I interpreted the repeated measurement experiments of the previous chapter by saying that quantum mechanics can find probabilities only, not certainties (that is, that quantum mechanics is “probabilistic”, not “deterministic”). You may object, maintaining that the world is deterministic, but that my particular deterministic scheme (the “magnetic arrow”) is incorrect. The next chapter presents an ingenious argument, invented by Einstein, which shows that no local deterministic scheme could give the results observed by experiment. In order to understand that argument you need some background in probability. But in fact, a knowledge of probability is generally useful in day-to-day life as well as in physics. You walk across a street — what is the probability of your being hit by a car? You are advised to undergo elective surgery — what is the probability that the surgery will extend your life, and what is the probability that the surgery will go wrong and injure you? You breath some asbestos or smoke a cigarette — what is the probability of contracting cancer? Misconceptions about probability abound and can lead to disastrous public policy decisions. A knowledge of quantum mechanics is good for your soul, but it is of practical importance only to the designers of lasers, transistors, and superconductors. A knowledge of probability is of practical importance to everyone.
I interpreted the repeated measurement experiments of the previous chapter by saying that quantum mechanics can find probabilities only, not certainties (that is, that quantum mechanics is “probabilistic”, not “deterministic”). You may object, maintaining that the world is deterministic, but that my particular deterministic scheme (the “magnetic arrow”) is incorrect. The next chapter presents an ingenious argument, invented by Einstein, which shows that no local deterministic scheme could give the results observed by experiment. In order to understand that argument you need some background in probability. But in fact, a knowledge of probability is generally useful in day-to-day life as well as in physics. You walk across a street — what is the probability of your being hit by a car? You are advised to undergo elective surgery — what is the probability that the surgery will extend your life, and what is the probability that the surgery will go wrong and injure you? You breath some asbestos or smoke a cigarette — what is the probability of contracting cancer? Misconceptions about probability abound and can lead to disastrous public policy decisions. A knowledge of quantum mechanics is good for your soul, but it is of practical importance only to the designers of lasers, transistors, and superconductors. A knowledge of probability is of practical importance to everyone.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Everett interpretation seems to dispense with probabilities in quantum mechanics. Instead of describing a world for which many things are possible, but only some of those possibilities are actualised, it suggests a world in which all possibilities actually happen . Moreover, this is something of which we can be absolutely certain . Obviously, this does not straightforwardly fit our experience. We do not see multiple possibilities becoming actual. Whenever we measure a superposed particle, we observe only one property or another. Moreover, we have a very useful probabilistic rule to help us to predict what we will see. How can the success of this probabilistic rule be explained, if an Everett world does not involve any uncertainty? There are two main moves that are employed in response to this challenge. The first – what I call Stage A – is to show that there is a relevant sort of uncertainty, even in a universe where we are certain that everything will happen. The second move – Stage B – is to try to vindicate the probability of the Born rule in particular. That is, to show that we should not merely be uncertain about the future, but that we have good reason to attach the particular probabilities dictated by the Born rule to the possible outcomes of a quantum experiment. We will consider these two stages in turn.
Quantum mechanics is valuable because it opens a discussion about the nature of reality, because it demonstrates the power of reason in revealing the truth even when common sense is an obstacle, and simply because it is good to know how our universe ticks (“knowledge is better than ignorance”). But it is also valuable because a host of practical devices, from lasers to transistors to superconductors, all work because of quantum mechanics. Most of these applications are beyond the scope of this book. I could tell you in vague terms how a laser works, but I could never convince you that my description was correct — you would have to accept it on my authority, and acceptance on the basis of authority is the very antithesis of scientific thought. However, there is one very recent, very exciting application of quantum mechanics that can be treated in full within the “rigorous but not technical” style of this book, namely the use of quantum mechanics to send coded messages. (You may skip this chapter without interrupting the flow of the book's argument.) Can you keep a secret? Sending coded messages is a part of life. Governments and businesses need to transmit secrets that would be deadly in the wrong hands (military plans, formulas for explosives, etc.). But even you have information that you don't want everyone in the world to know: your bank balance, your voting record, your vacation plans. I'm not suggesting that you should be embarrassed about your bank balance, but it's your private information and no eavesdropper has any right to it.
Physicists have, hitherto, mostly adopted a frequentist conception of probability, according to which probability statements apply only to ensembles. It is argued that we should, instead, adopt an epistemic, or Bayesian conception, in which probabilities are conceived as logical constructs rather than physical realities, and in which probability statements do apply directly to individual events. The question is closely related to the disagreement between the orthodox school of statistical thought and the Bayesian school. It has important technical implications (it makes a difference, what statistical methodology one adopts). It may also have important implications for the interpretation of the quantum state. 1 1.
Since its inception, the many counter-intuitive aspects and results of quantum mechanics have provoked strong philosophical debates and many interpretations. Even fundamental issues, such as Max Born's basic rules concerning probability amplitudes and probability distributions, took decades to be appreciated by society and many leading scientists. Richard Feynman once said, think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.[48] According to Steven Weinberg, There is now in my opinion no entirely satisfactory interpretation of quantum mechanics. The Copenhagen interpretation - due largely to the Danish theoretical physicist Niels Bohr - remains the quantum mechanical formalism that is currently most widely accepted amongst physicists, some 75 years after its enunciation. According to this interpretation, the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is not a temporary feature which will eventually be replaced by a deterministic theory, but instead must be considered a final renunciation of the classical idea of causality. The full paper: http://www.iiste.org/PDFshare/APTA-PAGENO-307447-311734.pdf
Abstract If we are not persuaded of the approach to recovering causality in quantum physics through the de Broglie-Bohm theory (perhaps because, like Einstein, we think this route ‘too cheap’) or Popper’s reinterpretation of the meaning of probability, we must seek alternative solutions to the problems of quantum probability and the collapse of the wave function. Even if we choose to accept what quantum probability tells us concerning the fundamental indeterminism and acausality of the quantum world, we are still left to trouble over quantum measurement.