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Optics and Photonics News

Scatterings

Patricia Daukantas, Valerie C. Coffey, Sarah A. Michaud, Stewart Wills

Published Mar 1, 2015• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum Key Protection; Building a Better Qubit; Liquid Crystal Boosts Organic PVs; Trapped Light “Twister”; Blue Lasing from a Borane Solution; Remote Lasing in Plain Air; EMCORE Sells Space PV Unit for US$150M; Global UAV Market to Grow to US$15B by 2020; Shaping Laser Beams with Sound; Light-Activated “Trojan Horse”.

DOI
10.1364/opn.26.3.000009

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Abstract Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) disregard the effect of information leakage from the users’ devices, and, thus, do not protect against Trojan-horse attacks (THAs). In a THA, the eavesdropper injects strong light into the QKD apparatuses, and then analyzes the back-reflected light to learn information about their internal setting choices. Only a few recent works consider this security threat, but predict a rather poor performance of QKD unless the devices are strongly isolated from the channel. Here, we derive finite-key security bounds for decoy-state-based QKD schemes in the presence of THAs, which significantly outperform previous analyses. Our results constitute an important step forward to closing the existing gap between theory and practice in QKD.

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A well-protected and characterized source in a quantum key distribution system is needed for its security.Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage attacks, in which an eavesdropper actively injects bright light to hack the source unit.The hacking laser could be a high-power one that can modify properties of components via the laserdamage attack and also further help the Trojan-horse and other light-injection attacks.Here we propose a countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an additional sacrificial component placed at the exit of the source.This component should either withstand high-power incoming light while attenuating it to a safe level that cannot modify the rest of the source, or get destroyed into a permanent high-attenuation state that breaks up the line.We demonstrate experimentally that off-the-shelf fiberoptic isolators and circulators have these desired properties, at least under attack by a continuous-wave high-power laser.
Abstract form only given. The continuous monitoring of the atmosphere for traces of gases and pathogens at kilometer-scale distances is an important and challenging problem. We have demonstrated that by tailored pairs of pulses of different colors (e.g., red and blue) it is possible to invert an ensemble of molecules such that lasing and/or gain-swept superradiance is realized in a direction toward the observer. In recent experiments, we have observed strong backward lasing of oxygen-ionized molecules in air, thus enabling a transient gain for an optical field propagating toward the observer. This technique results in the generation of a strong, coherent, counter-propagating optical probe pulse. Such a probe, combined with a wavelength-tunable laser signal(s) propagating in the forward direction, provides a tool for various remote-sensing applications. The proposed technique can be enhanced by combining it with the gain-swept excitation approach as well as with beam shaping and adaptive optical techniques.
Abstract Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) disregard the effect of information leakage from the users’ devices, and, thus, do not protect against Trojan-horse attacks (THAs). In a THA, the eavesdropper injects strong light into the QKD apparatuses, and then analyzes the back-reflected light to learn information about their internal setting choices. Only a few recent works consider this security threat, but predict a rather poor performance of QKD unless the devices are strongly isolated from the channel. Here, we derive finite-key security bounds for decoy-state-based QKD schemes in the presence of THAs, which significantly outperform previous analyses. Our results constitute an important step forward to closing the existing gap between theory and practice in QKD.