283-14

Related papers

Reality, Seen and Unseen

In this chapter, we're going to consider some traditional philosophical questions about the nature of reality, and see how the transactional picture can shed new light on these questions. So far, we've considered the distinction between the macroscopic world and the microscopic world. We've seen that classical physics describes the macroscopic world quite well, but that it fails to adequately describe the microscopic world of atoms and other fundamental components of matter. We've also noted that the world of appearance corresponds to the macroscopic realm describable by classical physics, while the underlying, hidden reality can be seen as corresponding to the quantum level. It turns out that this distinction between the macroscopic and microscopic realms, and the need for different physical theories to describe them, is directly relevant to some longstanding philosophical puzzles.

IMPERIAL COLLEGE PRESS eBooks•Feb 24, 2015•0 citations

Quantum mechanical realism

Brian Ellis

Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists. For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world. I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality. But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models. To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state. The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrödinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse. I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense. Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.

•Sep 30, 2009•1 citation

Quantum Mechanical Realism1

Brian Ellis

Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists.For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world.I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality.But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models.To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state.The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrodinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse.I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense.Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.First, realism about Schrodinger waves requires the belief that particles are always transmitted as quantum mechanically indeterminate 1.

McGill-Queen's University Press eBooks•Jan 1, 2010•0 citations

THE REALIST-INSTRUMENTALIST CONTROVERSY IN QUANTUM MECHANICS

Vincent A. Lazara

My aim in this dissertation is to defend a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics.Firstly, I present considerations based on certain general features of theories in the natural sciences which indicate that realism affords a better account of those theories than instrumentalism.In particular, I consider certain issues surrounding the cognitive status of theories, including the role of models, the status of scientific explanation, and the referential character of theoretical terms.Secondly, I develop a detailed realist theory of measurement based on the notion of quantity terms as designators of objective properties of, and relations among, existing entities.I contrast this with the leading instrumentalist theories of measurement, and I argue that the realist theory is the better account of both the logic and practice of scientific measurement.Finally, I consider a number of objections to realism that arise because of certain theoretical features peculiar to quantum mechanics.In the course of this discussion, I consider crucial experimental evidence for the "dual" nature of microentities, various criteria of reality proposed by philosophers of science, the peculiar features of quantum mechanical measurement, and the status of causality in quantum mechanics.I argue that while certain realist viii ix interpretations of the quantum theory, namely the wave and wavicle interpretations, are unsatisfactory, an interpreta tion which construes micro-entities as existing particles is a tenable account.CHAPTER I ignored the considerations which arise at those more general levels of inquiry, but one can not adequately assess the status of quantum mechanics with respect to both realism and instrumentalism apart from those considerations.In the second two chapters of the dissertation, I shall argue that realist interpretations of quantitative theories in the natural sciences are preferable to instrumentalist interpretations.Then in the remainder of the dissertation, I shall go on to argue that realism is tenable at the quantum mechanical level despite the features peculiar to that theory.CHAPTER II THE COGNITIVE STATUS OF THEORIES transitions from one set of experiential statements to another.This view is in marked contrast to that of the realist who regards such terms as referential.This divergence in opinion between realists and instrumentalists about the referential character of theoretical terms leads to a related dispute over the role of models in the inter pretation of scientific theories.Before contrasting the various philosophical positions on this issue, it will be necessary to sort out different senses of the term "model."Upon inspecting the literature surrounding this dispute, it seems that much of the controversy about the role of models stems from a failure to make such distinctions.I will begin this task by distinguishing between 13 model-structures and model-objects.A model-structure is a definitely specifiable schema of mathematical-logical relationships which is exhibited by and can be abstracted from a set of objects.Any set of objects which exhibits a model-structure constitutes a set of model-objects.With respect to any particular scientific theory, there may be a variety of model-objects that scientists employ for various purposes.For example, in the kinetic theory of gases, one can distinguish the following.Firstly, there is the set of molecules themselves, the theoretical entities which we shall 13.For further detail in this regard, see Henry C. Byerly, "Model-Structures and Model-Objects," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.Vol. 20, 1969, pp.135-144.i In fact, if one were to make that claim, I do not see how it could be supported without again falling prey to Maxwell's criticism cited above.And if one is simply troubled by the "ontological risk" involved in asserting the existence of theoretical entities because of the tentativeness of the corresponding theories, it should be noted that the risk of being wrong is a small price to pay for the potentially deeper understanding of nature that scientific theories afford us in the light of realist commitments.

•Jan 1, 1973•0 citations

Introduction

Michael Redhead

I am very grateful to the Master and Fellows of Trinity College for inviting me to give the Tarner Lectures. What I want to do in this book, stated boldly and baldly, is to consider the relevance of developments in modern theoretical physics to metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of reality. By metaphysical questions I mean the very general sorts of questions that arise out of a critical examination of the principles, concepts and fundamental presuppositions that lie behind modern physics. How should we interpret the claims that physicists seem to be making about the world? Are they intended to be understood as literally true, for example, and exactly what are those claims, given that the pages of theoretical physics monographs are largely filled with abstract mathematical formalism? In the first chapter, I shall be looking at a range of philosophical points of view in the framework of which such questions can be addressed, and attempt the difficult task of adjudicating between the different approaches. At the end of the day I shall be arguing for a pretty straightforward metaphysical realism, that the external world exists independently of our knowledge of it. In the second chapter I shall look at arguments from various branches of modern physics that are sometimes claimed to bring in an essential role for subjectivity in physics, bringing the observer into a central role, creating his own reality.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Aug 17, 1995•0 citations

Nonseparability and Quantum Logic

Bernard d’Espagnat

This talk is about quantum logic, and before we engage in the subject proper let me say how much I appreciate the invitation to deliver it that was extended to me by the Japanese Society for the Philosophy of Science.In particular because I feel that such a meeting is really the place that is most adequate for the discussion of these matters.Let us introduce the subject by mentioning a few general points.First of all, logics deals with propositions.Hence we shall be concerned with propositions.But in fact our interest will be exclusively focused on what is-or what should be the simplest type of propositions: the propositions by means of which a physicist expresses what he knows about a physical system.A priori, our subject should then be very simple.Indeed the elementary books about logic tell us that the rules concerning these propositions can be formalized.That, for example, the propositions can be combined by means of two rules, corresponding to and and to or, and that the resulting structure is just that of a Boolean Algebra.We would expect this to hold for any system.However, as you know, a major difficulty already creeps in at this point when we want to deal with atomic systems.This is because a very simple word such as "and" may well have no obvious meaning in that case.And when we try to force a meaning to it was sometimes encounter quite unpleasant surprises, exemplified by the Heisenberg relations.Among the founders of quantum physics the reactions to such a fact were quite varied as is well known.Some of them sort of hoped that the difficulty just came from our using the wrong concepts.For example, it is quite obvious that if we try to describe as a particle something which is really a wave, we are heading for trouble and we are bound to formulate some meaningless propositions.However, this remark did not lead to a satisfactory solution in the end.Other physicists notably the Copenhagen group took a very different standpoint.Substantially, what they said boiled to this: since we cannot "see" the elementary particles, let us refrain from formulating directly propositions bearing on them.Ultimately, there fore, all their propositions bear on the instruments; or should be interpreted in terms of such propositions.This is -it turned out a very good recipe.Of course, propositions bearing on instruments are propositions of classical, macroscopic physcis.As such, they fall -57-

Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science•Jan 1, 1977•0 citations
This chapter has some kind of a philosophical admixture in it. It Concerns on two preliminary remarks in order. The first bears on the very word "realism", the second remark is of a more practical nature. All statements in physics are, of course, objective. But this assertion is, to some extent, there are two distinct types of objectivity, strong and weak objectivity. The environment theory is aimed at being more than a purely "phenomenalistic" theory since, (contrary to, e.g., Bohr's approach) it imparts a meaning to the notion of the quantum state of the instrument independently of whether or not the latter is used as such. It is based on the quite crucial remark that macroscopic systems of even quite a small size (such as dust specks) have such a dense energy spectrum that they never can be considered as totally isolated from environment.
In this chapter, we're going to consider some traditional philosophical questions about the nature of reality, and see how the transactional picture can shed new light on these questions. So far, we've considered the distinction between the macroscopic world and the microscopic world. We've seen that classical physics describes the macroscopic world quite well, but that it fails to adequately describe the microscopic world of atoms and other fundamental components of matter. We've also noted that the world of appearance corresponds to the macroscopic realm describable by classical physics, while the underlying, hidden reality can be seen as corresponding to the quantum level. It turns out that this distinction between the macroscopic and microscopic realms, and the need for different physical theories to describe them, is directly relevant to some longstanding philosophical puzzles.
Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists. For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world. I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality. But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models. To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state. The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrödinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse. I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense. Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.
Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists.For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world.I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality.But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models.To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state.The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrodinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse.I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense.Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.First, realism about Schrodinger waves requires the belief that particles are always transmitted as quantum mechanically indeterminate 1.
My aim in this dissertation is to defend a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics.Firstly, I present considerations based on certain general features of theories in the natural sciences which indicate that realism affords a better account of those theories than instrumentalism.In particular, I consider certain issues surrounding the cognitive status of theories, including the role of models, the status of scientific explanation, and the referential character of theoretical terms.Secondly, I develop a detailed realist theory of measurement based on the notion of quantity terms as designators of objective properties of, and relations among, existing entities.I contrast this with the leading instrumentalist theories of measurement, and I argue that the realist theory is the better account of both the logic and practice of scientific measurement.Finally, I consider a number of objections to realism that arise because of certain theoretical features peculiar to quantum mechanics.In the course of this discussion, I consider crucial experimental evidence for the "dual" nature of microentities, various criteria of reality proposed by philosophers of science, the peculiar features of quantum mechanical measurement, and the status of causality in quantum mechanics.I argue that while certain realist viii ix interpretations of the quantum theory, namely the wave and wavicle interpretations, are unsatisfactory, an interpreta tion which construes micro-entities as existing particles is a tenable account.CHAPTER I ignored the considerations which arise at those more general levels of inquiry, but one can not adequately assess the status of quantum mechanics with respect to both realism and instrumentalism apart from those considerations.In the second two chapters of the dissertation, I shall argue that realist interpretations of quantitative theories in the natural sciences are preferable to instrumentalist interpretations.Then in the remainder of the dissertation, I shall go on to argue that realism is tenable at the quantum mechanical level despite the features peculiar to that theory.CHAPTER II THE COGNITIVE STATUS OF THEORIES transitions from one set of experiential statements to another.This view is in marked contrast to that of the realist who regards such terms as referential.This divergence in opinion between realists and instrumentalists about the referential character of theoretical terms leads to a related dispute over the role of models in the inter pretation of scientific theories.Before contrasting the various philosophical positions on this issue, it will be necessary to sort out different senses of the term "model."Upon inspecting the literature surrounding this dispute, it seems that much of the controversy about the role of models stems from a failure to make such distinctions.I will begin this task by distinguishing between 13 model-structures and model-objects.A model-structure is a definitely specifiable schema of mathematical-logical relationships which is exhibited by and can be abstracted from a set of objects.Any set of objects which exhibits a model-structure constitutes a set of model-objects.With respect to any particular scientific theory, there may be a variety of model-objects that scientists employ for various purposes.For example, in the kinetic theory of gases, one can distinguish the following.Firstly, there is the set of molecules themselves, the theoretical entities which we shall 13.For further detail in this regard, see Henry C. Byerly, "Model-Structures and Model-Objects," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.Vol. 20, 1969, pp.135-144.i In fact, if one were to make that claim, I do not see how it could be supported without again falling prey to Maxwell's criticism cited above.And if one is simply troubled by the "ontological risk" involved in asserting the existence of theoretical entities because of the tentativeness of the corresponding theories, it should be noted that the risk of being wrong is a small price to pay for the potentially deeper understanding of nature that scientific theories afford us in the light of realist commitments.
I am very grateful to the Master and Fellows of Trinity College for inviting me to give the Tarner Lectures. What I want to do in this book, stated boldly and baldly, is to consider the relevance of developments in modern theoretical physics to metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of reality. By metaphysical questions I mean the very general sorts of questions that arise out of a critical examination of the principles, concepts and fundamental presuppositions that lie behind modern physics. How should we interpret the claims that physicists seem to be making about the world? Are they intended to be understood as literally true, for example, and exactly what are those claims, given that the pages of theoretical physics monographs are largely filled with abstract mathematical formalism? In the first chapter, I shall be looking at a range of philosophical points of view in the framework of which such questions can be addressed, and attempt the difficult task of adjudicating between the different approaches. At the end of the day I shall be arguing for a pretty straightforward metaphysical realism, that the external world exists independently of our knowledge of it. In the second chapter I shall look at arguments from various branches of modern physics that are sometimes claimed to bring in an essential role for subjectivity in physics, bringing the observer into a central role, creating his own reality.
This talk is about quantum logic, and before we engage in the subject proper let me say how much I appreciate the invitation to deliver it that was extended to me by the Japanese Society for the Philosophy of Science.In particular because I feel that such a meeting is really the place that is most adequate for the discussion of these matters.Let us introduce the subject by mentioning a few general points.First of all, logics deals with propositions.Hence we shall be concerned with propositions.But in fact our interest will be exclusively focused on what is-or what should be the simplest type of propositions: the propositions by means of which a physicist expresses what he knows about a physical system.A priori, our subject should then be very simple.Indeed the elementary books about logic tell us that the rules concerning these propositions can be formalized.That, for example, the propositions can be combined by means of two rules, corresponding to and and to or, and that the resulting structure is just that of a Boolean Algebra.We would expect this to hold for any system.However, as you know, a major difficulty already creeps in at this point when we want to deal with atomic systems.This is because a very simple word such as "and" may well have no obvious meaning in that case.And when we try to force a meaning to it was sometimes encounter quite unpleasant surprises, exemplified by the Heisenberg relations.Among the founders of quantum physics the reactions to such a fact were quite varied as is well known.Some of them sort of hoped that the difficulty just came from our using the wrong concepts.For example, it is quite obvious that if we try to describe as a particle something which is really a wave, we are heading for trouble and we are bound to formulate some meaningless propositions.However, this remark did not lead to a satisfactory solution in the end.Other physicists notably the Copenhagen group took a very different standpoint.Substantially, what they said boiled to this: since we cannot "see" the elementary particles, let us refrain from formulating directly propositions bearing on them.Ultimately, there fore, all their propositions bear on the instruments; or should be interpreted in terms of such propositions.This is -it turned out a very good recipe.Of course, propositions bearing on instruments are propositions of classical, macroscopic physcis.As such, they fall -57-