The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is an old problem which started back in 1935 with an article in Physical Review titled ‘Does Quantum Mechanics Describe Physical Reality Completely?’ These authors assert that quantum mechanics, being inconsistent, cannot describe physical reality completely. In the present paper the nature of the inconsistency will be analyzed and it will be shown that the E.P.R. paradox is essentially of formal nature and that the apparent formal inconsistency may be regarded as a consequence of unjustifiable presupposition. According to quantum mechanical theory the states of a microscopic system may be represented by state vectors and in the absence of any disturbance from outside the state vectors will change continuously with time according to Schrodinger's equation.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is an old problem which started back in 1935 with an article in Physical Review titled ‘Does Quantum Mechanics Describe Physical Reality Completely?’ These authors assert that quantum mechanics, being inconsistent, cannot describe physical reality completely. In the present paper the nature of the inconsistency will be analyzed and it will be shown that the E.P.R. paradox is essentially of formal nature and that the apparent formal inconsistency may be regarded as a consequence of unjustifiable presupposition. According to quantum mechanical theory the states of a microscopic system may be represented by state vectors and in the absence of any disturbance from outside the state vectors will change continuously with time according to Schrodinger's equation.
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen pointed out that the quantum-mechanical description of “physical reality” implies an unphysical, instantaneous action between distant measurements. To avoid such an action at a distance, these three concluded that quantum mechanics had to be incomplete. However, its extensions involving additional “hidden variables,” allowing for the recovery of determinism and locality, have been disproved experimentally (Bell’s theorem). In this paper, an opposite solution of the paradox is presented, based on the greater indeterminism of the modern quantum field theory (QFT) description of particle physics, which prevents the preparation of any state having a definite number of particles. The resulting uncertainty in photon radiation has interesting consequences in quantum information theory (e.g., cryptography and teleportation). Moreover, since it allows for fewer elements of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) physical reality than the old non-relativistic quantum mechanics, QFT satisfies the EPR condition of completeness without the need for hidden variables. The residual physical reality never violates locality; thus, the unique objective proof of “quantum nonlocality” is removed in an interpretation-independent way. At the same time, the supposed nonlocality of the EPR correlations turns out to be a problem in interpretation of the measurement process. If we do not rely on hidden variables or new physics beyond QFT, the viable interpretation is a minimal statistical one, which preserves locality and Lorentz symmetry.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades. The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper [17] in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete.That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics.There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics.There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality.Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities).The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities.And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades.The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers.It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
Over fifty years ago Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen published a striking argument that quantum theory provides only an incomplete description of physical reality – that is, that some elements of physical reality fail to have a counterpart in quantum-theoretical description. What made this a challenge to the quantum-theoretical Weltanschauung was the very mild character of the sufficient condition for the reality of a physical quantity on which their argument hinged: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.” The argument consists in pointing out that it is possible to construct a quantum-mechanical state ψ with the following properties: The state ψ describes two noninteracting systems (I and II). In almost all discussions the two systems are taken to be two particles, and the absence of relevant interaction is built in by taking ψ to assign negligible probability to finding the particles closer together than some macroscopically large distance. By measuring an observable A of system I, one can predict with certainty the result of a subsequent measurement of a corresponding observable P of system II. If, instead, one chooses to measure a different observable B of system I, one can predict with certainty the result of a subsequent measurement of a corresponding observable Q of system II. The observables P and Q are represented in quantum theory by noncommuting operators, which means that they cannot both have definite values.
The 1935 debate opposing Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen to Bohr elicited so many comments and developments, both theoretical and experimental, until this day, that the main point at stake at that time can be overlooked by modern readers, especially students. This paper draws the reader's attention to the historical background of Einstein's paper and Bohr's reply. We show that Einstein's definition of a complete physical theory is taken from Mach's criticism of atomic theory based upon classical-mechanical views. As for Bohr's definition of physical reality, it can be simply understood by reference to classical physics although it was embedded in the quantum-mechanical formalism.
In 1935, Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen ('EPR') reported on a thought experiment that they believed showed that quantum theory provided an incomplete description of reality. Today we know that quantum theory is a complete and correct description of Nature (in flat space-time). The EPR thought experiment is predicted by quantum theory and has since been experimentally confirmed. However, EPR experiments have no physical pictorial explanation, and are considered part of a "paradox". Here I resolve the "paradox". I show independently of any interpretation of quantum theory that EPR (thought) experiments are a direct and compelling consequence of the existence of true randomness and the conservation of energy. It becomes obvious why EPR (thought) experiments allow for the precise prediction of truly random measurement values. Local hidden variables are not motivated.