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Routledge eBooks

Indirect Knowability of Inner Constitution: The Interpretation of Quantum Theory

Michael Whiteman

Published Jun 3, 2014• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In all such cases it would perhaps be a more satisfactory mode of speech to say that we do not in fact have any knowledge of the person, thing, or conceptual structure in question. We do not know Julius Caesar; we only imagine what kind of happenings probably occurred in his life. We do not actually see the other side of the moon; we only see a photographic emulsion on which the light and dark shading is reasonably taken as copying other shadings reasonably taken as caused by light reflected from the surface of the moon; and so with the other examples. In what sense, then, can we have 'indirect' knowledge of the inner constitution of nature? Do we only imagine the sort of existence or conditions which might reasonably be supposed to be constituted 'behind the scenes'? In that case, what is the kind of 'reason' to which we are appealing?

DOI
10.4324/9781315830117-32

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April 1999, “Thinking Kantian Thoughts?” The other day I wrote the little essay below [cf. “Fuchsian Genesis” addressed to Greg Comer, dated 22 April 1999] for myself, and then searched up a reason to send it to my friend Greg Comer. It would have been better to send it to you I think. It strikes me as sounding a little Kantian, though with an extra twist: namely, that we are even further removed from the “ding an sich” than he had imagined. On my view, we know that the quantum formalism CANNOT correspond to reality (whatever it may be). My understanding of Kant is that he would have said that classical physics may or may not be a reflection of the real thing, but we can never know. It does form part of the categories of understanding and is therefore necessary to make sense of the world; but correspondence to reality is a different issue – in fact, one that cannot be decided. In the case of the quantum world, I think it is (reasonably) safe to assume that the terms in quantum theory cannot be mapped to any sort of “ding an sich.” That's why it strikes me as a still stronger form of Kantianism. Am I way off track here? Any thoughts? Jon's Reply Chris said: My understanding of Kant is that he would have said that classical physics may or may not be a reflection of the real thing, but we can never know.

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In all such cases it would perhaps be a more satisfactory mode of speech to say that we do not in fact have any knowledge of the person, thing, or conceptual structure in question. We do not know Julius Caesar; we only imagine what kind of happenings probably occurred in his life. We do not actually see the other side of the moon; we only see a photographic emulsion on which the light and dark shading is reasonably taken as copying other shadings reasonably taken as caused by light reflected from the surface of the moon; and so with the other examples. In what sense, then, can we have 'indirect' knowledge of the inner constitution of nature? Do we only imagine the sort of existence or conditions which might reasonably be supposed to be constituted 'behind the scenes'? In that case, what is the kind of 'reason' to which we are appealing?
Abstract It must have been around 1950. I was accompanying Einstein on a walk from The Institute for Advanced Study to his home, when he suddenly stopped, turned to me, and asked me if I really believed that the moon exists only if I look at it. The nature of our conversation was not particularly metaphysical. Rather, we were discussing the quantum theory, in particular what is doable and knowable in the sense of physical observation. The twentieth century physicist does not, of course, claim to have the definitive answer to this question. He does know, however, that the answer given by his nineteenth century ancestors will no longer do. They were almost exactly right, to be sure, as far as conditions of everyday life are concerned, but their answer cannot be extrapolated to things moving nearly as fast as light, or to things that are as small as atoms, or—in some respects—to things that are as heavy as stars.
April 1999, “Thinking Kantian Thoughts?” The other day I wrote the little essay below [cf. “Fuchsian Genesis” addressed to Greg Comer, dated 22 April 1999] for myself, and then searched up a reason to send it to my friend Greg Comer. It would have been better to send it to you I think. It strikes me as sounding a little Kantian, though with an extra twist: namely, that we are even further removed from the “ding an sich” than he had imagined. On my view, we know that the quantum formalism CANNOT correspond to reality (whatever it may be). My understanding of Kant is that he would have said that classical physics may or may not be a reflection of the real thing, but we can never know. It does form part of the categories of understanding and is therefore necessary to make sense of the world; but correspondence to reality is a different issue – in fact, one that cannot be decided. In the case of the quantum world, I think it is (reasonably) safe to assume that the terms in quantum theory cannot be mapped to any sort of “ding an sich.” That's why it strikes me as a still stronger form of Kantianism. Am I way off track here? Any thoughts? Jon's Reply Chris said: My understanding of Kant is that he would have said that classical physics may or may not be a reflection of the real thing, but we can never know.
I suppose one could imagine laws of physics which would dictate that a world be exactly so, and not otherwise, allowing no detail to be varied. But what could dictate that those laws of physics be ‘the’ laws of physics? By considering a spectrum of possible laws, one could again consider a spectrum of possible worlds. In fact the laws of physics of our actual world, as presently understood, have no such dictatorial character. So that even with the laws given, a spectrum of different worlds is possible. There are two kinds of freedom. Although the laws say something about how a given state of the world may develop, they say nothing (or anyway very little) about in what state the world should start. So, to begin with, we have freedom as regards ‘initial conditions’. To go on with, the future that can evolve from a given present is not uniquely determined, according to contemporary orthodoxy. The laws list various possibilities, and attach to them various probabilities. The relation between the set of possibilities and the unique actuality which emerges is quite peculiar in modern ‘quantum theory’ – the contemporary all-embracing basic physical theory. The absence of determinism, the probabilistic nature of the assertions of the theory, is already a little peculiar… at least in the light of pre-twentieth-century ‘classical’ physics. But after all everyday life, if not classical physics, prepares us very well for the idea that not everything is predictable, that chance is important.