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Nature

A ‘quantum knot’ unties itself

Published Oct 25, 2019• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1038/d41586-019-03212-0

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Untying the Gordian Knot: Process, Reality, and Context by Timothy Eastman

Dan Dombrowski

Reviewed by: Untying the Gordian Knot: Process, Reality, and Context by Timothy Eastman Dan Dombrowski EASTMAN, Timothy. Untying the Gordian Knot: Process, Reality, and Context. New York: Lexington Books, 2020. 344 pp. Cloth, $120.00; eBook, $45.00 The title of this book reminds one of David Ray Griffin’s 1998 study, Unsnarling the World Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem. Both books rely on process philosophy to respond to seemingly insoluble problems (called the “world-knot” by Arthur Schopenhauer) created in the wake of early modern dualism, which led to late modern mechanism once the ghost in the machine was exorcised. One significant difference is that Eastman is a prominent physicist who tries to untie the knots created by deterministic views of the natural world, in contrast to Griffin’s more philosophical and theological approach. The knots in question can be untied only by thinking creatively in new ways, Eastman thinks. Eastman calls his approach the “Logoi framework,” which rejects Niels Bohr’s Copenhagen Interpretation and the assumption that indeterminacy effects are mostly assigned to epistemic limitations while fundamental reality is set aside. Eastman also spends a good deal of time challenging the assumption that the real is nothing but the actual in that reality includes, he thinks, both actualizations and possibilities. That is, Eastman argues against mechanism, determinism, and “actualism.” This last sort of opposition, in turn, leads Eastman to defend not merely Boolean logic but also a non-Boolean order of potentials. Eastman criticizes various “theories of everything” and conceptions of “multiverses” that ironically continue nominalism and metaphysically parsimonious, reductionist, deflationary ontologies. In some ways he is continuing where Henri Bergson left off in his debates with Albert Einstein in 1922. By focusing exclusively on objective measurement, Bergson thought that Einstein had neglected important contextual issues. In contrast to Einstein’s deterministic outlook, Bergson (along with Eastman) argues that the future is open and indeterminate. There is no warrant for “scientism” to overrule experience. That is, it is a mistake, Eastman thinks, to hold that there are preexistent laws that result in strict entailments from causes to effects and to hold that effects are, for all practical purposes, contained in their causes. Physicists themselves undermine the metaphysical claim that the real is merely the actual in that their research presupposes as well the region of the potential; this “hardcore actualism” is bad physics by ignoring [End Page 144] altogether the reality of potentiae. The “scientism” that Eastman opposes is thus problematic because of its actualism, its assumption that reality is fully captured by quantitative laws of entailment, its reliance on dyadic relations alone (in contrast to the Peircian triadic scheme favored by Eastman), its commitment to the causal closure of the physical, and its mechanism. Eastman’s own positive process alternative involves the claim that all reality is characterized by res extensa, res qualia, and potentiae. This positive alternative makes us realize that classical mechanics is not a neutral designator in that it tends to carry with it metaphysical assumptions, including a type of substantialism in tension with a processual approach. Many or most practicing scientists do not pay much attention to the fact that nominalism and realism imply metaphysical claims, as do actualism and determinism. Although Werner Heisenberg argued several decades ago for the importance of potentiae, he was only minimally influential in the community of physicists, who unwittingly had metaphysical commitments that they were not willing to abandon. Although Eastman’s own approach is encyclopedic in the sense that he seemingly cites every author who deals with the topics he is interested in, his own distinctive approach is clear in the midst of the citations. Most notably, Eastman takes Alfred North Whitehead’s diachronic approach very seriously in his own interpretation of the results that physicists have offered. One of the reasons for Eastman’s skepticism regarding what are often called “possible worlds” is that defenders of these often offer nothing other than acutalized possibles, rather than ontic possibiliae. Eastman’s own area of expertise is plasma physics, which puts him in an enviable position to defend the common process argument against the concept of absolute nothingness. There is no such thing as...

The Review of Metaphysics•Sep 1, 2021•0 citations

Quantum Knots Revisited

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Lord Kelvin proposed that atoms form hydrodynamic vortex knots. However, they typically untie through reconnections, i. e., local cut-and-slice events, unlike stable vortex unknots such as smoke rings. The same holds in superfluids--quantum fluids with zero viscosity--where vortices have quantized circulation, making them topologically stable. For over 150 years, hydrodynamically stable vortex knots have been sought both experimentally and theoretically. Here, we present the first demonstration of hydrodynamically stable vortex knots and links in experimentally realizable Bose-Einstein condensates of ultracold atomic gases and confirm it through dynamic simulations. Our method creates stable knotted vortex structures in systems where reconnections are prohibited, with potential relevance to neutron star interiors. Additionally, we anticipate our mathematical framework could have applications in quantum computation, quantum turbulence, and DNA dynamics, particularly where reconnections are restricted.
Reviewed by: Untying the Gordian Knot: Process, Reality, and Context by Timothy Eastman Dan Dombrowski EASTMAN, Timothy. Untying the Gordian Knot: Process, Reality, and Context. New York: Lexington Books, 2020. 344 pp. Cloth, $120.00; eBook, $45.00 The title of this book reminds one of David Ray Griffin’s 1998 study, Unsnarling the World Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem. Both books rely on process philosophy to respond to seemingly insoluble problems (called the “world-knot” by Arthur Schopenhauer) created in the wake of early modern dualism, which led to late modern mechanism once the ghost in the machine was exorcised. One significant difference is that Eastman is a prominent physicist who tries to untie the knots created by deterministic views of the natural world, in contrast to Griffin’s more philosophical and theological approach. The knots in question can be untied only by thinking creatively in new ways, Eastman thinks. Eastman calls his approach the “Logoi framework,” which rejects Niels Bohr’s Copenhagen Interpretation and the assumption that indeterminacy effects are mostly assigned to epistemic limitations while fundamental reality is set aside. Eastman also spends a good deal of time challenging the assumption that the real is nothing but the actual in that reality includes, he thinks, both actualizations and possibilities. That is, Eastman argues against mechanism, determinism, and “actualism.” This last sort of opposition, in turn, leads Eastman to defend not merely Boolean logic but also a non-Boolean order of potentials. Eastman criticizes various “theories of everything” and conceptions of “multiverses” that ironically continue nominalism and metaphysically parsimonious, reductionist, deflationary ontologies. In some ways he is continuing where Henri Bergson left off in his debates with Albert Einstein in 1922. By focusing exclusively on objective measurement, Bergson thought that Einstein had neglected important contextual issues. In contrast to Einstein’s deterministic outlook, Bergson (along with Eastman) argues that the future is open and indeterminate. There is no warrant for “scientism” to overrule experience. That is, it is a mistake, Eastman thinks, to hold that there are preexistent laws that result in strict entailments from causes to effects and to hold that effects are, for all practical purposes, contained in their causes. Physicists themselves undermine the metaphysical claim that the real is merely the actual in that their research presupposes as well the region of the potential; this “hardcore actualism” is bad physics by ignoring [End Page 144] altogether the reality of potentiae. The “scientism” that Eastman opposes is thus problematic because of its actualism, its assumption that reality is fully captured by quantitative laws of entailment, its reliance on dyadic relations alone (in contrast to the Peircian triadic scheme favored by Eastman), its commitment to the causal closure of the physical, and its mechanism. Eastman’s own positive process alternative involves the claim that all reality is characterized by res extensa, res qualia, and potentiae. This positive alternative makes us realize that classical mechanics is not a neutral designator in that it tends to carry with it metaphysical assumptions, including a type of substantialism in tension with a processual approach. Many or most practicing scientists do not pay much attention to the fact that nominalism and realism imply metaphysical claims, as do actualism and determinism. Although Werner Heisenberg argued several decades ago for the importance of potentiae, he was only minimally influential in the community of physicists, who unwittingly had metaphysical commitments that they were not willing to abandon. Although Eastman’s own approach is encyclopedic in the sense that he seemingly cites every author who deals with the topics he is interested in, his own distinctive approach is clear in the midst of the citations. Most notably, Eastman takes Alfred North Whitehead’s diachronic approach very seriously in his own interpretation of the results that physicists have offered. One of the reasons for Eastman’s skepticism regarding what are often called “possible worlds” is that defenders of these often offer nothing other than acutalized possibles, rather than ontic possibiliae. Eastman’s own area of expertise is plasma physics, which puts him in an enviable position to defend the common process argument against the concept of absolute nothingness. There is no such thing as...