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Oxford University Press eBooks

Meaning

Richard Healey

Published Jul 20, 2017• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Novel quantum concepts acquire content not by representing new beables but through material-inferential relations between claims about them and other claims. Acceptance of quantum theory modifies other concepts in accordance with a pragmatist inferentialist account of how claims acquire content. Quantum theory itself introduces no new beables, but accepting it affects the content of claims about classical magnitudes and other beables unknown to classical physics: the content of a magnitude claim about a physical object is a function of its physical context in a way that eludes standard pragmatics but may be modeled by decoherence. Leggett’s proposed test of macro-realism illustrates this mutation of conceptual content. Quantum fields are not beables but assumables of a quantum theory we use to make claims about particles and non-quantum fields whose denotational content may also be certified by models of decoherence.

DOI
10.1093/oso/9780198714057.003.0012

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Novel quantum concepts acquire content not by representing new beables but through material-inferential relations between claims about them and other claims. Acceptance of quantum theory modifies other concepts in accordance with a pragmatist inferentialist account of how claims acquire content. Quantum theory itself introduces no new beables, but accepting it affects the content of claims about classical magnitudes and other beables unknown to classical physics: the content of a magnitude claim about a physical object is a function of its physical context in a way that eludes standard pragmatics but may be modeled by decoherence. Leggett’s proposed test of macro-realism illustrates this mutation of conceptual content. Quantum fields are not beables but assumables of a quantum theory we use to make claims about particles and non-quantum fields whose denotational content may also be certified by models of decoherence.
Abstract Models in quantum theory have non-representational uses through which content accrues to claims involved in their application. A promising approach to understanding how is provided not by a referential semantics but by inferentialist pragmatism. In use, a quantum model is applied to physical systems, but not to represent them or their behavior. It is used to issue probabilistic claims about phenomena involving these systems by the Born Rule. Instances of the Born Rule, statements assigning quantum states, and claims about the values of magnitudes all derive their content through their inferential relations, to one another and to other claims.
The quantum theory of decoherence plays an important role in a pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory. It governs the descriptive content of claims about values of physical magnitudes and offers advice on when to use quantum probabilities as a guide to their truth. The content of a claim is to be understood in terms of its role in inferences. This promises a better treatment of meaning than that of Bohr. Quantum theory models physical systems with no mention of measurement: it is decoherence, not measurement, that licenses application of Born's probability rule. So quantum theory also offers advice on its own application. I show how this works in a simple model of decoherence, and then in applications to both laboratory experiments and natural systems. Applications to quantum field theory and the measurement problem will be discussed elsewhere.
Pragmatism about quantum mechanics provides an attractive approach to the question of what quantum mechanics says. However, the conclusions reached by pragmatists concerning the content of quantum mechanics cannot be squared with the way that physicists use quantum mechanics to describe physical systems. In particular, attention to actual use results in ascribing content to claims about physical systems over a much wider range of contexts than countenanced by recent pragmatists. The resulting account of the content of quantum mechanics is much closer to quantum logic, and threatens the pragmatist conclusion that quantum mechanics requires no supplementation.
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Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabilities for physical events: both state and probability are objective—not because they represent elements of physical reality, but because each exerts normative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements (about values of magnitudes) that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not “collapse” on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violation of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate “spooky” non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner’s friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.
Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabiities for physical events: both state and probability are objective--not because they represent elements of phyiscal reality, but because each exerts norrmative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not "collapse" on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violations of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate "spooky" non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps us to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner's friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.