Quantum mechanics originated with a paper of 24-year-old Werner Heisenberg in early July 1925 seeking "to establish a quantum-theoretical mechanics based entirely on relations between quantities that are observable in principle". Heisenberg argues that experimental conditions limit simultaneous use of both kinematic and dynamic concepts in the description of an atomic object, complementarity more broadly enjoined an essential limitation in application of classical concepts to the quantum domain. The quantum-to-classical transition argument then targets the purported universality of quantum mechanics, the claim that descriptions of "real states" of macroscopic systems can be recovered as the classical limit of the more fundamental underlying quantum mechanical ones. The looming problem in quantum-to-classical transition is wave-particle duality and in particular the principle of superposition. As quantum mechanics holds that all possible physical information about the state of the individual system is represented by Ψ, the theory must be incomplete. Einstein suggest quantum orthodoxy holds a completely different sense of quantum mechanical completeness.
Quantum mechanics originated with a paper of 24-year-old Werner Heisenberg in early July 1925 seeking "to establish a quantum-theoretical mechanics based entirely on relations between quantities that are observable in principle". Heisenberg argues that experimental conditions limit simultaneous use of both kinematic and dynamic concepts in the description of an atomic object, complementarity more broadly enjoined an essential limitation in application of classical concepts to the quantum domain. The quantum-to-classical transition argument then targets the purported universality of quantum mechanics, the claim that descriptions of "real states" of macroscopic systems can be recovered as the classical limit of the more fundamental underlying quantum mechanical ones. The looming problem in quantum-to-classical transition is wave-particle duality and in particular the principle of superposition. As quantum mechanics holds that all possible physical information about the state of the individual system is represented by Ψ, the theory must be incomplete. Einstein suggest quantum orthodoxy holds a completely different sense of quantum mechanical completeness.
The behavior of classical macroscopic particles – from baseballs to planets – is governed by Newtonian mechanics as we have described in the first chapters of this book. The behavior of very small particles, on the other hand, is governed by an entirely different collection of equations and rules that go under the name of “quantum mechanics” and these particles are referred to as quantum particles. These rules have analogies to classical mechanics, but are fundamentally different and somewhat mysterious as we discussed in Chapter 8. The fundamental principles of quantum mechanics cannot be proven to be correct. They were developed based on the results of experimental observation, by analogy with classical mechanics, and through the consideration of logical implications of the formalisms used. There is no way to derive the fundamental elements of quantum mechanics, any more than one could predict from first principles that Newtonian forces should add as vectors. On the other hand, quantum mechanics is among the most rigorously tested theories in science, and the predictions of quantum mechanics have, so far, always been in agreement with experiment. In this chapter, we will present quantum mechanics as a series of postulates and examine their implications in application to simple one-dimensional systems. In the next chapter we will examine quantum effects in real systems including atoms, molecules, crystals, and artificially engineered nano-structures. Postulates of quantum mechanics QM Postulate 1: A quantum particle is described by a wave function Ψ( x , y , z , t ) which is a function of spatial coordinates and time. All physically determinable quantities can be derived from the wave function Ψ( x , y , z , t ) ; quantities which cannot be found from the wave function are not physically meaningful. Note that some things that one could ask about a quantum particle, for example the exact position and simultaneous exact momentum of a particle, are not derivable from the wave function and are therefore considered indeterminate (or uncertain ). These are things which cannot ever be known about a particle, and, as such, they are meaningless to contemplate.
Unlike special relativity, quantum mechanics was not the inspired product of one mind. It developed, in fits and starts, over a period of 25 years (1900–1925), and many cooks stirred the broth. Even now, a century later, quantum mechanics raises profound conceptual questions. Every competent physicist can “do” quantum mechanics, and the predictions it makes are in spectacularly good agreement with experimental results; there can be little doubt that quantum mechanics is “right.” On the other hand, as Richard Feynman once remarked, “nobody understands quantum mechanics.” I'll tell the story in two parts. First the history (how the essential pieces of the puzzle were assembled), and then the implications (what the finished picture has to say about our world). Photons Like relativity, quantum mechanics began with the study of light. In both cases, this historical association is misleading. Relativity, really, has nothing to do with light – to be sure, it involves that magic speed limit, c , and of course the most familiar thing that travels at speed c is light. So light is a convenient vehicle for introducing the subject. But it is perfectly possible to imagine a universe in which there is no such thing as light, and yet relativity might still be valid. Quantum mechanics, too, starts with light – in this case the “quantum” of light (the photon). But, as it turns out, this is just one rather specialized example of much more general principles – in fact, a rather bad example, because photons are by their nature relativistic (they travel at the speed of light), and it would be more natural to begin with the quantum mechanics of slow-moving objects, in analogy with Newtonian mechanics.
Updating the wave-particle duality Maria C. Bosca e-mail: bosca@ugr.es Departamento de Fisica Atomica, Molecular y Nuclear Universidad de Granada E-18071. Granada Spain The wave-particle-duality, the fundamental component of the new quantum formalism in Bohr’s opinion, must be reformulated by incorporating the results of some experiments accomplished in the last decades of twentieth century. The Bohr´s complementarity principle stated the mutual exclusiveness and joint full completeness of the two (classical) descriptions of quantum systems; after Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen’paper, the wave-particle duality, or wave-particle complementarity, could be expressed by stating that it is impossible to build up an experimental arrangement in which we observe at the same time both corpuscular and wave aspects. In a two-slit experiment, they would correspond, respectively, to the which-way knowledge and the observation of interference pattern. Bohr showed this mutual exclusivity in numerous examples , and linked it to the unavoidable disturbance inherent in any measurement event. In quantum mechanical formalism, the complementarity principle has a clear mathematical expression: two observables are complementary if precise knowledge of one of them implies that all possible outcomes of the other are equally probable; their extension to classical concepts (as wave and particle) is not concerned. In 1991 Scully et al published a variant of the two-slit experiment that incorporates two micromasers cavities and a laser beam to provide which-path information without net momentum transferred during the interaction ; the impossibility of know which slit an atom went through and still observe the interference fringes is preserved by the establishing of quantum correlations between the measuring apparatus and the system being observed. They claimed that complementarity, of which wave-particle duality would be to them a manifestation, is more fundamental than the uncertainty principle . In 1996 B-G. Englert, following an approach originally due to Wooters and Zurek , derived , without making use of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation, an inequality that quantifies the mutual compatibility relation between fringe visibility and which-way information. The inequality, that they denominated as “interferometric duality”, has the expression D^2 + V^2 ≤ 1, where D stands for the distinguishability of the ways and V for the fringe visibility; both of them are mathematical expressions that can be measured to check experimentally the inequality . Today, it is clear that intermediate particle-wave behaviours exist and, in addition to that, there are single experiments in which both classical wave-like and particle-like behaviours are showed total and simultaneously on an individual system. For instance, in the Bose’s double-prism experiment , tunnelling and perfect anticoincidence were observed in single photon states. Consequently, the meaning of the wave-particle duality must incorporate the simultaneous use of the two classical descriptions in the interpretation of experiments, loosing their original mutual exclusivity , which is incorporated as an extreme case in the new interferometric duality, a continuous quantum concept . The wave-particle duality, therefore, must be formulated as an interpretative addition to quantum mechanics, to which is possible to renounce if any pretension of visualize quantum phenomena in terms of classical concepts and intuitions is abandoned.
Introduction Quantum mechanics is based on the intuition that the essential difference between atomic physics and classical physics is the occurrence of discontinuities (see in particular [1,4,58–63]). Quantum mechanics should thus be considered a direct continuation of the quantum theory founded by Planck, Einstein and Bohr. Bohr in particular stressed repeatedly, already before the birth of quantum mechanics, that the discontinuities must lead to the introduction of new kinematical and mechanical concepts, so that indeed classical mechanics and its corresponding conceptual scheme should be abandoned [1,4]. Quantum mechanics tries to introduce the new concepts through a precise analysis of what is ‘observable in principle’. In fact, this does not mean setting up the principle that a sharp division between ‘observable’ and ‘unobservable’ quantities is possible and necessary. As soon as a conceptual scheme is given, one can infer from the observations to other facts that are actually not observable directly, and the boundary between ‘observable’ and ‘unobservable’ quantities becomes altogether indeterminate. But if the conceptual scheme itself is still unknown, it will be expedient to enquire only about the observations themselves, without drawing conclusions from them, because otherwise wrong concepts and prejudices taken over from before will block the way to recognising the physical relationships [Zusammenhänge].
The ideas in Heisenberg's paper on quantum mechanics in 1925 mark the beginning not only of a new phase in modern physics, but also of Heisenberg's own philosophical journey. This thesis examines that journey between 1925 and the late 1950s by situating Heisenberg's philosophy of quantum mechanics in the context of his encounters with his contemporaries as well as the context of various strands of thought in the German-speaking world at the time. Heisenberg's early philosophical critique of the 'classical' viewpoint between 1925 and 1927 bears the decisive influence of Einstein's theory of relativity, more specifically, the positivism he saw as underpinning Einstein's emancipation from Newtonian physics. The positivist influence on Heisenberg's early attitude to quantum mechanics is evident in three ways: (a) his invocation of an observability principle in 1925 to justify the renunciation of the concept of the electron orbit, (b) an instrumentalist conception of understanding, which characterised Heisenberg's response to Schrodinger's demand for classical visualisation in space and time in 1926-7, and (c) the introduction of an operational definition of concepts such as position and velocity in 1927, in an attempt to replace the concepts of classical physics. But after discussions with Bohr and Einstein in 1926-7, Heisenberg soon recognised what we might term his `empiricist' viewpoint was problematic. In 1927 Heisenberg's thought undergoes a shift away from the `empiricist' viewpoint that had underpinned his early philosophy of quantum mechanics. The nature and scope of this transformation, which forms the central theme in this thesis, has, up until now, been poorly understood and often completely neglected. Through his discussions with Bohr, Heisenberg came to the realisation that despite their limitations, classical concepts were conditions for the possibility of the description of all experience. This marked the abandonment of his earlier attempt to replace classical concepts with quantum concepts. The recognition of the primacy of classical language forms the point of departure for much of Heisenberg's later thought, which brought him into contact with the attempts in the German-speaking world in the 1920s to reconstruct Kantian epistemology. By the mid-1930s, Heisenberg advocated a 'pragmatic transformation' of Kantian philosophy, in which classical concepts were held to be a priori in the sense that they remained the conditions for the possibility of experience, but were no longer held to be necessary or universal in a strict Kantian sense. After 1940 Heisenberg saw the paradoxes of quantum mechanics under the aegis of what can be termed a 'transcendental conception of language', according to which language is not a mere tool, but actively shapes, gives form, and objectifies, our 'reality'. The limits of a classical 'description' in quantum mechanics therefore came to signify for Heisenberg, the limits of 'objective reality'. While Bohr exerted perhaps the most important philosophical influence on Heisenberg, their intellectual relationship was characterised by disagreement and misunderstanding. This is most strikingly displayed in their respective views on wave-particle duality and complementarily. While after 1927 Heisenberg accepted Bohr's basic insight that our knowledge of the quantum world is mediated through classical language, he did not share Rohr's interpretation of complementarity. While Heisenberg certainly used terms such as 'complementarity' and wave-particle duality' in his writings, a close reading reveals that these terms had very different meanings for the two physicists. This is particularly evident in the contrast between Heisenberg's notion of wave-particle equivalence and Bohr's idea of complementarity. In bringing to light these divergences between Bohr and Heisenberg, this thesis lends further weight to the view - already advocated by scholars such as John Hendry and Mara Beller - that the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics should not be thought of as a unified philosophical position, but actually comprises a number of different strands.