A practical viewpoint links reality, representation, and language to calculation by the concept of Turing (1936) machine being the mathematical model of our computers. After the Gödel incompleteness theorems (1931) or the insolvability of the so-called halting problem (Turing 1936; Church 1936) as to a classical machine of Turing, one of the simplest hypotheses is completeness to be suggested for two ones. That is consistent with the provability of completeness by means of two independent Peano arithmetics discussed in Section I.Many modifications of Turing machines cum quantum ones are researched in Section II for the Halting problem and completeness, and the model of two independent Turing machines seems to generalize them.Then, that pair can be postulated as the formal definition of reality therefore being complete unlike any of them standalone, remaining incomplete without its complementary counterpart. Representation is formal defined as a one-to-one mapping between the two Turing machines, and the set of all those mappings can be considered as “language” therefore including metaphors as mappings different than representation. Section III investigates that formal relation of “reality”, “representation”, and “language” modeled by (at least two) Turing machines.The independence of (two) Turing machines is interpreted by means of game theory and especially of the Nash equilibrium in Section IV.Choice and information as the quantity of choices are involved. That approach seems to be equivalent to that based on set theory and the concept of actual infinity in mathematics and allowing of practical implementations.
A practical viewpoint links reality, representation, and language to calculation by the concept of Turing (1936) machine being the mathematical model of our computers. After the Gödel incompleteness theorems (1931) or the insolvability of the so-called halting problem (Turing 1936; Church 1936) as to a classical machine of Turing, one of the simplest hypotheses is completeness to be suggested for two ones. That is consistent with the provability of completeness by means of two independent Peano arithmetics discussed in Section I.Many modifications of Turing machines cum quantum ones are researched in Section II for the Halting problem and completeness, and the model of two independent Turing machines seems to generalize them.Then, that pair can be postulated as the formal definition of reality therefore being complete unlike any of them standalone, remaining incomplete without its complementary counterpart. Representation is formal defined as a one-to-one mapping between the two Turing machines, and the set of all those mappings can be considered as “language” therefore including metaphors as mappings different than representation. Section III investigates that formal relation of “reality”, “representation”, and “language” modeled by (at least two) Turing machines.The independence of (two) Turing machines is interpreted by means of game theory and especially of the Nash equilibrium in Section IV.Choice and information as the quantity of choices are involved. That approach seems to be equivalent to that based on set theory and the concept of actual infinity in mathematics and allowing of practical implementations.
Any computer can create a model of reality. The hypothesis that quantum computer can generate such a model designated as quantum, which coincides with the modeled reality, is discussed. Its reasons are the theorems about the absence of “hidden variables” in quantum mechanics. The quantum modeling requires the axiom of choice. The following conclusions are deduced from the hypothesis. A quantum model unlike a classical model can coincide with reality. Reality can be interpreted as a quantum computer. The physical processes represent computations of the quantum computer. Quantum information is the real fundament of the world. The conception of quantum computer unifies physics and mathematics and thus the material and the ideal world. Quantum computer is a non-Turing machine in principle. Any quantum computing can be interpreted as an infinite classical computational process of a Turing machine. Quantum computer introduces the notion of “actually infinite computational process”. The discussed hypothesis is consistent with all quantum mechanics. The conclusions address a form of neo-Pythagoreanism: Unifying the mathematical and physical, quantum computer is situated in an intermediate domain of their mutual transformation.
Quantum computer is considered as a generalization of Turing machine. The bits are substituted by qubits. In turn, a "qubit" is the generalization of "bit" referring to infinite sets or series. It extends the consept of calculation from finite processes and algorithms to infinite ones, impossible as to any Turing machines (such as our computers). However, the concept of quantum computer mets all paradoxes of infinity such as Gödel's incompletness theorems (1931), etc. A philosophical reflection on how quantum computer might implement the idea of "infinite calculation" is the main subject.
Quantum computing allows us to solve some problems much faster than existing classical algorithms. Yet, the quantum computer has been believed to be no more powerful than the most general computing model—the Turing machine. Undecidable problems, such as the halting problem, and unrecognizable inputs, such as the real numbers, are beyond the theoretical limit of the Turing machine. I suggest a model for a quantum computer, which is less general than the Turing machine, but may solve the halting problem for any task programmable on it. Moreover, inputs unrecognizable by the Turing machine can be recognized by the model, thus breaking the theoretical limit for a computational task. A quantum computer is not just a successful design of the Turing machine as it is widely perceived now, but is a different, less general but more powerful model for computing, the practical realization of which may need different strategies than those in use now.
The mathematical representation of the universe consists of sequences of symbols, rules and operators containing Gödel's undecidable propositions: information and its manipulation, also with Turing Machines. Classical information theory and mathematics, ideally independent from the medium used, can be interpreted realistically and objectively from their correspondence with quantum information, which is physical. Each representation of the universe and its evolution are, in any case, physical subsets of the universe, structured sets of observers and their complements in the universe made with spacetime events generated by local quantum measurements. Their description becomes a semantically closed structure without a global object-environment loss of decoherence as a von Neumann's universal constructor with a semantical abstract whose structure cannot be decided deterministically a priori from an internal observer. In a semantically closed structure, the realization of a specific event that writes the semantical abstract of the constructor is a problem of finding "which way" for the evolution of the universe as a choice of the constructor's state in a metastructure, like the many-world Everett scenario, from a specific result of any quantum measurement, corresponding to a Gödel undecidable proposition for an internal observer.
Contrary to the classical case, the relation between quantum programming languages and quantum Turing Machines (QTM) has not been fully investigated. In particular, there are features of QTMs that have not been exploited, a notable example being the intrinsic infinite nature of any quantum computation. In this paper, we propose a definition of QTM, which extends and unifies the notions of Deutsch and Bernstein & Vazirani. In particular, we allow both arbitrary quantum input, and meaningful superpositions of computations, where some of them are “terminated” with an “output”, while others are not. For some infinite computations an “output” is obtained as a limit of finite portions of the computation. We propose a natural and robust observation protocol for our QTMs, which does not modify the probability of the possible outcomes of the machines. Finally, we use QTMs to define a class of quantum computable functions—any such function is a mapping from a general quantum state to a probability distribution of natural numbers. We expect that our class of functions, when restricted to classical input-output, will not be different from the set of the recursive functions.
Humans are limited in what they know by the technical limitation of their cortical language network. A reality is a situation model. The universe is a collection of self-driven mathematical entities. If we are happy to accept randomness, it’s obviously possible that all other so-called “worlds” in the many-worlds interpretation don’t exist objectively. The so-called “physical interaction” (aka objective interaction) among any number of elementary particles is consistent with the so-called “physical law”. From the viewpoint of an imagined external observer (who is located somewhere outside of all worlds), in all worlds, every self-driven elementary particle is changing its state to match its fated state, together form a single fated self-driven state machine; the so-called “subjective reality” (aka the so-called “subjective conscious experience”) is actually the use of a mathematical model (MM) by a Turing machine (TM). The so-called “subjective reality” shouldn’t be able to alter/impact the fated world line of any elementary particle within this world. Except one objective MM which is a fitted MM of the objective reality, every other causality is not an objective MM but a Granger causality, and is an under-fitted MM of the objective reality.