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International Workshop on Computer Science and Engineering (WCSE)

Analysis on the Beam-split Eavesdropping by Eavesdropper with Storage Ability

Published Jan 1, 2015• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Focusing on QKD systems based on the weak-coherent pulse photon source and BB84 protocol, puting forward the beam-eavesdropping projects simulating eavesdropper with storage ability--single base-2APD and single base-4APD projects, and obtaining the efficiency of generating keys in the receiver, the efficiency of eavesdropping in the eavesdropper, eavesdropping-information proportion and formula for beam-split proportion.Based on the practical sample with transmission length 10km and average photon number 0.1~0.9,calculate the eavesdropping-information proportion and get 0.35%~5.79%on account of the beam-split proportion 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5.Results show that current QKD systems with average photon number 0.1 are safe for the beameavesdropping.

DOI
10.18178/wcse.2015.04.087

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The BB84 protocol is fundamental to quantum-secure communications, yet its extension to multi-receiver networks remains underexplored. This study addresses this gap by implementing a dual-receiver BB84 framework in Qiskit to evaluate security against intercept–resend and photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks. Our methodology incorporates weak coherent pulses and realistic channel imperfections. Key findings show that intercept–resend attacks induce a detectable (~25%) increase in QBER, while PNS attacks allow a 100% gain in eavesdropper information with less than 2.5% QBER—revealing a critical vulnerability, which highlights the importance of a true single-photon source. The findings emphasize the suitability of BB84 for multiparty QKD scenarios, either as a decoy-state mechanism for enhanced eavesdropping detection or as a direct secure communication protocol.
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Based on practical implementations of quantum cryptography with the attenuated laser pulses as the signal source rather than single photon, as well as lossy channels, detection efficiency, dark count of singlephoton counter, and technological possibilities of a realistic eavesdropping, we discuss a combining eavesdropping strategy of Breidbart basis and beamsplitting, and give a bound on maximum disturbance for a given mean photon number and transmission length for which a secret key can be distilled.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides an innovative approach for secure communication by utilizing the principles of quantum mechanics. Among various QKD protocols, the BB84 protocol remains the most widely studied and implemented due to its simplicity and theoretical security guarantees. However, practical implementations of BB84 are vulnerable to several eavesdropping attacks and channel imperfections. This paper presents a comprehensive study on the detection and analysis of eavesdropping attacks in the BB84 protocol. The work focuses on common attacks such as intercept-resend attack, photon-number splitting attack, Trojan horse attack, and phase-covariant cloning attack. The effect of these attacks on Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) is analyzed in detail. Simulation-based observations are discussed to demonstrate how QBER increases under malicious interference. The study further explores statistical methods for detecting eavesdropping and examines practical countermeasures including decoy states, privacy amplification, and error correction techniques. The paper concludes that BB84 remains robust against eavesdropping when proper detection and mitigation mechanisms are employed.