Hidden World

Gary Heen

In this paper a 'hidden variables' interpretation of the quantum world is presented. A hidden variables explanation assumes current quantum mechanical theories are imperfect in that they do not incorporate a physical reality to the quantum world. At the Solvay conference of 1927, Louis De Broglie presented a hypothesis which was to be the forerunner to hidden variables theory: at the quantum level, a 'matter wave' steered particles. Under the powerful influence of Neils Bohr, Louis De Broglie's matter wave was disregarded in favor of the 'Copenhagen Interpretation' championed by Bohr himself, and the Copenhagen interpretation became the de facto accepted theory of quantum mechanics. In 1932, John Von Neumann presented a supposed that no hidden variables theory could properly describe the quantum world. He was first shown to be wrong by Grete Hermann, but she was largely ignored do to Neumann's immense stature as a mathematician. Later in 1966, John Bell further established that the proof was flawed, and the hidden variables interpretation has since seen a renewal of interest amongst researchers. The model presented in this paper incorporates d-branes and Type I strings into a hidden variables quantum structure; this physical structure can be interpreted as both 10-dimensional and 11- dimensional, and is designated: the D-string.

Anil Ananthaswamy

Casey Blood

The linear mathematics of quantum mechanics gives many versions of reality instead of the single version we perceive, with the perceived version chosen at random according to a probability law. Because of these peculiarities, the theory requires an interpretation to be fully understood. Over 50 years ago, Everett proposed in his many-worlds interpretation that these characteristics could be accounted for if the mathematics itself, with no collapse or hidden variables, was carefully analyzed. We show this is incorrect; the linear mathematics cannot account for the probability law. Thus the many-worlds interpretation is not viable. Some mechanism, such as collapse or hidden variables, must be added to obtain a satisfactory understanding of the physical universe.

Wallace Arthur

László E. Szabó

According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support objective indeterminism, since the statistical laws of classical physics allow a deterministic hidden background, while --- as Arthur Fine writes polemizing with Grünbaum --- "{\sl the antilibertarian position finds little room to breathe in a statistical world if we take laws of the quantum theory as exemplars of the statistical laws in such a world. So, it appears that, contrary to what Grünbaum claims, the libertarians' 'could have done otherwise' does indeed find support from indeterminism if we take the indeterministic laws to be of the sort found in the quantum theory.}" In this paper I will show that, quite the contrary, quantum mechanics does not save free will. For instance, the EPR experiments are compatible with a deterministic world. They admit a deterministic local hidden parameter description if the deterministic model is 'allowed' to describe not only the measurement outcomes, but also the outcomes of the 'decisions' whether this or that measurement will be performed. So, the derivation of the freedom of the will from quantum mechanics is a tautology: from the assumption that the world is indeterministic it is derived that the world cannot be deterministic.

P. Teerikorpi, Mauri J. Valtonen, Kirsi M. Lehto +3 more