Three Arguments for the Reality of Wave-Function Collapse

Dorje C. Brody, Lane P. Hughston

This is the first single volume about the collapse theories of quantum mechanics, which is becoming a very active field of research in both physics and philosophy. In standard quantum mechanics, it is postulated that when the wave function of a quantum system is measured, it no longer follows the Schrödinger equation, but instantaneously and randomly collapses to one of the wave functions that correspond to definite measurement results. However, why and how a definite measurement result appears is unknown. A promising solution to this problem are collapse theories in which the collapse of the wave function is spontaneous and dynamical. Chapters written by distinguished physicists and philosophers of physics discuss the origin and implications of wave-function collapse, the controversies around collapse models and their ontologies, and new arguments for the reality of wave function collapse. This is an invaluable resource for students and researchers interested in the philosophy of physics and foundations of quantum mechanics.

M. A. B. Whitaker

Franz Klaus Jansen

When phenomena in quantum mechanics are interpreted from the perspective of bio-psychology, wave function collapse from several to a single eigenstate must be plausibly explained. Quantum mechanics requires a context, yet the context of an observer is rarely considered. On the other hand, in bio-psychology, the observer context is examined to explain superposition and collapse by different mental functions used in everyday life. Three mental functions are described, one of which is responsible for observation, and the others for conservation and treatment of information in mental representation. Whereas observation produces information with certainty, the subsequent processes result in information that remains uncertain potentiality. In order to encompass uncertainty, multiple possibilities are simultaneously considered in mental superposition, one of which should represent the unknown future outcome in observable reality. During verification by new observation, all suggested potentialities necessarily collapse to one real outcome. The collapse of superposition does not occur in observable physical reality, but in its mental representation. Some physical principles—such as superposition, infinity and nothingness before the Big Bang—are pure phenomena of mental representation, which will always remain unverifiable by observation. This argument proves that mental representation brought about by the observer context participates in the production of mental models for the best approximation of physical reality.

David Z. Albert

Franz Klaus Jansen

When phenomena in quantum mechanics are interpreted from the perspective of bio-psychology, wave function collapse from several to a single eigenstate must be plausibly explained. Quantum mechanics requires a context, yet the context of an observer is rarely considered. On the other hand, in bio-psychology, the observer context is examined to explain superposition and collapse by different mental functions used in everyday life. Three mental functions are described, one of which is responsible for observation, and the others for conservation and treatment of information in mental representation. Whereas observation produces information with certainty, the subsequent processes result in uncertain potentiality. In order to encompass uncertainty, multiple possibilities are simultaneously considered in mental superposition, one of which should represent the unknown future outcome. During observation, all suggested potentialities necessarily collapse to one real outcome. The collapse of superposition does not occur in observable physical reality, but in its mental representation. Some physical principles—such as superposition, infinity and nothingness before the Big Bang—are pure phenomena of mental representation, which will always remain unverifiable by observation. This argument proves that mental representation brought about by the observer context participates in the production of mental models for the best approximation of physical reality.

Carl Frederick