In this chapter, we inquire how foundations independent of measurement could look like. Section 8.1 briefly reviews Born’s rule, the core of the traditional interpretation and its limitations (discussed in detail in Chapter 14 of the Appendix). Section 8.2 discusses the reasons why the axiomatic method made geometry and number theory selfinterpreting mature theories. Section 8.3 poses the question whether quantum physics can be given a similar status as geometry, and introduces Callen’s criterion as the appropriate bridge between theory and reality. Section 8.4 discusses requirements for objective properties relevant for quantum theory. Section 8.5 treats the question of how the universe may be considered as a quantum system. The final Section 8.6 gives a classical view of the qubit, known by Malus and Stokes already long before the advent of quantum mechanics. It gives a model for a successful interpretation of certain quantum phenomena in fully realistic terms.
In this chapter, we inquire how foundations independent of measurement could look like. Section 8.1 briefly reviews Born’s rule, the core of the traditional interpretation and its limitations (discussed in detail in Chapter 14 of the Appendix). Section 8.2 discusses the reasons why the axiomatic method made geometry and number theory selfinterpreting mature theories. Section 8.3 poses the question whether quantum physics can be given a similar status as geometry, and introduces Callen’s criterion as the appropriate bridge between theory and reality. Section 8.4 discusses requirements for objective properties relevant for quantum theory. Section 8.5 treats the question of how the universe may be considered as a quantum system. The final Section 8.6 gives a classical view of the qubit, known by Malus and Stokes already long before the advent of quantum mechanics. It gives a model for a successful interpretation of certain quantum phenomena in fully realistic terms.
This paper gives a thorough critique of the foundations of quantum physics in its mainstream interpretation (i.e., treating pure states as primitives, without reference to hidden variables, and without modifications of the quantum laws). This is achieved by cleanly separating a concise version of the (universally accepted) formal core of quantum physics from the (controversial) interpretation issues. The latter are primarily related to measurement, but also to questions of existence and of the meaning of basic concepts like 'state' and 'particle'. The requirements for good foundations of quantum physics are discussed. Main results: * Born's rule cannot be valid universally, and must be considered as a scientific law with a restricted domain of validity. * If the state of every composite quantum system contains all information that can be known about this system, it cannot be a pure state in general.
Quantum physics consists of a formal core that is universally agreed upon (basically being a piece of mathematics with suggestive names for concepts matching related concepts of experimental culture) and an interpretational halo (trying to make this relation more precise) that remains highly disputed even after more than 90 years of modern quantum physics. The latter is the subject of the interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Part II), where many interpretations coexist and compete for the attention of those interested in what quantum physics really means. In this chapter, an axiomatic introduction to the undisputed formal core of quantum physics is given. The axioms described present nonrelativistic quantum statistical mechanics in the Schrödinger picture. The relativistic case is outside the scope of these axioms, as it must be treated by quantum field theory; see Chapter 7. As in any axiomatic setting (necessary for a formal discipline), there are a number of different but equivalent sets of axioms or postulates that can be used to define formal quantum physics. Since they are equivalent, their choice is a matter of convenience. The choice presented here is a formulation featuring three aspects: It emphasises the similarity of quantum mechanics and classical mechanics, gives most direct access to statistical mechanics, and is free from allusions to measurement. The reason for the first is that this similarity serves as a guide to meaning. From the axiomatic setting for quantum mechanics presented below, classical mechanics (in the Koopman setting discussed in Section 7.10) is obtained by simply restricting the operators to be diagonal, so that all operations happen pointwise on the diagonal elements. Thus, multiplication is commutative, and one can identify operators and functions. In particular, the density operator degenerates into a probability density. Therefore, the quantum case appears as a generalization of the classical case allowing for noncommutativity, so that both q-observables and the density operator are (usually infinite-dimensional) operators. The reason for the second is that statistical mechanics is the main tool for applications of quantum physics to the macroscopic systems we are familiar with. The reason for the third is that realistic measurements constitute a complex process involving macroscopic detectors, hence should be explained by quantum statistical mechanics rather than be part of the axiomatic foundations themselves. (This is in marked contrast to other foundations, and distinguishes the present system of axioms.)
Traditionally, some version of Born’s rule is always considered to be an indispensable part of any interpretation of quantum mechanics, either as a postulate, or as a result derived-not always on the basis of convincing reasoning-from other postulates. In this section, we have a close look at the possible forms of Born’s rule and discuss the limits of its validity. All traditional foundations of quantum mechanics heavily depend on the concept of (hypothetical, idealized) experiments-far too heavily. This is one of the reasons why these foundations are still unsettled, over 90 years after the discovery of the basic equations for modern quantum mechanics. No other theory has such controversial foundations. The main reason is that the starting point of the usual interpretations is an idealization of the measurement process that is taken too seriously, namely as the indisputable truth about everything measured. But in reality, this idealization is only a didactical trick for the newcomer to make the formal definitions of quantum mechanics a bit easier to swallow. Except in a few very simple cases, it is too far removed from experimental practice to tell much about real measurements, and hence about how quantum physics is used in real applications. In experimental physics, measurement is a very complex thing, far more complex than Born’s rule (the usual starting point) suggests. To measure the distance between two galaxies, the mass of the top quark, or the Lamb shift, just to mention three basic examples, cannot be captured by the idealistic measurement concept used there, nor by any of the refinements of it discussed in the literature. In each of the three cases mentioned, one assembles a lot of auxiliary information and ultimately calculates the measurement result from a best fit of a model to the data. Clearly, the theory must already be in place in order to do that. We do not even know what a top quark should be, whose mass we are measuring, unless we have a theory that tells us this! The two most accurately determined observables in the history of quantum physics, namely the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron and Lamb shift, are not even q-observables! To present the stage for the criticism of Born’s rule in Section 14.3, we first need to clarify the meaning of the term “Born’s rule”. To distinguish different useful meanings, we look in Sections 14.1-14.2 at the early history of Born’s rule.
This paper presents the thermal interpretation of quantum physics. The insight from Part I of this series that Born's rule has its limitations -- hence cannot be the foundation of quantum physics -- opens the way for an alternative interpretation -- the thermal interpretation of quantum physics. It gives new foundations that connect quantum physics (including quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, quantum field theory and their applications) to experiment. The thermal interpretation resolves the problems of the foundations of quantum physics revealed in the critique from Part I of this series. It improves the traditional foundations in several respects: * The thermal interpretation reflects the actual practice of quantum physics, especially regarding its macroscopic implications. * The thermal interpretation gives a fair account of the interpretational differences between quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. * The thermal interpretation gives a natural, realistic meaning to the standard formalism of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory in a single world, without introducing additional hidden variables. * The thermal interpretation is independent of the measurement problem. The latter becomes a precise problem in statistical mechanics rather than a fuzzy and problematic notion in the foundations. Details will be discussed in Part III.
Abstract Many theories and models from physics are probabilistic. This observation raises several philosophical questions: What are probabilities in physics? Do they reflect objective chances which exist independently of the human mind? Or do they only express subjective credences and thus capture our own uncertainty about the world? Finally, which metaphysical lessons, if at all, can one draw from the largely probabilistic character of physics? The chapters collected in this volume address these questions and provide a detailed philosophical appraisal of the status of probabilities in all of physics. Particular emphasis is laid upon statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Many chapters reflect a desire to understand probabilities from physics as objective chances. These chances are characterized, e.g., as time-averages, as probabilities from a best system in the terms of David Lewis, or using the Boltzmannian typicality approach. Other chapters are sympathetic to a Bayesian view of probabilities in physics. The chapters about quantum mechanics elucidate the peculiar characteristics of quantum correlations and discuss strategies to justify the Born Rule. Finally, the chapters of this volume demonstrate how closely interpretive issues about probabilities are entangled with other foundational problems of physics such as the Reversibility Paradox, the ontology of the quantum world and the question whether the world is deterministic.
During the past two or three centuries western philosophy and science have confirmed each other in their ontological attitude towards external reality. The particular opinion that physical objects have an existence completely independent of observation was established as the necessary basis for all scientific investigation. The discovery in quantum physics that the phenomena ultimately constituting the stability of the material world cannot be separated from the instruments of observation was necessarily felt disastrous to the scientific world-picture, and many philosophers and scientists, including celebrated physicists, are still trying by all means to save ontology in quantum physics. The motive power behind this activity is the belief that the objectivity of science can be maintained only if the elementary particles of matter can be objectified in the usual way. The present chapter deals with the fundamental conditions in quantum physics which entail a complete breakdown of the conceptual frame of classical mechanics